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Presidents of both parties defended libraries as allies of democracy for a century – until Trump

President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt stands with a Queens book bus in 1932. MCNY/Gottscho-Schleisner/Archive Photos via Getty Images

On March 31, 2026, President Donald Trump was asked about plans for his presidential library, the archive that presidents build to house their administration’s records.

His was most likely going to be a hotel, he said, with “a beautiful building underneath and a 747 Air Force One in the lobby.”

“I don’t believe in building libraries or museums,” he told reporters.

Trump’s comments reflect how he has diverged from the customary and expected presidential attitude toward libraries of all types. As an information science professor, I have analyzed statements by 17 presidents, beginning with Calvin Coolidge.

Combing their speeches, proclamations, messages and letters in the Public Papers of the Presidents, the American Presidency Project, the Federal Register and the American Library Association’s archives and publications, I have found that Trump has broken with a century-old tradition. Nearly all presidents of both parties since 1923 have described libraries, whether public, academic or presidential, as a prerequisite to a healthy democracy and as crucial to sustaining an informed citizenry.

Trump, however, has rarely spoken of libraries at all. When he has, he has dismissed them.

Libraries and democracy

In the 1920s, Republican Calvin Coolidge said that public libraries were “within the reach of almost everyone” and contained “the best books and authorities on any subject.” By using these institutions, he said, citizens could evaluate “current proposals for political improvement.”

Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt took up that theme as the U.S. edged toward World War II. In 1941, he opened his own presidential library, the first in what would become the National Archives’ system. At the dedication, FDR argued that libraries proliferated in democracies where citizens refuse to accept “so-called information as may be handed out to them by certain types of self-constituted leaders who decide what is best for them.”

The Cold War reinforced the emphasis on libraries as foundational to self-government.

Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower feared censorship during the Red Scare and urged a 1953 audience, “Don’t join the book burners.” He also set a precedent for federal library aid by signing the Library Services Act of 1956, which authorized up to US$7.5 million a year for developing public library services for rural Americans. Eisenhower’s successor, Democrat John F. Kennedy, likewise believed that “libraries should be open to all – except the censor.” Kennedy’s budgets continued funding public libraries.

In 1976, Democrat Jimmy Carter said libraries were fundamental to democracy and in 1980 he said they strengthened the First Amendment, which protects free speech, a free press and the free exercise of religion. Eight years later, Republican Ronald Reagan said that a free society “must prize its libraries just as it values its liberties.”

That view outlasted the Cold War, which ended in 1991.

In 1992, Republican George H.W. Bush said libraries provided the lifelong education each American needed “to remain a fully productive and fully participating citizen.” Campaigning for the Democratic Party’s nomination for president that same year, Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton argued that libraries’ provision of equal access to information helped safeguard democracy.

As president, Democrat Barack Obama said in 2009 that “an informed and educated citizenry is essential to the functioning of our modern democratic society” and said libraries “can help separate truth from fiction and signal from noise.” Democrat Joe Biden subsequently called library services “essential to the well-being, health, vitality, and democracy of our Nation” in a 2022 executive order.

While presidents from Eisenhower onward had tied libraries to the freedom to read, Obama and Biden carried that tradition into the fight over banning books, often by or about people of color or LGBTQ people, especially in school and public libraries.

“Freedom begins with our capacity to share and access ideas, even ideas we may disagree with or find deeply offensive,” former President Obama wrote during 2022’s Banned Books Week.

During National Library Week in 2023, Biden thanked librarians and vowed to “stand with teachers and parents against politicians who try to score political points by banning books.”

“In America, we do not ban books,” he declared in 2024.

A black-and-white photo of a man seated at a desk signing a document as a crowd of people in suits stands behind him.
President Lyndon Johnson signs a 1964 law expanding federal aid to libraries.
Cecil W. Stoughton/The American Library Association Archives

The break

One of Trump’s rare public comments on libraries came during his first term at a January 2019 Cabinet meeting. Complaining about U.S. allies’ contributions in Afghanistan, he ridiculed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for “constantly telling (him) he built a library in Afghanistan.”

“A library! That’s like five hours of what we spend,” Trump said. “Don’t know who’s using (a library) in Afghanistan.”

Since returning to office, Trump has taken a series of actions affecting libraries. Just days after his second inauguration, in 2025, the Department of Education eliminated its so-called “book ban coordinator” position. The Biden administration had appointed that coordinator in the Office for Civil Rights in 2023 to address book bans in schools and provide guidance on when removing books from school libraries might violate civil rights. The Trump administration rescinded that guidance, ending what it called “Biden’s book ban hoax.”

Like fellow Republicans Richard Nixon and Reagan, Trump asked Congress every year in his first term to eliminate federal library aid. Congress rejected each president’s requests.

In March 2025, however, Trump took an unprecedented step: He bypassed Congress altogether, signing an executive order to dismantle the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the chief federal funder of libraries and museums. Since 1996, the institute has run the library grant program that descended from the legislation that Eisenhower signed into law. A federal court blocked the order to dismantle the institute.

Two months later, Trump fired Librarian of Congress Carla Hayden, the first woman and first African American to hold the position. Asked why Hayden was fired, then-White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt pointed to “quite concerning things she had done at the Library of Congress in the pursuit of DEI and putting inappropriate books in the library for children.”

Hayden, for her part, had made the Library of Congress into what she called “a library for everyone,” winning a $15 million Mellon Foundation grant to bring underrepresented communities into its collections.

“We like to say as librarians, ‘Free people read freely,’” Hayden said after her dismissal. “There’s been an effort recently to quelch that.”

At the September 2026 Republican midterm convention, Trump again mentioned libraries, this time alleging that some Democratic candidates want “to put the books of Lenin … and Stalin in every library for all our young children to read and study.”

The Conversation

Alex H. Poole does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Open Channels FM: Look What Was Waiting Down Your List

And update on our feed.

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Open Channels FM: Mistral LeChonk, Open-Source Windows Tools, and Rethinking the Internet’s Platforms

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Political information increasingly comes from pop culture, outside of partisan silos but where male creators – and sometimes misogyny – dominate

Young people are increasingly likely to get political content from social media influencers and popular culture sources. Illustration JDawnInk/Getty Images Plus

Research on political polarization points to how people’s preferred news outlets and social media use create information silos, environments in which people primarily encounter views consistent with their own, further cementing those views.

But this research often omits an important source of political information: popular culture, from influencers and podcasts to comedy, television and movies.

Politics are intertwined with popular entertainment media. The current president is a former reality television star who was reelected in 2024 with the help of comedy podcasters like Joe Rogan. Blockbuster films such as “The Odyssey” spark controversy and turn into political footballs, while late-night talk show hosts must skirt the Trump administration’s regulatory ire with their politically oriented humor.

While we know a lot about the news-consumption habits of Republicans and Democrats, there is less data about the other places that people encounter political ideas. This is particularly true for younger people, who are increasingly likely to get political content from social media influencers and popular culture sources.

Political consultant Sarah Longwell of The Bulwark recently told The New York Times’ Ezra Klein that many people in her focus groups get political information from an “algorithm-driven information environment” populated by influencers, comedians and sports personalities. She noted that the “overlap between politics and culture” creates a “vibe” that shapes many people’s political decision-making.

As co-founders and research affiliates of Colorado State University’s Center for Democracy, Art, and Popular Culture, we conducted a survey that documents the pop culture preferences of Americans ages 18-49.

We wanted to know whether the siloing that has been observed in Americans’ news environments is replicated when younger Americans are consuming entertainment media that often contains political content.

It isn’t.

That matters, because popular influencers and entertainers who cross partisan boundaries have an increased ability to shape the political “vibe” discussed by Longwell. And an important finding from our survey is that many of the favorite creators and outlets ranked in the survey feature men and promote masculinity.

Favorite influencers and podcasts

Pop culture is the diverse collection of cultural productions consumed by members of a society: films, television series, video games, art, music, comedy and the like.

We asked 741 Americans to name their top influencers, podcasts, comedians, musicians, video games, films and television series. We examined results by age and political party.

Respondents first identified which pop culture outlets they engaged with and then shared their favorites in each content category. The answers were diffuse, but trends are evident in the top three listed by people across political affiliations.

Both the Democratic and Republican parties have turned to influencers to reach voters – particularly young voters – who “don’t consume traditional political news.”

In our survey’s lists of favorite influencers, three creators who rose to fame staging viral stunts, interviewing celebrities and playing video games on YouTube and the live streaming platform Twitch dominated the list: MrBeast was No. 1 for Democrats, Republicans and independents. Republicans and independents ranked Kai Cenat in their top three, while IShowSpeed was No. 2 for Democrats and Republicans.

A chart showing pictures of the top 3 favorite influencers by political party -- Republicans, Democrats and independents
The top three favorite influencers by political affiliation – Republicans, Democrats and independents.
Center for Democracy, Art, and Popular Culture

A similar pattern of the same names populating each list is evident in people’s favorite podcasts. “The Joe Rogan Experience” and “Call Her Daddy” were in all groups’ top three, while Republicans and independents also ranked the “Tucker Carlson Show” and “This Past Weekend with Theo Von.”

Joe Rogan and Theo Von are comedians turned podcasters, whereas Tucker Carlson rose to fame as a right-wing pundit. “Call Her Daddy” is an outlier on our list insofar as it is hosted by a woman, Alex Cooper, and is known for frank discussions of sex and relationships.

A chart showing pictures of the top three favorite podcasts by political party.
The top three favorite podcasts by political affiliation – Republicans, Democrats and independents.
Center for Democracy, Art, and Popular Culture

The website Campaigns & Elections reported that in 2024 half of all registered voters surveyed who listened to at least one podcast per month said that podcasts had some influence on their vote. The site reported that in the 2024 presidential election, those podcast listeners favored conservatives.

Our survey helps to explain why. Rogan, popular with all three groups, has long voiced libertarian ideas and platformed right-wing politicians. Von occupies a similar space, and Carlson is conservative. Both are favorites not just of Republicans but also independents.

Favorite comedians and video games

Political scientists and media scholars have demonstrated how comedy can influence politics. Our survey found considerable overlap among political partisans’ favorite comedians.

Dave Chappelle, creator of the boundary-breaking Comedy Central series “Chappelle’s Show,” topped the list for Democrats and Republicans and was the second favorite of independents. Bill Burr, known for comedy that is both cocky and aggrieved, was in the top three for Republicans and Democrats, while Shane Gillis, whose comedy The New York Times says “fits into the evolving meaning of conservatism,” was second and third for independents and Republicans.

A chart showing pictures of the top three favorite comedians by political party.
The top three favorite comedians by political affiliation – Republicans, Democrats and independents.
Center for Democracy, Art, and Popular Culture

Video games are another shared pop culture venue where Americans of different political affiliations are encountering one another as they play, via discussions with other players on Twitch and by participating in the comments sections of gameplay livestreams.

Researchers have demonstrated that young people, in particular, are exposed to diverse political views when engaging with one another in “online participatory activities that are non-political in nature.”

For example, one study examined how a viral trend of “building Trump’s wall” while playing Fortnite spurred political discussions both inside the game and in comments on gameplay videos and social media posts.

U.S. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez demonstrated the political power of the medium in 2020 when she livestreamed herself playing the game Among Us, an online, multiplayer deduction game similar to the popular party games Mafia and Werewolf. Ocasio-Cortez playing the game with U.S. Rep. Ilhan Omar and prominent gamers was billed as a get-out-the-vote effort and earned 4.5 million views.

In our survey of video games favored by people of different political affiliations, Call of Duty, Fortnite and Sims appeared on all three lists.

A chart showing pictures of the top three favorite video games by political party.
The top three favorite video games by political affiliation – Republicans, Democrats and independents.
Center for Democracy, Art, and Popular Culture

Our data suggests that these pop culture spaces are thus not partisan silos. But that doesn’t mean they are free of particular ideologies.

Manosphere vibes

Some of the most popular creators – Rogan, Von, Carlson and Gillis – appeal to, or helped construct, the manosphere, a loose collection of online communities that promote masculinity and often reflect misogynistic attitudes.

Burr’s comedy is not politically conservative. But The New York Times said that it “gives voice to the aggrieved confusion of the white heterosexual guy adrift.”

Chappelle is known for his satirical critiques of racism. But in his more recent Netflix stand-up specials, he voiced anti-trans sentiments that Mother Jones called “indistinguishable from, and grist for, the material of conservative streamers and right-wing edgelords.”

Our survey did not ask respondents why they preferred these influencers, podcasts, comedians and video games. Academic research has shown that pop culture audiences don’t passively accept every message a creator delivers. Nevertheless, the dominance of male creators and the prevalence of misogyny and transphobia in their humor and commentary is significant.

Whether convened online or in person, the groups that gather via popular culture do not fit into the partisan silos that have formed around news and social media outlets. That makes the gendered nature of these lists even more significant, because the manosphere vibes are not relegated to one side of the political spectrum.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Democrats are the unwitting beneficiaries of Trump’s immigration policies

A volunteer walks along the U.S.-Mexico border near Jacumba Hot Springs, Calif., on June 5, 2025. AP Photo/Gregory Bull

In a 2025 investigation, The New York Times reported that officials in President Joe Biden’s administration, in the wake of Biden’s 2020 election win, had viewed rising immigration as “a distraction” best ignored so that the administration could concentrate political resources on more important economic matters.

Scott Shuchart, a Biden appointee who joined the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency in 2022, told the newspaper that the White House was “wishing the problem would go away so that they could focus on the things they cared about.”

But two years after Donald Trump leveraged voter dissatisfaction with the Biden administration’s management of the U.S. southern border to win the 2024 election and enforce his immigration crackdown, the issue has suddenly become a secondary matter.

Amid the rising U.S. cost of living, a destabilizing war in Iran and a disrupted system of global commerce, the now-quiet border has relieved Democrats of their thorniest issue just in time for midterm elections.

From liability to advantage

For the past three decades, the Democratic Party and its candidates have struggled to develop and pass new immigration policies and communicate related political messages.

Bipartisan attempts at comprehensive immigration reform died on Capitol Hill in 2006, 2007 and 2013. Since then, a majority of Americans has trusted Republicans more with governing the issue. That has given the GOP an advantage when the salience of immigration policy has risen due to border crises and related high-profile events, even if that edge has recently narrowed.

In a February 2024 poll, 28% of U.S. respondents told Gallup that immigration was the country’s most important problem – matching the largest share since tracking began in 1981. By May 2026, that figure was 8%, a staggering drop in such a short period.

In a different poll by The Economist/YouGov, the share of U.S. registered voters who identified immigration as the country’s most important issue fell from 14% in October 2024 to 5% in September 2026.

Erik Iverson, a Republican Senate campaign pollster, recently told Axios that declining border crossings have reduced the urgency of immigration, depriving Republicans of an issue that previously energized voters and offered conservatives an advantage.

“You become a victim of your own success,” he said.

But this success is dubious. President Trump’s approval ratings on immigration are underwater.

In the RealClear Polling average from September to October 2026, his net approval was at negative 10.8%. In a recent Fox News poll, most Americans believe the Trump administration has “gone too far” in enforcing immigration laws, including 60% of independents.

Despite Republicans’ insistence that the mass removal of undocumented immigrants and a halt to new migrants would raise wages and make housing more accessible, Americans are experiencing high inflation rates, slow gross domestic product growth and sour consumer sentiment.

Two men wearing bulletproof vests overlook a line of passengers in an airport.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents patrol Terminal 1 at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York on March 27, 2026.
Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

Ominously for the White House, Trump’s negative 10.8% net approval score on immigration is actually among his best. On inflation, the economy and foreign policy, his net approval rating is at negative 42.8%, negative 31.7% and negative 27.8%, respectively.

These dynamics bode well for Democrats’ midterm election prospects.

Republicans are now less concerned about immigration – what has been their greatest source of political energy and the left’s greatest political liability – as both parties’ voters are focused on other matters.

Despite the White House’s aggressive and frequently violent pursuit of undocumented immigrants, its proposal to end birthright citizenship, and its near closure of U.S. borders, even Democrats are no more likely to identify immigration as the country’s top issue today than they were previously.

According to The Economist/YouGov polling cited earlier, 1% of Democrats named immigration as their top issue in September 2026. In October 2024, 3% said the same.

Remarkably, without Democrats’ endorsement of a single new immigration policy idea, independents now express greater trust in Democrats than Republicans on immigration, 41% to 27%, according to a September 2026 Marist survey.

Democrats’ trial and error

Democrats’ sudden edge arises after a decade of trialing different approaches to counter the nativism and popular discomfort that Trump has harnessed.

Before Trump’s 2016 election victory and immediately thereafter, Democratic leaders sought to ameliorate the image of foreigners in the U.S., by highlighting that immigrants start more businesses, file more patents and commit fewer crimes than native-born U.S. citizens on average.

Gates at a border crossing bridge are painted with U.S. and Texas flags.
The Eagle Pass 1 International Bridge at the U.S.-Mexico border is pictured in Eagle Pass, Texas, on Feb. 18, 2026.
Ronaldo Schemidt/AFP via Getty Images

During this period, Democrats commonly cited immigrants’ acute vulnerability and their willingness and ability to fill critical low-skilled and high-skilled labor gaps. But the praise and pity produced resentment among many Americans who did not want an admissions system that elevated foreigners to a higher pedestal.

Toward the end of the first Trump administration, Democrats
began citing
the immense macroeconomic and fiscal benefits driven by immigrants’ long-term settlement in the U.S.

Economists attribute to immigrants the bulk of U.S. population growth from 1990 to 2015. And economists have shown that continued immigration mitigates inflation and extends the solvency of Social Security and Medicare funds. Immigration also provides workers for industries like construction, agriculture, food production and healthcare.

However, the benefits of these relationships for average voters tend to be diffuse and realized in the medium-to-long run. That makes them hard to recognize.

After the global pandemic halted most human mobility in 2020, the Biden administration sought to avoid the immigration issue altogether. It’s a strategy that Democrats have now carried over while the dynamics of being out of power still permit doing so.

No mandate for inaction

Should Democrats win majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives in 2026, the issue of immigration is highly unlikely to be resolved. As a matter of constitutional oversight, Democrats plan to commence investigations into the Trump administration’s abusive immigration enforcement tactics, questionable case adjudication and alleged corruption.

It will be almost impossible to pass meaningful immigration legislation in such an environment.

The Biden-era approach was a pivotal electoral liability in 2024. And the Obama administration’s series of immigration executive actions instigated a tennis match of such orders between subsequent administrations ever since.

Democrats will soon feel some pressure to develop bipartisan approaches to immigration governance that ensure order at U.S. borders and a strategy for immigrant selection and integration that is designed with the national interest in mind.

Anything less, and the dysfunctional system – with its massive political risks – will return.

The Conversation

Justin Gest is affiliated with The Niskanen Center, The Aspen Institute España, America’s Competitive Edge (ACE) Initiative, and the Migrant Rights Initiative at Cornell Law School.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Federal policy helped widen rural America’s fresh food gap, but a 90-year-old law could help close it

A defunct grocery store in New Mexico in 2020. Brian van der Brug/Los Angeles Times via Getty Images

When picking up groceries requires a two-hour round trip, fresh produce can become a luxury. As a food systems researcher, I see this tension firsthand: People need fresh food to be healthy, but rural regions increasingly lack access to it.

Food insecurity among rural households increased from 12% in 2019 to nearly 16% in 2024, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Low income plays a part, but so too do supply chain logistics. Delivering groceries to rural areas costs distributors more, leading to higher prices and less access for rural consumers.

Perishable foods – produce, meat and dairy – travel in refrigerated trucks, making them among the most expensive products to distribute. Rural routes add further costs. Small stores order less and rarely fill a truck on their own, meaning distributors either run long, multi-stop routes, or they send trucks out and back partly empty. Either way, delivery costs increase.

Because of this, many national supply chains don’t prioritize rural communities. But this wasn’t always the case. Since the 1970s, deregulation, supply chain privatization and resulting concentration have skewed food distribution and left rural America behind.

Today, as grocery chains grow larger, rural access to produce, meat, dairy and prepared foods is decreasing. My colleagues and I analyzed the delivery of perishable foods and found that national distributors are underserving seven states when it comes to refrigerated meat, dairy and other prepared foods.

Regulation

In 1935, the Motor Carrier Act required licensed trucking companies to serve specific regions, so carriers served rural and urban routes alike, ensuring that publicly financed roads were serving public needs. In exchange for a regional operating license, companies offset unprofitable rural service with the high margins they made on profitable city-to-city routes, integrating rural communities into their supply chains.

The following year, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited wholesale suppliers from favoring large grocers with better prices, advertising or other exclusive deals, discouraging retailers from getting bigger to get better deals.

Together, the two laws strengthened regional economies and held national distribution in check. This protected rural grocers from big grocery chains and split distribution costs between urban and rural communities. As a result, a small-town grocer in 1950 had access to much the same products as a city grocer in the same region.

Deregulation

Though Robinson-Patman is still on the books, enforcement waned in the 1970s as the growing influence of Chicago School economists led a shift toward deregulation. Grocery companies accelerated consolidation, gaining control of supply chains by accumulating massive buying power.

In 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed a new Motor Carrier Act, removing the requirement that trucking companies serve specific regions. Once carriers could choose their routes, service to rural regions declined, as companies began to prioritize more profitable urban routes.

Over time, the dismantling and neglect of these regulatory fail-safes jacked up rural food distribution costs and allowed big grocers to get even bigger. Chains gained access to wholesale discounts that independents didn’t have, affecting smaller grocers and generations of rural Americans.

A white semi-truck pulling a white trailer drives down a highway, with hills in the background.
Long routes with many stops make rural deliveries costly for distributors.
THEPALMER/E+ via Getty Images

Information is power

These two policy shifts were amplified in the 1990s as chain stores started to use point-of-sale data like checkout and loyalty-program records. Large companies had the resources to collect data on purchasing preferences over whole geographic regions, while local businesses did not. Chains began to use early forms of artificial intelligence to find patterns in big datasets, giving bigger companies yet another competitive advantage over small ones.

As AI-powered data became more sophisticated, businesses with the means adopted new technology to improve trucking logistics that optimize for high-density, high-margin urban corridors. This has pushed independent grocers further to the margins.

Mapping the gaps

My colleagues and I use USDA and Department of Transportation databases and AI models to explore rural food access. We found that national distributors are underserving West Virginia, Arizona, Texas, Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota and Montana when it comes to refrigerated meat, dairy and other prepared foods.

To trace produce in particular, we focused on Wisconsin, using proprietary data from Transearch, a tool that transportation planners use to track interstate commerce. In most Wisconsin counties, national distributors delivered less than 9.2 pounds (4.2 kilograms) of leafy greens per person annually, or less than a third of the 30 to 35 pounds (14 to 16 kilograms) of leafy greens a typical American eats in a year. By contrast, urban counties around Milwaukee and Madison received 19 to 37 pounds (9 to 17 kilograms) per person annually.

Interviews with grocers, distributors and food pantry volunteers across 13 northern Wisconsin counties helped illustrate why.

Federal safety rules cap truckers at 11 hours behind the wheel, so a distant delivery might fit in a shift only if the truck has one stop to make. “But to be profitable, we need multiple stops on the truck,” one distributor said. “That’s why a lot of those really far-out stores, we’re not really interested in.”

Working to fill this gap, independent retailers operate more than half of rural grocery stores, providing 38% of food sales. To alleviate the supply chain cost burden, some rural grocers have joined or formed distribution co-ops they own and govern.

But co-ops alone won’t fix the underlying problem.

One grocer told our team that two cooperative distributors – which had served smaller, independent grocers – merged and were bought out by a private equity firm. Eventually, Kroger – one of the country’s largest integrated grocery chains – bought the distribution network and stopped supplying independent stores, serving only those it owned. It also focused on more profitable urban locations, opening new stores in high-growth markets.

This reduced competition in rural food distribution.

Reviving enforcement

During the Biden administration, the Federal Trade Commission revived enforcement of the long-dormant 1936 Robinson-Patman Act and other antitrust laws meant to protect independent businesses from a few big companies controlling the market.

The FTC sued to block a merger between Kroger and Albertsons, two of the country’s largest grocery chains. It also sued distributor Southern Glazer’s for allegedly giving deep discounts to national chain stores, including Kroger, and PepsiCo for allegedly giving a large retailer deals that smaller ones didn’t get.

In May 2025, under the Trump administration, the FTC dropped the PepsiCo case, citing partisanship. But in October 2026, it settled its case against Southern Glazer’s in a deal the agency said would make it easier for small businesses to compete with large chains.

In my assessment, enforcing Robinson-Patman and other laws would discourage discriminatory pricing that gives chains an advantage over smaller rural stores.

Taking a fresh look at food distribution policies – like the Motor Carrier Act and public utility policies – could also level the playing field. For example, including rural delivery as a licensing requirement again could improve rural food access.

What now?

In 2025, the Trump administration announced that it would no longer collect food security data, without which food systems researchers will struggle to know whether conditions in rural America improved or worsened in 2026. Meanwhile, public funding to monitor food systems continues its decline.

Though rural distribution remains a challenge globally, other countries are making inroads: In June 2026, Canada announced a 10-year food security strategy worth 3.2 billion Canadian dollars, including aid to independent grocers, refrigerated warehouses and open wholesale marketplaces where farmers can sell their produce.

Large regions of the U.S. would benefit from the same.

The Conversation

Michelle Miller receives funding from the United States Department of Agriculture, and the State of Wisconsin. She is affiliated with Wisconsin Farmers Union and Warehouses 4 Good.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Israel has voted, but what comes next? Dissecting a messy ballot and coalition-building process

Gadi Eisenkot or Benjamin Netanyahu – under whose direction will Israel head? Erik Marmor/picture alliance via Getty Images

The Israeli election of Oct. 27, 2026, was among the most highly anticipated votes in the country’s history. It was consequential, if not yet conclusive.

With nearly all the votes counted, it is still unclear who will lead the country following the first national ballot since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack, and the devastating wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran that Israel has launched since.

The Conversation turned to Dov Waxman, an expert on Israeli politics at the University of California, Los Angeles, to walk us through the main takeaways and the process and difficulties facing anyone trying to form a coalition government following a divided vote.

What can we take away from the election results?

The first thing to note is simply the massive turnout – with a 77.7% turnout of those eligible voting, the highest turnout in more than two decades. That in itself is significant. It underscores how much importance Israelis attached to this vote.

Before the election, many observers were saying that it was one of the most consequential – if not the most consequential – votes, and clearly many Israelis felt the same way.

What drove this high turnout was different types of fears. Israelis of all persuasions were worried about how the outcome would affect what kind of country Israel becomes.

The second big takeaway is that the ruling coalition, formed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the 2022 election, was resoundingly rejected by the majority of Israeli voters – well over 50% cast their vote for parties opposed to the current government.

A man in a white hat takes a picture of someone on a stage.
Likud supporters at an election night event in Jerusalem, Israel.
Alexi J. Rosenfeld/Getty Images

The five parties that make up Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious coalition went into the election with 68 seats in the 120-seat parliament. That same bloc will now have 53 – and that is a significant loss, no matter how Netanyahu tries to spin this as a victory.

It means that those five parties will not be able to form the next government, and as such, the vote stands as a repudiation of the Netanyahu government.

Netanyahu’s Likud party will still be the largest in parliament. But its share of the national vote declined, and it looks like it will have six fewer seats in the next parliament, another blow to Netanyahu.

Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners fared worse than expected, too. In part, this was due to “wasted votes” going to a new far-right party that failed to make it above the 3.25% of the national vote needed to be represented in parliament. Also, Likud drew some voters away from these far-right parties who had voted for them in the last election.

What drove the Arab parties’ surprise showing?

The performance of the Arab majority parties – the more secular and left-wing Joint List and the more religious and conservative United Arab List – is very important.

Combined, they currently look to have increased their representation by nine seats, bringing their total to 19, a historic high for them.

The reason for that is the massive turnout of Arab voters – much higher than the last election. But also, a less noticed trend is the increase in Jewish votes that those parties received. It is important to note that these are Arab-majority parties, not simply Arab parties.

Protesters hold placards and a loudspeaker.
Israeli left-wing protesters call for the formation of a government including Arab parties.
Ilia Yefimovich/AFP via Getty Images

Aside from Netanyahu, it was also a disappointing result for the main opposition party, Yashar; its leader, Gadi Eisenkot; and the anti-Netanyahu Change Bloc it was part of. The preelection polls suggested that the Zionist opposition bloc would do slightly better than the ruling coalition bloc.

But Yashar ended up with over 200,000 fewer votes than Likud, winning a projected 21 seats compared to Likud’s 26, and the “Change Bloc” is heading to 48 seats, far short of a parliamentary majority.

Ultimately, what is clear is that the Israeli public remains deeply divided. And the fact that there is still a good chance that Netanyahu will emerge as prime minister is remarkable given that many observers had already written his political obituary after the Oct. 7 attack.

Was the vote a referendum on Netanyahu?

Certainly many saw this as a referendum on Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister.

For his supporters, Netanyahu is the only person to be trusted with Israel’s security, especially given the threat from Iran. They credit him for weakening – albeit not defeating – the two non-state actors that most threaten Israeli security, Hezbollah and Hamas, and they praise him for ensuring President Donald Trump’s support for Israel.

But for those who voted against Netanyahu, the fact that he has refused to take any personal responsibility for the Oct. 7 security failure – amid reports that he had advance warning of a major planned Hamas attack – factored into his poor election showing, as did his government’s refusal to establish a state commission of inquiry to investigate the Oct. 7 security failings.

Many also blame Netanyahu for not prioritizing the release of the Israeli hostages held in Gaza and prolonging the war there. He is also held responsible by many for the precipitous decline in Israel’s international standing and for jeopardizing Israel’s crucial alliance with the United States.

But it was domestic issues, rather than external ones, that motivated many of those who voted for anti-Netanyahu parties. Many fear that democracy in Israel is under attack, and they particularly oppose the effort by Netanyahu’s government to weaken the power and independence of the Israeli judiciary, which sparked massive street protests in 2023. They also strongly resent that Netanyahu’s government has allowed ultra-Orthodox men to avoid military service, despite the Israeli military’s growing manpower shortage. And on a personal level, Netanyahu is widely perceived as self-serving and dishonest – he is still on trial for corruption.

Arab voters have other, more specific concerns that drove them to vote in record numbers, in addition to the Netanyahu government’s policies in Gaza and the West Bank, which they strongly oppose. Chief among them is the soaring rates of violent crime in their communities, which the government – particularly the far-right Itamar Ben-Gvir, who oversees the police – has done nothing to address, say his critics. More broadly, many Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel fear that if the far-right parties remained in power, their civil rights would be under threat.

What should we expect next?

The key thing to underline is what happens on election day in Israel is just the first stage in the process of forming a new government. Since no party ever receives a majority of seats in the parliament, what really matters is what happens after the election when the coalition building begins. This can take weeks, if not longer.

The party with the largest number of seats typically gets the first chance to assemble a governing coalition, but not always. Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, will choose who gets the first chance to form a government based on who is most likely to succeed.

Right now, it looks like Eisenkot will get the first opportunity, but his only real option is to form a minority government that would depend on the parliamentary support of the Arab-majority parties – which some members of his Change Bloc adamantly oppose.

A man waves a large blue and white flag.
Former Israeli military chief and Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot waves an Israeli flag as he addresses supporters on Oct. 28, 2026.
Tomer Neuberg/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

Despite the success of the Arab-majority parties in the election, it is unlikely they will be invited to be formal members of any coalition – although that has happened once in the past, when the United Arab List joined the short-lived government of 2021-22 led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid.

If Eisenkot is unable to form a government, then Netanyahu will get the chance. He could try to entice some leaders of the parties in the Change bloc to defect and join a right-wing government under his leadership, or a broader “national unity” government with a rotating leader. Netanyahu did that in the past with Benny Gantz, but then he later prevented Gantz from becoming prime minister – so I doubt Eisenkot would agree to do this with Netanyahu.

There are reports in the media that the Trump administration would like a national unity government in Israel, so that might increase the pressure on Eisenkot to accept this outcome. And should war with Iran heat up again, that would increase the pressure.

The most likely scenario, I believe, is that neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot will be able to form a government, and a new election will be called, with Netanyahu as caretaker prime minister until that vote. Netanyahu has reason to hope that his bloc will do better in another election, so that may well be his game plan. In which case, it will be many months until Israel has a new government.

The Conversation

Dov Waxman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation