Category: Uncategorized

Multiple women told The New York Times that Mexican American civil rights hero Cesar Chavez assaulted them decades ago, including when some were just girls, one as young as 13. Over their multiyear investigation, published on March 18, 2026, journalists at the paper found “extensive evidence” of that abuse by poring over historical records and conducting interviews with more than 60 people.

While yearslong investigations into abuse allegations are rare, silence about abuse is common.

As a clinical psychologist who studies interpersonal trauma, I’ve seen how the dynamics of abuse can lead to silence, even over decades.

This research can help answer the question many asked when they heard about the charges against Chavez: Why didn’t the women speak earlier?

Power and trust betrayed

Among the women who disclosed abuse by Chavez, Dolores Huerta described seeing him “as my boss, as my hero, as, you know, somebody that would do the impossible.” Debra Rojas said, “I had love for him … He did his grooming very well.”

When perpetrators abuse those who trust and depend on them, the betrayal adds to the harm of trauma. Betrayal trauma theory helps explain why.

Victims who depend on the people abusing them face extraordinary pressure to minimize what is happening. Disclosure can mean losing relationships or resources that are necessary for survival. Children abused by caregivers or community leaders risk relationships that they need to get their basic needs met. Adults who disclose abuse or harassment by employers risk losing their jobs and economic security.

Adding to the harm of abuse, perpetrators commonly twist reality to keep victims silent. They might directly instruct victims not to tell others what happened. They might also tell victims that they are actually the ones to blame for causing the abuse or that no one will believe them.

Victims must adapt to this untenable situation in which they depend on the very people causing harm.

For some people, betrayal results in dissociation symptoms and memory impairment for what happened. Dissociation is a common response to traumatic stress that can include amnesia, feelings that things are unreal or feeling disconnected from what is happening. Dissociation and memory impairment can help victims maintain necessary attachments in the short run.

Betrayal also contributes to more shame and self-blame, as well as more severe psychological and physical health problems.

Shame and self-blame can make it harder to disclose what happened. Not surprising, then, victims of high-betrayal traumas are less likely to disclose what happened relative to other kinds of traumas.

When betrayal-trauma survivors do speak up, delayed disclosures can be met with blame or disbelief, even from health providers. Survivors with more severe psychological symptoms are also met with more negative reactions to their disclosures.

Betrayal also makes escaping abusive relationships, including physically violent ones, difficult. Greater dependence on the perpetrator has been linked with a greater likelihood of staying with an abusive partner a year after a police report of domestic violence.

Cultural and institutional betrayal add to harm

Women told The New York Times that they stayed silent about their abuse, which for some began when they were girls, in part “for fear of tarnishing the image of a man who has become the face of the Latino civil rights movement.”

When people in marginalized groups are abused by someone from the same group, that constitutes an additional wound. Dr. Jennifer Gómez described this as “cultural betrayal trauma.”

With cultural betrayal trauma comes even greater pressure to stay silent as well as greater harm from the abuse.

When institutions such as churches, schools or unions fail to stop abuse or respond appropriately, that institutional betrayal can also add to the harm caused by the original abuse. In turn, institutional betrayal predicts greater dissociation and health problems, adding to the burden of abuse.

Anticipating disbelief and blame

Ana Murguia told The New York Times that she believed she would be blamed for the abuse.

Huerta, who was one of three co-founders, along with Chavez, of what ultimately became the United Farm Workers union, told the newspaper that she “feared that no one within the union would believe her.”

Anticipating disbelief and blame affects decisions to disclose. When researchers asked college women who were sexually victimized at some point in their lives why they kept what happened to themselves, they heard four common reasons. Women kept assaults private because they felt shame, guilt or embarrassment, minimized what happened, feared consequences of disclosing or wanted privacy.

Fears about negative reactions are unfortunately well founded. Research shows that when victims do disclose, victim blaming and other negative reactions are common. In turn, those negative social reactions add to psychological distress and the harm of abuse.

Connection and courage: Antidotes to betrayal

In the wake of the harm that betrayal trauma causes, healing is possible through connection and care.

Research shows that people can learn to respond in better ways to disclosures of abuse, such as connecting people to resources and expressing empathy. In addition, institutions that act with courage in the wake of abuse, such as by making it easy to report or taking actions to prevent future abuse, can help reduce harm to survivors.

When survivors disclose, avoiding blame, disbelief and other negative reactions can minimize additional harm. Taking steps to offer emotional support and resources can even help open doors.

That’s what my research team found when we asked sexual assault survivors about the reactions they received from service providers, such as counselors or victim advocates. When survivors received more tangible support, they were more likely to later disclose what happened in a formal report to the police.

Anne P. DePrince has received funding from the Department of Justice, National Institutes of Health, State of Colorado, and University of Denver. She has received honoraria for giving presentations and has been paid as a consultant. She has a book with Oxford University Press. She is an Advisory Group Member of the National Crime Victim Law Institute and a Senior Advisor to the Center for Institutional Courage.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

In 2024, Donald Trump dramatically improved his performance among nearly all groups of voters from four years earlier. Trump’s growth among Hispanic voters was especially notable, increasing by more than 10 points from 2020 to 2024, at least according to exit polls.

This led to a considerable amount of commentary speculating that Hispanic voters, historically more supportive of Democrats, might continue shifting toward the GOP.

News reports suggesting Latinos were critical to Trump’s 2024 victory were, in our view, overblown. Even if Latinos had not shifted, Trump still would have won in 2024.

Yet there is no question that over the past three election cycles, Latino voters – Latino men under 40, in particular – have shifted right. That change has benefited GOP candidates, even as the majority of Latinos still voted for Democrats.

However, evidence from general elections in 2025 in places such as New Jersey, New York and Virginia, as well as special elections in 2026, suggest an abrupt correction is underway, with some of the Latino voters who backed Trump now swinging back to the Democrats.

As political scientists and pollsters who study Hispanic voting trends, we are concerned with the question of whether these latest movements are real or simply a function of fluctuating Latino Democratic turnout rates. In other words, are Latinos broadly changing their votes back to Democrats, or are Latinos who remained loyal to the Democrats now more angry and fired up?

Survey and election data suggest it’s a bit of both. So what does this portend for the future of American politics?

Latino voting trends

The history of the Latino vote nationwide had for decades been one of long-term stability. Historically, Democrats enjoyed an approximate 65% to 35% advantage over Republicans.

That advantage shrank marginally after Republican President Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, providing a path to citizenship for millions. But the more familiar two-thirds advantage for the Democratic Party returned following passage of Proposition 187, a 1994 anti-immigrant initiative in California that ultimately mobilized Latinos against Republicans.

Another effort at GOP outreach to Hispanic voters culminated in President George W. Bush taking approximately 40% of the Latino vote in 2004. That growth, however, soon eroded in the wake of anti-immigrant legislation passed by the Republican-controlled House in 2005 and 2006.

The successful campaigns of Democrat Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, as well as Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful 2016 campaign against Trump, saw Democrats reaping a relatively high level of Latino support, peaking at a 3-to-1 advantage in 2012.

That made Trump’s improvements among Latinos in 2020 and 2024 feel, for some, particularly unexpected. He lodged notable breakthroughs in parts of Florida, where he carried Miami-Dade County, and Texas, where he flipped the historically Democratic Rio Grande Valley.

Some Latinos question whether Democrats have delivered

It should not have been such a surprise. There has been a history of sizable shares of Latinos supporting Republican candidates. For instance, both former President George W. Bush and his brother, former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, performed well with Latinos in Texas and Florida.

For two decades, Democrats have campaigned among Latinos on the promise of comprehensive immigration reform and an economic policy that would level the playing field, including raising the federal minimum wage, providing universal pre-K education and promoting affordable housing.

Many Latinos feel they are still waiting for these Democratic policies to be enacted, let alone improve their lives.

Democratic trifectas in 2009-10 and 2021-22 – when the party held both chambers of Congress, along with the presidency – failed to produce meaningful movement on immigration policy. Many Latinos felt their daily lives had not improved, as they faced high costs of living, expensive housing markets and rising health care costs. While House Democrats did pass numerous bills to address these topics, Senate moderates proved difficult to persuade.

Given these shortcomings, running on the message that “the GOP are bad guys” only gets Democrats so far. In 2024, surveys and focus groups of Hispanic voters made it clear that not everyone was convinced by this characterization. The frustrations of working-class families during the Biden administration were real, whereas fears of mass deportations and other social chaos that a second Trump term might portend were, at that point, conjecture.

The Trump campaign specifically promised widespread action against immigrants, but many of our Latino focus group participants felt this was bluster. They believed that Trump’s actions would be targeted against blatant criminals and that his policies would not affect their families and friends.

They did not believe the worst-case scenarios presented by Vice President Kamala Harris and other Democrats during the campaign. Despite often not liking Trump, his economic promises felt good during the 2024 affordability crisis.

Latinos shifting back left?

Many Latinos are now quite upset with Trump. The 2025 gubernatorial elections in New Jersey and Virginia point to dramatic 25-point changes in the Latino vote in the Democrats’ direction, compared with Trump’s 2024 performance.

In December 2025, the first Democrat was elected mayor of Miami since 1997, with Latino support. A Democrat won a heavily Republican state legislative district in Texas in February 2026 with an estimated 79% of the Latino vote. Most recently, Latino voter turnout surged to record levels in the March Democratic primary in Texas.

Majorities of Latino voters believe that their economic fortunes have declined since Trump returned to the White House. Moreover, they expect the situation to worsen over the next year. In March 2026, The Economist reported that Trump’s support among Latinos had fallen to 22%.

In a bipartisan poll by UnidosUS released in November 2025, only 14% of Latino voters said their lives were better after one year under Trump, while 39% said they had gotten worse. Looking ahead, 50% expected things to get worse still in 2026, while only 20% were optimistic about their economic future. Two-thirds of Latino voters felt that Trump and the Republicans were not focusing enough on improving the economy for people like them.

What’s more, mass deportations have happened under the second Trump administration. The vast majority of those detained for deportation, including those who have died, had no criminal record.

Latinos are overwhelmingly opposed to federal troops in U.S. cities, according to our polling; 41% fear legal residents and U.S. citizens getting caught up in enforcement actions. The No. 1 immigration concern for Latino voters remains a path to citizenship for Dreamers – the undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children – and for immigrants who have worked and paid taxes in the country for more than 20 years but lack formal status.

Among Latinos who actually voted for Trump, many would not do so again. Our poll suggests that 22% of Latinos who voted for Trump in 2024 would not vote for him again. By contrast, Democrats retain support from 93% of their 2024 Latino voters.

The long-term effects of the Trump presidency on the Latino electorate are difficult to predict, but for now party preferences have shifted firmly back toward the Democrats. Among voters in the UnidosUS poll, 55% said they felt the Democrats “care a great deal” about Latinos, compared with 29% saying they felt that way about the GOP. At the same time, 33% of Latino voters see the GOP as “hostile,” compared with just 7% who believe this about the Democrats.

If the recent leftward shift is sustained, or the earlier shift to the right was illusory, the effects on the politics of 2026 could be large, potentially putting control of Congress in the hands of Latino voters. There are 46 House districts where the number of registered voters who are Latino exceeds the total margin of victory for those seats in 2024, with 23 currently held by Republicans and 23 currently held by Democrats.

Latino voters need to believe that politicians truly care about their concerns and will work to implement a plan to create equal opportunities for the nation’s largest minority group to achieve the American dream. We believe the candidates able to make that pitch convincingly will be the most successful.

Matt A. Barreto is principal and co-founder of the polling firm BSP Research. BSP Research has conducted polling for non-profit and advocacy organizations, businesses, and candidates. Barreto has, in the past, directly consulted with Democratic candidates for House, Senate and the presidency.

Gary M. Segura is principal and co-founder of the polling firm BSP Research. BSP Research has conducted polling for non-profit and advocacy organizations, businesses, and candidates. Segura has, in the past, directly consulted with Democratic candidates for House, Senate and the presidency.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

For generations, most Americans knew – and maybe believed – a story about upholstery seamstress Betsy Ross and the making of the nation’s first flag.

In the account passed down through her family, Ross was a young Philadelphia widow when George Washington and a congressional committee asked her to make a flag for the Colonies uniting in rebellion against England.

A sketch showed what they envisioned: red and white stripes and a constellation of six-pointed stars across a blue field.

But, the story continues, Ross folded a piece of paper “just so,” made a single cut, and voila! She produced a perfect five-pointed star. The men approved, she stitched a flag, Congress cheered and history was made.

As a historian of early American craftswomen, including Ross, I have often seen how mythologies – history’s sound bites – can bury richer and deeper understandings of the past. That’s the case with Betsy Ross, whose story was never about designing one flag but about producing many – and being one of thousands of women whose labor was essential to the nation’s origins.

Making of a legend

In 1870, Ross’ grandson William J. Canby recounted the family’s story about Betsy Ross and the making of the first flag in a speech to the Pennsylvania Historical Society. Historians and members of the public greeted the tale with skepticism.

Canby’s best efforts notwithstanding, no archival evidence then – or since – has confirmed that Ross fabricated the first U.S. flag.

Still, the story gained traction. For a long while, Ross was a popular historical figure in U.S. culture, up there with the likes of Martha Washington and Abigail Adams. One of the earliest biopics imagined her life story, and her name graced everything from dolls to decanters. Over time, thousands of people began visiting her supposed home at 239 Arch St. in the Old City neighborhood of Philadelphia. The landmark is preserved as a house museum.

As late as the 1980s, history professor Michael Frisch reported that “college students asked to name any person from pre–Civil War America who is not a politician or military figure” included Ross “year after year.”

But in the years following the 1976 U.S. bicentennial, Ross’ fame was already cresting. Today many Americans aren’t entirely sure whether she was real or fictional.

Widow turned aspiring government contractor

Elizabeth Griscom Ross was indeed real. She was an upholstery worker who lived in Philadelphia from the 1750s to the 1830s. While no written record confirms the flag story, ample evidence survives to document the successful multigenerational flagmaking enterprise that she launched and then sustained with her daughter and granddaughters.

According to an oral history recorded with Ross’ youngest daughter, sometime in the 1760s a young Elizabeth Griscom, who was born in 1752, joined a sister employed by Philadelphia upholsterer John Webster. Ross learned the craft of upholstery as well as the making of tassels and fringe from Ann King, who oversaw women’s work there.

Ross married upholstery apprentice John Ross in 1773, and the pair launched a small shop. John died in January 1776. Ross’ second husband, mariner Joseph Ashburn, served the Revolution as a privateer and died in an English prison. In 1783, another privateer, John Claypoole, became Ross’ third husband, and the couple raised a large family and lived full lives in the city.

My take on the legend’s veracity is that it is partly accurate, partly not, and there isn’t really any “first” flag.

What is certainly true is this: Ross found herself widowed in 1776 just as Philadelphia braced for British forces, an effort that required the building of a navy and new flags representing the Americans. Women all around the seaport were getting contracts to stitch flags, and Ross surely wanted in.

The “Did she or didn’t she sew the ‘first flag’?” question is usually framed as a story of design, but it’s not: It’s a story of production.

Ross, drawing on years of experience, was saying to these potential clients, “If you want a lot of these flags, and fast, five-pointed stars work better.”

Women’s massive wartime effort

When Betsy Ross told this story later to her children and grandchildren, at the heart of the story is a young craftswoman who met the “Father of Our Country” – and believed she taught him something.

Understanding Ross’ real life is important because her story offers a view of women’s massive wartime production of flags, uniforms, tents, knapsacks and more – and because of the deep pride she and women like her felt in their contributions to the independence movement.

Hundreds of Philadelphia women – including, briefly, Ross – manufactured ordnance for the Schuylkill arsenal. White, Black, Indigenous, enslaved and free women provided labor in the form of nursing, cooking, and making and maintaining clothes that was essential to military encampments. Women shaped diplomacy directly, especially among Indigenous peoples, and indirectly as they shared their perspectives with husbands, fathers and sons. They also managed affairs for absent family and stretched scarce resources to sustain wartime households.

Whatever she did or did not offer to the making of the first U.S. flag, Elizabeth Griscom Ross Ashburn Claypoole certainly enjoyed a long career in flagmaking.

The best documentation for this came just before the War of 1812. When Purveyor of public supplies Tench Coxe needed flags, he steered contracts to the onetime Elizabeth Ross, now known as Elizabeth Claypoole. In 1808, for instance, Coxe recorded that yards of blue fabric were en route to her; weeks later, the craftswoman submitted a bill for two garrison flags, two silk flags and seven regimental colors.

In 1810, she was contracted for six 18-by-24-foot garrison flags for a military installation at New Orleans. These flags unfolded to 432 square feet and required more than 100,000 stitches. They must have been well received because another order followed, for 46 garrison flags, which she was to deliver “with all dispatch” to the arsenal. Orders also came in from the Indian Department to produce dozens of flags used in diplomatic exchanges with Native nations.

By the time the U.S. went to war with England a second time in 1812, flags by Elizabeth Claypoole, aka “Betsy Ross,” flew all around the United States.

Over her long career, Betsy Ross produced an unknown number of flags – the hundred or so recorded in archival sources represent a fraction of her total output. As the U.S. observes the 250th anniversary of its independence, Ross’ real life – today fully interpreted by the dedicated staff of the Betsy Ross House – offers a view into the lives of working women across America whose wartime labor helped build a nation.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

Marla Miller receives funding from the National Park Service as a consultant providing expertise on women and the the American Revolution.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Wars are rarely lost first on the battlefield. They are lost in leaders’ minds − when leaders misread what they and their adversaries can do, when their confidence substitutes for comprehension, and when the last war is mistaken for the next one.

The Trump administration’s miscalculation of Iran is not an anomaly. It is the latest entry in one of the oldest and most lethal traditions in international politics: the catastrophic gap between what leaders believe going in and what war actually delivers.

I’m a scholar of international security, civil wars and U.S. foreign policy, and author of the book “Dying by the Sword,” which examines why the United States repeatedly reaches for military solutions and why such interventions rarely produce durable peace. The deeper problem with the U.S. war in Iran, as I see it, was overconfidence bred by recent success.

Dismissed concerns

Before the conflict involving Iran, Israel and the U.S. escalated, Energy Secretary Chris Wright dismissed concerns about oil market disruption, noting that prices had barely moved during the 12-day war in June 2025 between Israel and Iran. Other senior officials agreed.

What followed was significant: Iranian-aimed missile and drone barrages against U.S. bases, Arab capitals and Israeli population centers. Then Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply passes daily − not with a naval blockade, not with mines or massed anti-ship missiles, but with cheap drones.

A few strikes in the vicinity of the strait were enough. Insurers and shipping companies decided the transit was unsafe. Tanker traffic dropped to zero, although the occasional ship has made it through recently. Analysts are calling it the biggest energy crisis since the 1970s oil embargo.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has since vowed to keep the strait closed. U.S. Sen. Chris Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat, reported after a closed-door briefing that the administration had no plan for the strait and did not know how to get it safely back open.

With no embassy in Tehran since 1979, the U.S. relies heavily for intelligence on CIA networks of questionable quality and Israeli assets who have their own country’s interests in mind. So the U.S. did not anticipate that Iran had rebuilt and dispersed significant military capacity since June 2025, nor that it would strike neighbors across the region, including Azerbaijan, widening the conflict well beyond the Persian Gulf.

The war has since reached the Indian Ocean, where a U.S. submarine sank an Iranian frigate 2,000 miles from the theater of war, off the coast of Sri Lanka – just days after the ship had participated in Indian navy exercises alongside 74 nations, including the U.S.

The diplomatic damage to Washington’s relationships with India and Sri Lanka, two countries whose cooperation is increasingly important as the United States seeks partners to manage and mitigate Iran’s blockade, was entirely foreseeable. Washington has put them in a difficult position, with India choosing diplomacy with Iran to secure passage for its vessels and Sri Lanka opting to retain its neutrality, underscoring its vulnerable position.

But U.S. planners didn’t foresee any of this.

The wrong lesson from Venezuela

The swift military intervention by the U.S. in Venezuela in January 2026 produced rapid results with minimal blowback − appearing to validate the administration’s faith in coercive action.

But clean victories are dangerous teachers.

They inflate what I call in my teaching the “hubris/humility index” − the more a leadership overestimates its own abilities, underestimates the adversary’s and dismisses uncertainty, the higher the score and the more likely disaster will ensue. Clean victories inflate the index precisely when skepticism is most needed, because they suggest the next adversary will be as manageable as the last.

Political scientist Robert Jervis demonstrated decades ago that misperceptions in international relations are not random but follow patterns. Leaders tend to project their own cost-benefit logic onto opponents who do not share it. They also fall into “availability bias,” allowing the most recent operation to stand in for the next.

The higher the hubris/humility index, the less likely there is to be the kind of strategic empathy that might ask: How does Tehran see this? What does a regime that believes its survival is at stake actually do? History shows that such a regime escalates, improvises and takes risks that appear irrational from an outside perspective but are entirely rational from within.

Recent cases reveal this unmistakable pattern.

The United States in Vietnam, 1965–1968

American war planners believed material superiority would force the communists in Hanoi to surrender.

It didn’t.

American firepower alone didn’t lead to military defeat, much less political control. The Tet Offensive in 1968 – when North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces launched coordinated attacks across South Vietnam – shattered the official U.S. narrative that the war was nearly won and that there was “light at the end of the tunnel.”

Athough the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces ultimately repelled the attacks, their scale and surprise caused the public not to trust official statements, accelerating the erosion of public trust and decisively turning American opinion against the war.

The U.S. loss in Vietnam didn’t occur on a single battlefield, but through strategic and political unraveling. Despite overwhelming superiority, Washington was incapable of building a stable, legitimate South Vietnamese government or recognizing the grit and resilience of the North Vietnamese forces. Eventually, with mounting casualties and large-scale protests at home, U.S. forces withdrew, ceding control of Saigon to North Vietnamese forces in 1975.

The U.S. failure was conceptual and cultural, not informational. American analysts simply couldn’t picture the war from their opponent’s perspective.

Afghanistan: Deadly assumptions

The Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1979 and the United States in Afghanistan after 2001 conducted two different wars but held the same deadly assumption: that external military force can quickly impose political order in a fractured society strongly resistant to foreign control.

In both cases, great powers believed their abilities would outweigh local complexities. In both cases, the war evolved faster − and lasted far longer − than their strategies could adapt.

Russia, Ukraine and the Strait of Hormuz

This is the case that should most haunt Washington.

Ukraine demonstrated that a materially weaker defender can impose huge costs on a stronger attacker through battlefield innovation: cheap drones, decentralized adaptation, real-time intelligence, and the creative use of terrain and chokepoints to find asymmetrical advantages. The U.S. watched it all unfold in real time for four years and helped pay for it.

Iran was also watching − and the Strait of Hormuz is the proof.

Iran didn’t need a navy to close the world’s most important energy chokepoint. It needed drones, the same cheap, asymmetric technology Ukraine has used to blunt Russia’s onslaught, deployed not on a land front but against the insurance calculus of the global shipping industry.

Washington, which had underwritten much of that playbook in Ukraine, apparently never asked the obvious question: What happens when the other side has been taking notes? That is not a failure of U.S. intelligence. It is a failure of strategic imagination − exactly what the hubris/humility index is designed to highlight.

Iran does not need to defeat the U.S. conventionally. It needs only to raise costs, exploit chokepoints and wait for a fracture among U.S. allies and domestic political opposition to force a fake U.S. declaration of victory or a genuine U.S. withdrawal.

Notably, Iran has kept the strait selectively open to Turkish, Indian and Saudi vessels, rewarding neutral countries and punishing U.S. allies, driving wedges through the coalition.

Historian Geoffrey Blainey famously argued that wars start when both sides hold incompatible beliefs about power and only end when reality forces those beliefs to align.

That alignment is now happening, at great cost, in the Persian Gulf and beyond. The Trump administration scored high on the hubris index at exactly the moment when it most needed humility.

Monica Duffy Toft does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The Trump administration announced a US$10 million reward on March 15, 2026, for information leading to the capture of several senior Iranian figures.

While two of these leaders have since been killed by Israeli strikes, they are included here to provide a more complete picture of Iran’s powerful elite – people deeply embedded in the Islamic Republic’s political, intelligence and security architecture.

As an international affairs scholar, I know their careers reflect the institutional pillars of the regime – clerical authority, intelligence coordination, military power – and help explain why they are considered high-value targets.

Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei

The son of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a U.S.-Israeli strike in February 2026, Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, 56, was chosen as Iran’s new supreme leader in early March.

Long viewed as a powerful behind-the-scenes figure, he operated within his father’s inner circle. He has cultivated strong relationships with Iran’s security and intelligence institutions and earned a reputation as a political fixer and enforcer.

Despite never holding formal elected or senior appointed office, Khamenei had been widely perceived as a potential successor to his father. Such a transition would have been controversial under normal circumstances, given his lack of experience and the ideological sensitivity around hereditary succession in a system born from anti-monarchical revolution.

Khamenei has also been linked to political controversies. During the 2005 presidential election, reformist candidate Mehdi Karroubi accused him of involvement in electoral manipulation. Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad later alleged that Khamenei engaged in financial misconduct.

Public opposition to his perceived rise was visible during the 2022–23 protests, when demonstrators explicitly rejected the prospect of his leadership by shouting “Mojtaba, may you die and never see leadership.”

Seyyed Ali-Asghar (Mir) Hejazi

A cleric with long-standing ties to Iran’s intelligence apparatus, Seyyed Ali-Asghar Hejazi had been among the closest aides to Ali Khamenei. He began his political career in 1980 as part of a “purification committee” tasked with firing perceived opponents from state institutions in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Hejazi later served as deputy for foreign affairs in the Ministry of Intelligence in the early 1980s and, more recently, as deputy chief of staff in the Office of the Supreme Leader. In this role, he has functioned as a key intermediary between various branches of government as well as religious and political personalities – transmitting Khamenei’s directives, shaping high-level policy and coordinating Iran’s complex intelligence and security networks.

He was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2013 for alleged human rights violations, including involvement in the suppression of the 2009 Green Movement, and by the European Union in 2019. He apparently survived an Israeli attack on March 6, 2026.

Seyyed Esmail Khatib

Seyyed Esmail Khatib, 64, who was killed on March 18, 2026, had built his career within Iran’s intelligence and security establishment. He joined intelligence operations linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in 1980 and was wounded during the Iran–Iraq War.

Following the war, this cleric held a series of senior intelligence roles, including director general of intelligence for Qom province, starting in 1991. He also held positions within the supreme leader’s security office from 2009–11 and was head of the judiciary’s Protection and Intelligence Center, a counterintelligence body within Iran’s judiciary, from 2012–19. He later served as a senior official within Astan Quds Razavi, a major religious and economic conglomerate controlled directly by Iran’s supreme leader.

Sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2020 for alleged human rights abuses, Khatib became Iran’s minister of intelligence in 2021.

Ali Larijani

Ali Larijani, who was assassinated on March 17, 2026, was one of the Islamic Republic’s most experienced political insiders. Born into a prominent clerical family, he rose through both military and civilian institutions, beginning with roles linked to the Revolutionary Guard in the early 1980s.

Over the decades, Larijani, 68, held numerous senior positions. Those include minister of culture from 1992–94 and head of state broadcasting from 1994–2004. He was also secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from 2004–08 and again from 2025–26. Larijani also served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2005-07.

From early January 2026, and more clearly following the Feb. 28 killing of Ayatollah Khamenei, Larijani emerged as a central decision-maker within the system before his death.

Brig. Gen. Eskandar Momeni

A Revolutionary Guard-affiliated security official, Eskandar Momeni, 64, is a veteran of the Iran–Iraq War and participated in counterinsurgency operations against leftist groups in northern Iran.

He later held a range of senior law enforcement roles, including head of the Police Emergency Center, a dispatch center that directs emergency response units, from 2004–05, deputy for operations of the national police from 2005–08, and chief of traffic police from 2009–14. He also holds a doctorate in national security.

As deputy commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Force, responsible for public security, from 2015–18, Momeni oversaw security responses during the 2017-18 protests, which were met with force. Since becoming minister of interior in August 2024, he has remained a central figure in domestic security policy, including the lethal response to unrest in early 2026 in which an estimated 7,000 to 30,000 Iranians were killed.

Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi

A senior Revolutionary Guard commander and longtime military strategist, Yahya Rahim Safavi, 73, received military training in Syria prior to the 1979 revolution and later became a key figure during the Iran–Iraq War.

He served as commander of the Revolutionary Guard ground forces, from 1985–89, deputy commander in chief from 1989–97 and commander in chief of the Revolutionary Guard from 1997–2007. During his tenure, he reportedly also earned a Ph.D. in geography.

In December 2006, the U.N. Security Council put Safavi on its sanctions list for his involvement in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. After stepping down as Revolutionary Guard commander, Safavi was appointed senior military adviser to the supreme leader and is still serving in that role. He remains under U.S. sanctions.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Historically, when the U.S. has undertaken military action against foreign governments, journalists have relied heavily on government sources and rallied “’round the flag,” often uncritically sharing official narratives about U.S involvement. This has been evident during periods of U.S. military engagements in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recently, however, the Pentagon has restricted access for legacy news organizations. And on March 14, 2026, Brendan Carr, chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, replied to a social media post from President Donald Trump complaining about reporting on U.S. involvement in Iran. Carr threatened to deny license renewals to broadcasters not operating in the “public interest.”

“The People of our Country understand what is happening far better than the Fake News Media!” Trump asserted in his original Truth Social post.

This hostile relationship between journalists and a presidential administration is only part of the story about what is or isn’t happening on the ground in Iran and the Middle East.

In times of conflict, information about military activity can be seen as another domain of conflict, much like air, land and sea. Countries, including Iran, have long tried to manipulate information to persuade or influence what people think outside the region.

A preprint, not yet peer-reviewed study authored by academics affiliated with the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Air Force Academy describes increased government funding and attention to “cognitive warfare,” or efforts to influence what people think through strategic messaging.

A common call to action from advocacy and educational groups in politicized situations where misinformation weighs heavy is to teach media literacy. Conventional wisdom holds that if people only knew how to read the news and look for bias, they would understand a situation more clearly.

As a journalism scholar and educator, I agree that media literacy is valuable. But it’s also time-consuming. It’s impractical to complete a full training or curriculum when faced with immediate current events. As an abbreviated measure to assess the current Middle East conflict, readers can start with the premise that information is contested and an extension of the battlefield.

Key questions to ask

This assumption reframes news not as something that finds a reader by chance, but as something someone wants a reader to see. It primes readers’ critical thinking.

Then readers can consider some key questions:

Why does the author of this information want me to see this?

The obvious answer is that they think it’s important, but what are they focused on? Military progress? One actor in the conflict? Civilian responses? Public opinion? Diplomacy? Asking these questions helps assess what is left out and helps readers resist the temptation to extrapolate details they can’t know from a single news story.

What information does this person or organization have access to?

Because Iran is inaccessible to many journalists, readers must be especially careful about reporting purporting to know or show what is going on inside Iran. For sure, information is coming out via citizen reports and social media, but it is hard to verify and interpret.

Relatedly, and especially when consuming content from social media, readers can ask:

What about an author’s personal experience may inform their interpretation of events?

Media produced for and by diasporas – people displaced from their country of origin by choice or force – is a good source for contextualized and expert information about conflicts in their country of origin. But diasporas can also be deeply political and strategic in what they share. As a general consumer, readers don’t need to get to the bottom of the veracity of the information they share. Readers can simply be aware of disaporas’ positions so they can factor this into their interpretation and understanding of the conflict.

What do different people or organizations have to gain or lose by people widely seeing specific information?

If information is a battlefield, actors will make strategic choices in what they will share with the public. Sometimes they will shield information from the public or deny information. However, undesirable and unflattering information occasionally gets out and circulated, as was the case when a missile struck an Iranian elementary school.

Politicians will want to show they are winning. Journalists may want to show they are being a watchdog on the government. Readers can consider the goals of both the authors and the sources they cite when trying to orient themselves around the information they share.

Transparent fact-checking

Beyond media literacy, there are several potential short cuts to finding accurate information about immediate events in Iran.

First, readers can look for opinions and commentary from established experts on the Middle East, Iran, oil, the military and other related fields. Too many readers claim expertise after reading a few popular articles or listening to a podcast.

Instead, they can look for people who have been observing and researching the region for years – people whose work has been already validated by peer review. As a starting place, readers can look for subject matter experts on the social network LinkedIn or search for research on Google Scholar. Readers can also see whether authors of older popular books are writing about contemporary events on websites or blogs.

Think tanks that produce research reports may also be helpful, but sometimes think tanks with neutral-sounding names are politically affiliated. A close read of the “About Us” page and perusing the list of funders can offer some helpful clues.

Finally, perhaps the most efficient way to evaluate what is happening in Iran is to follow fact-checking and open-source reporting organizations. These groups often do a better job showing their assessment work and linking to evidence than do traditional news outlets, which focus on narrative structure and a cohesive final product.

Poynter, a nonprofit journalism institute, recently detailed the work of Factnameh, run by an Iranian fact-checker in exile. Bellingcat and Indicator are two excellent open-source reporting organizations that use public data to investigate whether actual events match circulating narratives.

And sometimes traditional news organizations do similar types of investigations, such as this example of The Associated Press debunking video misinformation in Iran.

The transparent methods of fact-checking and open-source sites can also serve as interactive exercises in media literacy. Both Bellingcat and Indicator regularly showcase information validation tools that readers can use.

Regardless of how much effort readers choose to spend on evaluating the accuracy of reporting on Iran, none of us are watching the battle from the sidelines.

Andrea Hickerson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Every major escalation in the Middle East sends shock waves far beyond the region. In the United States, those shock waves arrive not as distant tremors but as catalysts for domestic radicalization and violence, particularly against Jewish communities.

The data is unambiguous.

Following the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, which led to the deaths of more than 1,200 Israelis and taking of more than 200 hostages, Israel’s military responded in a campaign that intensified the following year, killing more than 70,000 Gazans.

At the same time, in 2024 the Anti-Defamation League recorded 9,354 antisemitic incidents in the U.S. – averaging more than 25 acts per day – the highest figure in the audit’s 46-year history.

FBI hate-crime statistics documented 1,938 anti-Jewish offenses in 2024, constituting 69% of all religion-based hate crimes. Jews comprise roughly 2% of the population.

The Secure Community Network, which provides Jewish communities in North America security services, tracked over 10,000 threat incidents and suspicious-activity reports since Oct. 7, 2023, including more than 500 credible threats to life in 2024.

Research shows similar trends following past military escalations in the Middle East.

Geopolitical violence abroad translates, with alarming efficiency, into homegrown threats in the U.S. and Canada. For the first time in the ADL audit’s history, a majority of incidents in 2024, 58%, contained elements explicitly related to Israel or Zionism. As someone who has studied domestic terrorism and hate for over 20 years, such dynamics are not surprising. They illustrate what my own research and that of others calls “imported conflict.”

The recent attacks against Jewish targets in Toronto, Michigan and possibly the one in San Jose underscore that the threat is neither abstract nor hypothetical.

Radicalization of strange bedfellows

Foreign conflict can become domestic violence via multiple pathways.

Left-wing extremists, Jihadi-inspired militants and far-right white supremacists occupy distinct spaces along the ideological spectrum, yet they converge on a shared target: Jews.

Each escalatory cycle in the Middle East energizes their exposure to and gradual adoption of extremist views. Online ecosystems accelerate the process dramatically.

Encrypted Telegram channels circulate operational guidance from jihadist media wings within hours of a Middle East strike, encouraging attacks against Jews wherever they can be found. On platforms like 4chan and Gab, white-supremacist accelerationists seize on the same events to amplify “great replacement” narratives casting Jews as orchestrators of unwanted demographic change.

Meanwhile, TikTok and Instagram accounts repackage eliminationist slogans, advocating the end of the state of Israel – “from the river to the sea,” “glory to the resistance” – as mainstream progressive content, reaching millions of young users whose algorithmic feeds reward outrage over nuance.

What once required years of indoctrination within a closed network can now unfold in weeks of passive scrolling.

On university campuses, the atmosphere has grown particularly volatile. Campus Jewish organization Hillel International documented 2,334 antisemitic incidents during the 2024–25 academic year, the highest since tracking began.

These confrontations involve physical intimidation, exclusion from student organizations and what the organization describes as the normalization of eliminationist language cloaked in social justice vocabulary.

Antisemitism as anti-racism

To understand the increasing ease with which geopolitical violence abroad turns into antisemitic violence in the U.S. requires understanding the ideological developments in recent progressive thinking.

One observation that our research demonstrates is that today’s antisemitism may not come from the political fringes but from within progressive movements themselves. Much of progressive ideological frameworks tend to divide the world into oppressors and oppressed. Because Jews are often seen as white, wealthy and well connected, they can get placed on the oppressor side of that line.

Intersectionality – a concept originally designed to show how different forms of disadvantage overlap – is now regularly used to justify shutting Jews out of progressive coalitions and solidarity campaigns.

According to ADL survey data, Americans who agreed with the belief that problems in the world “come down to the oppressor vs. the oppressed” were 2.6 times more likely to hold negative or stereotypical views about Jewish people compared to those who disagreed with the statement.

I believe this is not a fringe problem. Among some parts of the intellectual and cultural elite, such as parts of academia, nonprofits and political parties, hostility toward Jews has become more apparent, with some suggesting that Jews simply do not deserve the same moral sympathy extended to other minorities. In some of these circles, if you do not accept that Jewish collective life is inherently oppressive, you are labeled a bad progressive and exiled.

A coalition of progressive California Democratic delegates pushed a resolution that opponents described as a Zionism “litmus test,” effectively requiring that delegates reject Zionism to be considered legitimate progressives. The D.C. chapter of the Sunrise Movement, an influential progressive climate group, boycotted a voting rights rally because of “the participation of a number of Zionist organizations.”

Such dynamics reflect that there is little room in this framework for the complexity of Jewish history, people who have been both persecuted and resilient.

Furthermore, they can facilitate the rebranding of antisemitism as anti-racism. Some writers have noted that attacking Jewish influence can become a moral duty rather than a bigoted act. Antisemitism is renovated with concepts such as equity, decolonization and liberation, despite promoting the same traditional antisemitic tropes.

Strange alliance

I assert that multiple ideological movements targeting Jews reflect a deeper structural alignment between political Islam and segments of the progressive left.

Superficially, the two camps could hardly appear more different. Contemporary left-wing activism champions LGBTQ rights, environmentalism, social and economic equality, human rights and government transparency. Radical Islamist movements reject most of these commitments outright.

Beneath these contradictions appears to exist a shared ideological architecture powerful enough to sustain cooperation: anti-globalization, anti-imperialism, rejection of the Western nation-state, the primacy of collective identity over individual rights, a revolutionary vision and, most critically, a common set of enemies.

This alliance is visible in the protest movements that have erupted on American streets and campuses since the attacks of Oct. 7, 2023. Marches under the banner of Palestinian liberation routinely feature Islamist slogans such as “From the water to the water, Palestine is Arab” alongside progressive placards, or Hezbollah iconography beside “Queers for Palestine” signs. What binds this coalition is opposition to Israel, to American power, and, increasingly, to Jews as symbols of both.

For domestic security, this Red-Green alliance matters because it creates a shared radicalization experience in which grievances originating in very different worldviews are fused into a single call to action.

And as a scholar of political violence and extremism, I believe that when a progressive activist and an Islamist militant attend the same rally, share the same social media space and chant the same slogans, the boundary between political protest and operational violence becomes dangerously thin. Consider two recent cases.

In May 2025, Elias Rodriguez − steeped in anti-Zionist rhetoric and whom the ADL has called a far-left activist − shot and killed Yaron Lischinsky and Sarah Milgrim, two young Israeli Embassy staffers, outside the Capital Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., pulling out a keffiyeh and chanting “Free Palestine” as he was subdued. Weeks later in Boulder, Colorado, Mohamed Sabry Soliman, allegedly yelling “Free Palestine,” hurled Molotov cocktails at a weekly vigil for hostages held by Hamas, killing 82-year-old Karen Diamond.

These attackers occupied different positions on the spectrum between ideological radicalism and organized militancy, but they drew from the same well of dehumanizing language that circulates freely in spaces where political protest and incitement to violence have become indistinguishable.

Foreign crises, domestic failures

The structures governing how security agencies carry out their work in the U.S. are inadequate to this challenge.

Counterterrorism agencies seem to continue to treat Islamist militancy, far-right extremism and far-left radicalism as separate, unrelated threats. But the examples above point in a different direction: Ideologically distinct movements are converging on the same target − Jewish communities.

Meanwhile, civil rights agencies and nonprofit advocacy groups struggle to name progressive antisemitism for what it is, caught between legitimate commitments to anti-racism and the uncomfortable recognition that some anti-racist discourse has itself become bigotry.

Addressing the feedback loop between Middle East escalation and domestic antisemitic violence requires an honest reckoning with all of its sources – not only the familiar threats from jihadist networks and white supremacist cells, but also the ideological currents within progressive spaces that make hatred of Jews newly respectable.

Until policymakers, educators and leaders of civil society confront this threat’s full topology, Jewish Americans will continue to face a reality in which more than half report experiencing antisemitism in the past year and nearly half doubt that their neighbors would stand with them if the worst were to come.

Arie Perliger receives funding from Federal grants affiliated with DHS and DOJ.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Data released in January 2026 to Allegheny County officials offers a clear look at who is being held at Highland Detention Center – and how much it costs taxpayers. The numbers show short stays, significant racial disparities and millions spent to operate the facility. These findings raise new questions about whether detention is being used effectively in the county’s youth justice system.

In 2025, 220 young people passed through the center. The county paid nearly US$800 per day for each of the 12 beds in the facility, whether they were occupied or not.

The center operates at the site of the former Shuman Juvenile Detention Center in Allegheny County. After a documented history of child abuse, medical issues, unauthorized use of restraints and other violations, Shuman closed in September 2021 when the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services revoked its license.

Shuman opened in 1974 with an occupancy of approximately 120 beds. At the time it was closed, the daily population had dropped to 20 juveniles at an annual cost of $11 million.

As a professor of social work at the University of Pittsburgh, I study law, policy and child welfare. I have spent my career studying how the juvenile justice system can shape – and also damage – the lives of young people while creating significant costs to taxpayers.

Here’s what local taxpayers in Pennsylvania are paying for juvenile detention.

A costly reinvention

Allegheny County signed a five-year, $73 million contract with nonprofit organization Adelphoi to operate a detention facility at the old Shuman site in 2023. It was renamed Highland Juvenile Detention Facility.

The county agreed to pay $650.25 per bed, per day for the first year of the contract. That rate, the contract specifies, “shall be adjusted each year.” By the end of 2025, it had already climbed to $825 per day. In total, the county paid Adelphoi nearly $7 million last year to hold kids for an average stay of 13 days.

The facility offered 12 beds in 2025. The contract calls for that number to increase to 60 beds, with the costs also rising to $19 million annually. The county has an option to renew the contract when it expires at the end of 2028.

In March 2026, there were seven juveniles being held at Highland. As of late February 2026, there were approximately 12 to 14 juveniles held in the Allegheny County Jail. They can be held in the jail for a variety of reasons but are primarily there if they are being charged as an adult.

Who’s being locked up

Statistics show a correlation between juvenile detention and adult involvement with the criminal legal system.

According to The Sentencing Project, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit, more than a third of people in state prisons have served time in a juvenile facility.

Black youth are more than five times more likely to be placed in juvenile facilities than white peers, and two-thirds of state prisoners experienced an arrest before age 19.

In the juvenile system, detention is intended to be short term and is generally used prior to an adjudication, the determination of someone’s guilt or innocence.

Detention is typically used for kids who pose a threat of committing additional crimes or a risk of not appearing in court, based on a determination by a probation officer, a state risk-assessment test or a judge, typically. Dentention is not a destination but part of a continuum with a goal of moving a young person to less restrictive alternatives, such as community-based programs and services that allow youth to remain at home, in school and in their communities while receiving supervision, treatment and support. These alternatives are often more effective at reducing recidivism and less costly than secure confinement.

While kids in detention have the right to receive a free public education and should be offered physical, behavioral, mental health and recreational services, according to state law, detention is not a treatment facility.

The number of kids in detention facilities in the U.S has dropped substantially over the past 20 years, from approximately 400,000 to 135,000. However, an average of 13,000 to 14,000 kids remain in detention facilities across the country daily. Youth of color are disproportionately represented, and many kids are detained for minor crimes, technical violations or status offenses, such as breaking curfew.

Based on available data and my own experience working in and with detention facilities, it is clear that youth locked in these facilities are not only those at risk of committing another crime or not appearing in court. Many have education, mental health and substance abuse needs, come from poor families or identify as LGBTQ+. In many respects, detention facilities have served as a dumping ground for youth dealing with a vast array of issues in their lives.

The juvenile justice system was built primarily around managing risk and ensuring court appearances. It does little to address the underlying needs of the children moving through it. Unstable housing, missed school and lack of supervision can trigger detention even when a child poses no real threat. In many cases, juvenile detention ends up filling a gap left by social services.

Doubling down on detention

Despite its limited capacity, the Allegheny County Highland Detention Center dashboard shows 220 youths were detained at Highland in 2025. Eighty-six percent of these kids are Black. Firearms charges are the most common offense.

More than half had an individualized education plan, a legally binding document that outlines the specific educational support and services a student with a physical or mental disability is entitled to receive in school.

Over 60% were involved with the child welfare system, 88% had family involvement in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, and 72% had received a crisis mental health service at some point before entering Highland.

Research shows that young people who are detained are more likely to commit additional offenses when they are released, experience educational and economic disruption, and face increased mental health challenges. Detention does not promote the social development of young people or community safety.

A variety of alternatives to detention exist that have been shown to be more effective and cost significantly less – such as mentoring programs, family therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy and restorative justice programs.

Restorative justice programs bring victims, accused youth and trustworthy adults in their lives together to discuss the harm caused by the offense. They come up with a plan to help make things “right” between the parties to avoid subsequent offenses and help the youth learn from the incident.

The dollars being spent to confine kids in Allegheny County could be reinvested in the young people themselves and in their families, schools and communities. The new advisory board was appointed to Highland in July 2025. The board was created to provide a layer of accountability over the facility and Adelphoi – but what that looks like in practice remains up in the air.

Jeffrey Shook does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation