Category: Uncategorized

What is an election and when is it completed?

That’s the legal question at the heart of Watson v. Republican National Committee, the mail-in ballot case the U.S. Supreme Court took up in November 2025. The court will most likely hand down a ruling before the midterm elections in 2026.

Mississippi law, similar to that of 15 other states, allows for mail-in ballots postmarked by Election Day to be received by election officials up to five days later, then counted.

But the Republican National Committee is arguing in the Watson case, which was brought against the state of Mississippi in January 2024, that this procedure is not legal. An election, the argument goes, includes the receipt of ballots; therefore, all ballots must be in hand at the close of Election Day – the congressionally established “Tuesday after the first Monday” in November.

President Donald Trump’s March 2025 executive order 14248 similarly calls for ballots to be received no later than Election Day if they are to be counted, saying that doing otherwise “is like allowing persons who arrive 3 days after Election Day, perhaps after a winner has been declared, to vote in person at a former voting precinct, which would be absurd.”

The Supreme Court’s decision on mail-in ballots could have major consequences for the 47.6 million Americans who voted by mail in 2024, as well as more than 900,000 overseas military and civilian voters covered under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act. More than 28 million of the 47.6 million domestic mail-in votes and nearly 800,000 of the 900,000 votes cast and counted under the uniformed and overseas citizens act were from states that allow for return of mail-in ballots after Election Day.

As a political scientist and scholar of migration, I have conducted research for over 20 years on military service members and civilian U.S. citizens living overseas.

Currently, 16 states plus the District of Columbia allow domestic absentee ballots that are postmarked by Election Day to be counted if they arrive after Election Day; 29 states extend that right to military and civilian voters living overseas, recognizing that international mail often delays ballot return.

According to the U.S Constitution, states administer elections. Under the equal protection clause, however, the federal government can pass legislation to prevent inequalities in access to voting. This includes facilitating the right to vote of military service members and civilian U.S. citizens living overseas.

The Supreme Court will decide whether federal law overrides state election administration in determining whether ballots that are postmarked by Election Day but arrive later can be counted.

A 250-year history

The history of absentee, or mail-in, ballots in U.S. elections stretches back 2½ centuries.

Soldiers first voted by mail during the American Revolution, when men from the town of Hollis, New Hampshire, wrote their town leaders asking to have votes counted in local elections.

Pennsylvania passed the first law allowing soldiers to vote absentee in the War of 1812, a right expanded in the Civil War when 19 Union and seven Confederate states allowed soldiers to vote absentee.

Absentee voting for soldiers from all states was codified in federal law in 1942. A 1944 amendment specified that ballots that were postmarked by Election Day and arrived within two weeks after Election Day could be counted.

Some civilians residing overseas, including civilian government employees and spouses and dependents of military and civilian employees, gained absentee ballot voting rights with the 1955 Federal Voting Assistance Act. All overseas U.S. citizens were enfranchised with the 1975 Overseas Citizens Voting Act. The 1986 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act consolidated military and civilian voting rules. Later laws addressed electronic communications.

Over 1,000 military service members requested an absentee ballot in Mississippi’s 2024 election, along with nearly 1,000 civilian overseas voters. Nationally, more than 900,000 people voted in 2024 under the uniformed and overseas citizens act.

Many of these U.S. citizens would be affected by a ballot receipt deadline on Election Day. Their votes, coming from around the world, are often not able to be counted because of late arrival.

Under the magnifying glass in Florida

Overseas absentee military and civilian ballots came to widespread notice in Florida in the 2000 presidential election. That election – and ultimately the presidency — centered on state election law being waived by canvassing boards under pressure from the Republican Party to count military and civilian absentee ballots received after Election Day.

The Supreme Court decided in December 2000 to stop further counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day because of tight certification deadlines, with the Electoral College meeting just six days later.

Congress was concerned about the unequal treatment of ballots at home and abroad in the 2000 election. To move toward addressing these concerns, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act in 2002, which includes measures to facilitate overseas voting.

Ensuring that everyone gets a vote

Increasing mail-in voting has been a question of making sure everyone who qualifies to vote can do so. Oregon was the first state, in 1998, to offer mail-in voting. Surveys have shown that more Democrats than Republicans voted by mail in 2020. Sending ballots to all voters reduces that gap.

By 2020, 33 states offered “no excuse” domestic absentee voting, with others expanding or facilitating mail-in voting during the COVID-19 pandemic that year.

The Federal Voting Assistance Program is charged with making it easier for overseas voters to vote. It continues to find obstacles, including problems in returning ballots on time. Meanwhile, Florida election supervisors in November 2025 requested that Florida officials reinstate a checkbox that was dropped from Florida absentee ballots in 2021. The checkbox allowed the voter to request an absentee ballot for the next election.

Mail-in ballot security

Following concerns about the security of mail-in ballots in the 2000 election in Florida, the 2002 Help America Vote Act required that all states have a minimum security requirement.

The multiple levels of scrutiny include signature comparison, ballot tracking and penalties for malfeasance from the moment of registration to ballot request, to ballot receipt. With these layers of security there were only an estimated four fraudulent votes cast for every 10 million mail-in ballots in the 2016, 2018, 2020 and 2022 U.S. general elections.

Mail-in voting elsewhere

The United States is one of 32 countries worldwide that allow mail-in voting for at least some of its citizens. These include the United Kingdom since 1945 and Germany since 1957.

In Germany’s federal elections in 2025, 37% of all voters, or 18.5 million citizens, cast a ballot by mail. German citizens who are eligible to vote automatically receive ballots. In the United Kingdom’s 2024 election, just under 5%, or nearly 1.3 million citizens, applied for mail-in ballots.

The bottom line

The Supreme Court case could reshape the voting landscape in the United States, potentially affecting 47 million people, including some 5 million military and civilian voters living abroad. Watson v. Republican National Committee could also affect laws in 29 states. The outcome of the case has the potential to make voting more difficult for millions of civilian and military voters at home and abroad.

Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Minneapolis is once again the focus of debates about violence involving law enforcement after an Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer shot and killed Renee Nicole Good, a 37-year-old mother, in her car.

The incident quickly prompted dueling narratives. Trump administration officials defended the shooting as justified, while local officials condemned it.

The shooting will also likely prompt renewed scrutiny of training and policy of officers and the question of them shooting at moving vehicles. There has been a recent trend in law enforcement toward policies that prohibit such shootings. It is a policy shift that has shown promise in saving lives.

Decades ago, the New York City Police Department prohibited its officers from shooting at moving vehicles. That led to a drop in police killings without putting officers in greater danger.

Debates over deadly force are often contentious, but as I note in my research on police ethics and policy, for the most part there is consensus on one point: Policing should reflect a commitment to valuing human life and prioritizing its protection. Many use-of-force policies adopted by police departments endorse that principle.

Yet, as in Minneapolis, controversial law enforcement killings continue to occur. Not all agencies have implemented prohibitions on shooting at vehicles. Even in agencies that have, some policies are weak or ambiguous.

In addition, explicit prohibitions on shooting at vehicles are largely absent from the law, which means that officers responsible for fatal shootings of drivers that appear to violate departmental policies still often escape criminal penalties.

In the case of ICE, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security, its policy on shooting at moving vehicles – unlike that of many police agencies – lacks a clear instruction for officers to get out of the way of moving vehicles where feasible. It’s an omission at odds with generally recognized best practices in policing.

ICE’s policy on shooting at moving vehicles

ICE’s current use-of-force policy prohibits its officers from “discharging firearms at the operator of a moving vehicle” unless it is necessary to stop a grave threat. The policy is explicit that deadly force should not be used “solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect.”

That point is relevant for evaluating the fatal shooting in Minneapolis. Videos show one officer trying to open the door of the vehicle that Good was driving, while another officer appears to be in front of the vehicle as she tried to pull away.

Shooting to prevent the driver simply from getting away would have been in violation of agency policy and obviously inconsistent with prioritizing the protection of life.

ICE’s policy lacks clear instruction, however, for its officers to get out of the way of moving vehicles where feasible. In contrast, the Department of Justice’s use-of-force policy makes it explicit that officers should not shoot at a vehicle if they can protect themselves by “moving out of the path of the vehicle.”

Notably, President Joe Biden issued an executive order in 2022 requiring federal law enforcement agencies – like ICE – to adopt use-of-force policies “that are equivalent to, or exceed, the requirements” of the Department of Justice’s policy.

Despite that order, the provision to step out of the way of moving cars never made it into the use-of-force policy that applies to ICE.

The rationale for not shooting at moving vehicles

Prioritizing the protection of life doesn’t rule out deadly force. Sometimes such force is necessary to protect lives from a grave threat, such as an active shooter. But it does rule out using deadly force when less harmful tactics can stop a threat. In such cases, deadly force is unnecessary – a key consideration in law and ethics that can render force unjustified.

That’s the concern involved with police shooting at moving vehicles. It often is not necessary because officers have a less harmful option to avoid a moving vehicle’s threat: stepping out of the way.

This guidance has the safety of both suspects and police in mind. Obviously, police not shooting lowers the risk of harm to the suspect. But it also lowers the risk to the officer in the vast majority of cases because of the laws of physics. If you shoot the driver of a car barreling toward you, that rarely brings a car to an immediate stop, and the vehicle often continues on its path.

Many police departments have incorporated these insights into their policies. A recent analysis of police department policies in the 100 largest U.S. cities found that close to three-quarters of them have prohibitions against shooting at moving vehicles.

The gap between policy and best practices for protecting life

The shooting in Minneapolis serves as a stark reminder of the stubborn gap that often persists between law and policy on the one hand and best law enforcement practices for protecting life on the other. When steps are taken to close that gap, however, they can have a meaningful impact.

Some of the most compelling examples involve local, state and federal measures that reinforce one another. Consider the “fleeing felon rule,” which used to allow police to shoot a fleeing felony suspect to prevent their escape even when the suspect posed no danger to others.

That rule was at odds with the doctrine of prioritizing the protection of life, leading some departments to revise their use-of-force policies and some states to ban the rule. In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for police to shoot a fleeing suspect who was not a danger.

Banning that questionable tactic notably led to a reduction in killings by police.

This history suggests that clear bans in law and policy on questionable tactics have the potential to save lives, while also strengthening the means for holding officers accountable.

Ben Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The Department of Homeland Security in September 2025 said that 2 million undocumented immigrants had been forced out of the United States since the start of Donald Trump’s second presidency.

Through its use of the Alien Enemies Act, a wartime law from 1798, the Trump administration has bypassed immigration courts and the right to due process to more easily detain and deport immigrants.

The Trump administration has, in part, reached these numbers by arresting immigrants in courthouses and at their workplaces. It has also conducted raids in schools, hospitals and places of worship.

And the Supreme Court in September, in its Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo decision, lifted a federal court order that barred agents with Immigration and Customs Enforcement from racially profiling suspected undocumented immigrants. For now, ICE agents can use race, ethnicity, language and occupation as grounds for stopping and questioning people.

This form of targeting has disproportionately affected Latino communities, which represent 9 in 10 ICE arrests, according to a UCLA study published in October.

Targeting immigrants is a centuries-old American practice. In particular, Asian Americans have drawn parallels between the attacks on Latinos today and the forced relocation and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II.

Notably, the passage of the War Brides Act, passed just three months after the end of WWII, in December 1945, broke with the nation’s centuries-long practice of exclusionary immigration policy. The act allowed American servicemen to bring their non-American spouses and children to the United States. The measure seemed to inaugurate a new era of inclusive immigration policy.

As a feminist studies scholar and author, I know the War Brides Act forever altered the nation’s racial demographics, increasing both Asian migration to the U.S. and the birth of biracial children.

On the 80th anniversary of the War Brides Act, I’ve also noticed an alarming contradiction: Although America may be more multiracial than ever before, the U.S. immigration system remains as exclusive as it has ever been.

Exclusionary immigration policy

The racial profiling of Latino people by ICE agents today is not unlike what took place during World War II in the U.S.

Following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the forced removal of anyone deemed to be a national security threat. Anyone, that is, who was Japanese. From 1942 to 1945, the U.S. government incarcerated approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans in internment camps.

To determine who was a national security threat, the government used overt racial profiling. Similar to today, when the U.S. government often misidentifies Latino Americans as noncitizens, a majority of the Japanese people incarcerated in WWII were U.S. citizens.

Amid the Trump administration’s treatment of immigrants, it’s worth recalling the exclusionary origins of U.S. immigration policy.

The first restrictive immigration law in the U.S., the Page Act of 1875, barred Chinese women from entering the country. The assumption the law was based on was that all Chinese women were immoral and worked in the sex trade.

The Page Act laid the groundwork for the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which banned all Chinese immigration into the U.S. for 10 years. This was the first federal law to ban an entire ethnic group, launching an era of legalized and targeted exclusion.

With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, the U.S. created its first border control service, which enforced new immigration restrictions. It also implemented a quota system, which banned or limited the number of immigrants from specific regions, including Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe.

The act stemmed from nativism – the policy that protects the interests of native-born residents against those of immigrants – and a desire to preserve American homogeneity.

The 1945 War Brides Act largely diverged from these previous measures, helping to dismantle the Asian exclusion made commonplace in the 19th and early 20th centuries. From 1945 until 1948, when the War Brides Act expired, more than 300,000 people entered the country as nonquota immigrants, people from countries not subject to federal immigration restrictions.

Exclusionary tendencies

Decades later, in 1965, the U.S. formally abolished the quota system. America opened its doors to those who President Lyndon B. Johnson deemed most able to contribute to the nation’s growth, particularly skilled professionals.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 eliminated racial exclusion. As a result, the U.S. population diversified. Immigrants deepened the multiracialism initiated by the War Brides Act.

This trend increased later in the 1960s when the Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, overturned anti-miscegenation laws, which criminalized marriage between people of different races. The justices ruled that laws banning interracial marriage violated the 14th Amendment.

Multiracialism further increased after the Vietnam War. Subsequent legislation such as the 1987 Amerasian Homecoming Act facilitated the entry of biracial children born in Vietnam and fathered by a U.S. citizen.

By the 1960s, however, exclusion was taking on a different shape.

After 1965, immigration policy initiated a preference system that prioritized skilled workers and relatives of U.S. citizens. Quotas related to race and national origin were abolished. Nonetheless, preferences for families and professionals excluded people from Latin America.

For the first time, immigration from the Western Hemisphere was limited. This directly affected migrant workers in the farming and agricultural industries, many of whom were Latino.

Recalling the War Brides Act allows Americans to better comprehend the fiction that undergirds the U.S. immigration system: that immigration policy’s preference for certain immigrants is enough to justify the discriminatory policies which deem some families more valuable than others.

Anna Storti has received funding from the Institute for Citizens and Scholars, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the McNair Scholars Program.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

As the bell struck midnight on Jan. 1, 2026, time ran out on Obamacare subsidies for over 24 million Americans. These subsidies, propped up through various legislative packages over the years, lowered the health insurance costs for Americans on the Obamacare exchange.

Following the expiration of these subsidies, health insurance premiums are skyrocketing for around 90% of Americans who use health insurance from the exchange. For many Americans, the new year means a choice between paying exorbitant costs or taking the risk of no health insurance at all.

But unlike other policy challenges that Congress may face in 2026, the expiration of health insurance subsidies was not unexpected.

The extension of health care subsidies was the pivotal disagreement that ultimately led to the longest government shutdown in U.S. history in the fall of 2025. Democratic members, in support of extending the subsidies, faced off against the majority party in Congress: Republicans who wanted a short-term legislative fix that did not fund subsidies.

Republicans ultimately won the shutdown battle. And while Democrats attempted a last-gasp vote in December to reform and extend health care subsidies, the health care debate was yet again punted into the next year.

Congress has reconvened, and Democratic members – joined by four Republican members – used the best possible procedural tool at the minority party’s disposal, the discharge petition, to force congressional leaders to allow votes on an extension of Obamacare subsidies during its first week back in session. But overcoming congressional leadership is an immense challenge: Even if the House is successful, Senate Republican leadership has made clear that there is no future for the legislation in that chamber.

The challenge of passing meaningful solutions to rising health care costs is not unique to this year or to this Congress. It has been a decades-long argument among lawmakers that shows no sign of being resolved.

Why is it so hard for Congress to lower the cost of health care for the people who sent them to Washington?

Like many policy problems, partisanship is partly to blame. But the sprawling complexities of the American health care system pose a particular challenge to members of Congress. As my own research finds, the outsized power and resources of congressional leaders means that for Congress’ most intricate issues, rank-and-file members do not have the time, resources or, frankly, the interest to dedicate to meaningful problem-solving.

Government ‘dips its toe’

Americans face some of the highest health care costs in the world. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have long campaigned on addressing exorbitant costs and equitable access.

Progressive politicians proposed the idea of national health insurance as early as the 1900s, but efforts were limited to women and children, and any policy successes were moderate and temporary.

Following the Great Depression and the advent of Social Security in the 1940s, Congress had warmed to the idea of the federal government providing social services. But attempts at widespread health care coverage failed to gain traction.

During the 1950s, as Americans began to expect more services from their tax dollars, formal coalitions formed in support of, and in opposition to, government-supported health care. Workers and unions, bolstered by Congress and the Supreme Court, used the power of collective bargaining to push for employee benefits such as health insurance. Doctors and medical providers, enjoying their current – and profitable – position, coordinated campaigns against national health insurance proposals.

The tension held until 1956, when the government dipped its toe into federally funded health care, enacting the first “Medicare” government-funded program for dependents of the armed forces.

In the private sector, employee demands and employer tax incentives led to a convoluted web of employer-based insurance programs. But for many Americans, particularly the retired and elderly and those with low-paying jobs, there remained few, if any, insurance options available.

Enter: Medicare and Medicaid

In the 1960s, under Democratic President Lyndon Johnson’s vision for a “Great Society,” and with a bipartisan vote in Congress, the federal government took the greatest step forward in providing federal health assistance for Americans: Medicare and Medicaid. The programs helped with the cost of health care via federal health insurance for those who were elderly and low-income, and they ushered in a new era of federal health policy.

This was a watershed moment for policymakers. With health care coverage now under the umbrella of the federal government, domestic policymaking responsibility expanded to match. For lawmakers, this meant not only new debates but also new federal agencies, new congressional committees, new lobbying firms and new interest group coalitions.

In the decades that followed, Congress’ responsibility for health care policy continued to expand: Coverage amounts and eligibility requirements were tweaked, programs were expanded to include prescription drugs and vaccines, health savings accounts were introduced, and more.

Yet still, the web of private and federal health insurance programs left millions of Americans uninsured. It wasn’t until 2010, under President Barack Obama, that the Democratic-controlled House and Senate passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, known as “Obamacare,” to close that gap. But as evident from the 2025 government shutdown, this solution was far from perfect – and quite expensive.

Why, despite centuries of attention, does health care coverage remain one of – if not the most – perplexing and challenging domestic issues that Congress faces?

Consensus becomes more difficult

Part of this is a uniquely American problem: Like many services, the American health care system is based on economic incentives, and the foundational ideal of American liberalism means the government is inclined to let capitalism thrive.

As a former congressional staffer and now a scholar of Congress, I know that nowhere is the tension of societal support and personal freedom more apparent than the debate over health care access.

But the issue is also immensely complex, and today’s Congress does not have the resources to meet the challenge, particularly in the face of a sprawling executive branch.

Over time, as policies were adopted by the federal government, the scope of potential solutions expanded. To put it another way, as more cooks enter the policymaking kitchen, consensus became more difficult. The history of American health care is populated by private industries, powerful interest groups, federal officials and concerned citizens.

And the web of federal funding and private insurance companies across 50 states has resulted in a policy landscape that is easier to tweak, rather than whole-scale reform.

This is further stymied by the limited resources and expertise of the modern Congress. My research has shown that rank-and-file members are increasingly reliant on party leaders to take the lead on policymaking and problem-solving. Negotiating across coalitions and parties is unpleasant, and communicating policy changes on such a complex issue is difficult.

The result? Tepid policy tweaks made for partisan messaging.

And as ideological divisions on government support and personal autonomy become crystallized by the two parties in Congress, partisan policy solutions diverge even further. Collaboration becomes harder every year.

The continuing resolution passed late in 2025 funded the government only until Jan. 30, 2026, which means Congress is facing a Groundhog Day rather than a clean slate for the new year. With millions of Americans facing exploding health care costs, the question becomes who will Congress follow: party leadership or concerned constituents?

SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Perhaps no one outside of Venezuela or Cuba should care more about the U.S. capture of nominal President Nicolás Maduro than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Khamenei and his regime are in trouble, and it’s not clear how they would survive should the Trump administration decide to support the millions who want a new government system without Khamenei and his ilk.

Iran has no state allies that would be willing to intervene militarily on its behalf. Further, its once-powerful network of partner and proxy militias – Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other members of the Axis of Resistance – has been rendered incapable or reluctant to get involved. And Iran’s economy is in shambles in the midst of an ongoing water crisis with no relief in sight.

Further, the Iranian people have again taken to the streets to air their grievances against harsh economic conditions as well as government corruption, mismanagement and hypocrisy, echoing similar conditions to Venezuela in recent years.

Lastly, President Donald Trump has returned his attention to Iran. On Jan. 2, Trump warned Khamenei that if his forces violently suppress protesters, Iran would be “hit very hard” by the U.S.

Trump’s warning and show of solidarity will likely embolden protesters, which will almost certainly cause Iran’s internal security to crack down harder, as has happened in the past. Such U.S. intervention could lead to the overthrowing of the ayatollah, intended or not. Furthermore, Maduro’s fate demonstrates that the Trump administration is willing to use military force for that purpose if deemed necessary.

As an analyst of Middle East affairs focusing on Iran, I believe that these conditions place Khamenei’s regime under greater threat today than perhaps any other time in its 46-year history.

Growing threats, internal and external

If Khamenei hopes to survive politically or mortally, I believe he has three options.

First, he could capitulate to U.S. demands to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, Iran could sprint toward a nuclear bomb. Lastly, he could flee.

In hopes of restoring deterrence, Khamenei could also continue rebuilding his country’s military capabilities, which were significantly degraded during the June 2025 12-day war in which Israel and the U.S. aimed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability.

Israel is eager to stifle Iran’s reconstitution plans, protests are spreading and growing more intense, and Trump – through hostile rhetoric and offensive military action – has put Khamenei on notice.

Khameini’s problems aren’t his alone. The revolutionary theocratic system of government that he leads is in danger of falling. And his military and internal security apparatus may not have the time or ability to address its growing and interrelated internal and external threats simultaneously.

There are two fundamental factors analysts like me consider when assessing enemy threats: offensive capability to inflict damage and hostile intentions to use these capabilities to harm enemies.

Determining offensive capability involves evaluating the quality of a country or organization’s complete arsenal – air, ground, maritime, cyber and space capabilities – and how trained, disciplined, integrated and lethal their forces might be. Determining intentions involves evaluating if, when and under what conditions offensive capabilities will be used to achieve their goals.

If states hope to survive when they come under such pressure, their defense strategy should account for differences between their own military capability and the enemy’s, especially if enemies intend to attack. Or states need to convince enemies to be less hostile, if possible.

Maduro’s mistake was his inability to defend against a far superior U.S. military capability while believing that U.S. leaders would not remove him from office. Maduro gambled and lost.

Bad choices

Iran’s supreme leader faces a similar conundrum: First, there is no foreseeable path that allows Tehran to produce or acquire the military capabilities necessary to deter Israel or defeat the United States, unless Iran develops a nuclear weapon.

And decades of mutual hostility, the memory of Iran’s once-clandestine nuclear weaponization program and recent Iranian lawmaker calls to develop nuclear bombs minimizes the prospect that U.S. leaders view Khamenei’s intentions as anything but hostile.

But as the clear weaker party, it is in Tehran’s interest to change Trump’s mind about Tehran’s hostile intent. The way to do that would be by abandoning nuclear enrichment.

In terms of threat analysis, the regime’s oft-repeated chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” perhaps have sent an easily misinterpreted message: that Iran’s hostile leaders intend to destroy the U.S. and Israel. But they simply lack the capability, for now.

President Theodore Roosevelt famously said “speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” Today, he might say that Khamenei is unwise for speaking with such vitriol considering the size of Iran’s stick. The United States and Israel possess military capabilities far superior to Iran’s – as demonstrated by the 12-day war – but they did not then share the same intent. Though both Israel and the U.S. operations shared the objective of neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability, Israel’s objectives were more broad and included targeting senior Iranian leaders and destabilizing the regime.

To Khamenei’s momentary personal and institutional fortune, Trump immediately called for a ceasefire following U.S. B-2 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, delineating the United States’ narrower objectives that at the time did not include regime change in Iran.

But that was before U.S. forces removed Maduro from Caracas and before the outbreak of protests in Iran, both of which coincide with Israel’s signaling preparations for Round 2 against Iran.

Iran without Khamenei?

During Trump’s Dec. 29 press conference at Mar-a-Lago with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he warned that the U.S. could “knock the hell” out of Iran if the country reconstitutes its nuclear facilities.

This is separate from the ominuous warning that the U.S. could intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters; it would almost certainly differ in scale.

Nevertheless, a potential U.S. intervention could embolden protesters and further undermine and destabilize the Islamic Republic regime. Khamenei has predictably scoffed at and dismissed Trump’s warning.

I believe this is a serious mistake.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on Jan. 3, 2025, that Khameini should not “play games” as Maduro did. Khamenei, Rubio said, should take Trump’s warnings seriously. I agree.

If Iran refrains from violent crackdowns on protesters, there is a chance that anti-government protestors overthrow the government. But the supreme leader’s chances of surviving a popular uprising are probably greater than surviving an unbridled U.S. or Israeli military intent on ushering in a new – post-Islamic Republic – Iran.

Otherwise, Khamenei has to address superior U.S. and Israeli military capability, quickly. But Iran is broke, and even if sanctions were not continuously strangling Iran economically, the country could probably never purchase its way to military parity with the U.S. or Israel.

Alternatively, Iran could determine that it must move quickly to develop a nuclear weapon to mitigate U.S. and Israeli military capabilities and deter future aggression. However, it is extremely unlikely Iran could do this without U.S. and Israeli intelligence discovering the project, which would immediately trigger an overwhelming military campaign that would likely expedite regime change in Iran.

And like Maduro, the supreme leader is utterly alone. None of Maduro’s closest partners – China, Russia, Cuba and even Iran – were willing to fight in his defense, despite weeks of forewarning and U.S. military buildup near Venezuela.

Under these circumstances, it may be impossible for Khamenei to address overwhelming U.S. and Israeli military capabilities. He could, however, reduce the threat by doing what is necessary to ensure the United States’ objectives for Iran remain narrow and focused on the nuclear program, which may also keep Israel at bay.

However, Khamenei would have to demonstrate unprecedented restraint from cracking down violently on protesters and a willingness to give up nuclear enrichment. Due to historical animosity and distrust toward the U.S., both are unlikely, increasing, I believe, the probability of a forthcoming Iran without Khamenei.

Dr. Aaron Pilkington is a U.S. Air Force Senior Analyst of Middle East affairs and a Fellow at the University of Denver’s Center for Middle East Studies. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, the Department of the Air Force, or any other organizational affiliation.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The U.S. military operation in Venezuela and capture of President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, topped off months of military buildup and targeted strikes in the Caribbean Sea. It fulfills President Donald Trump’s claim to assert authoritative control over the Western Hemisphere, articulated in his administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

Some national security experts say U.S. military action in Venezuela – taken without U.S. congressional approval or U.N. Security Council authorization – is unlawful. It may violate domestic and international law.

The Venezuela attack represents the clearest example during Trump’s second presidency of the shift from traditional American values of democratic freedom and the rules-based international order to an America exerting unilateral power based purely on perceived economic interests and military might. Autocratic leaders are unconstrained by law and balance of power, using force to impose their will on others.

So, what does this transition from a liberal America in the world to an autocratic U.S. look like? After decades of working internationally on democracy and peace-building, I see three interrelated areas of long-standing U.S. foreign policy engagement being unraveled.

1. Peace and conflict prevention

The Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela reflect its “peace through strength” approach to international relations, which emphasizes military power. The actions also follow the emphasis the administration places on economic pressure and wins as a deterrent to war and a cudgel for peace.

This approach contrasts with decades of diplomatic efforts to build peace processes that last.

Foreign policy experts point out that the Trump administration’s emphasis on business deal-making in its conduct of foreign relations, focused on bargaining between positions, misses the point of peacemaking, which is to address underlying interests shared by parties and build the trust required to tackle the drivers of conflict.

Trump’s focus on deal-making also counters the world’s traditional reliance on the U.S. as an honest broker and a reliable economic partner that supports free trade. Trump made it clear that U.S. interest in oil is a key rationale for the Venezuela attack.

Before Venezuela, the limits of the Trump administration’s approach were already showing in the global conflicts Trump claims to have halted. That’s evident in ongoing violence between Thailand and Cambodia and in ceasefire violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Moreover, U.S. expertise and resources for sustainable peacemaking and preventing conflict are gone.

The entire Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations in the U.S. Department of State was dismantled in May 2025, while funding for conflict prevention and key peace programs like Women, Peace and Security was cut.

Trump’s unilateral military action against Venezuela belie an authentic commitment to sustainable peace.

While it’s too soon to predict Venezuela’s future under U.S. control, the Trump administration’s approach is likely to drive more global conflict and violence in 2026, as major powers begin to understand the different rules and learn to play the new game.

2. Democracy and human rights

Since the 1980s, U.S. national security strategies have incorporated aspects of democracy promotion and human rights as U.S. values.

Trump has not highlighted human rights and democracy as rationales for capturing Maduro. And, so far, the administration has rejected claims to the Venezuelan leadership by opposition leader María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, widely considered the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election.

Much of the U.S. foreign policy to build democracy globally and promote human rights was delivered through foreign assistance, worth over US$3 billion in 2024. The Trump administration cut that by nearly 75% in 2025.

These funds sought to promote fair elections, supporting civil societies and free media globally. They were also meant to help enable independent and corruption-free judiciaries in many countries, including Venezuela.

Since 1998, for example, the U.S. has funded 85% of the annual $10 million budget of the U.N Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. The fund, now imperiled, helps survivors recover from torture in the U.S. and around the world.

The congressionally mandated annual Human Rights Report issued by the State Department in August signaled the Trump administration’s intent to undermine key human rights obligations of foreign governments.

However, the White House has used tariffs, sanctions and military strikes to punish countries on purported human rights-related grounds, such as in Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa. Equally concerning to democracy defenders is its rhetoric chastising European democracies and apparent willingness to elevate political parties in Europe that reject human rights.

3. International cooperation

A major aim of U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been to counter threats to America’s security that require cooperation with other governments.

But the Trump administration is ignoring or denying many transnational threats. They include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, new technologies and climate change.

Moreover, the tools that America helped build to tackle shared global threats, like international law and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, have been disparaged and undermined.

Even before the U.S. attack on Venezuela, scholars were warning of the collapse of the international norm, embedded in the U.N. Charter, that prohibits the use of force by one sovereign country against another, except in specific cases of self-defense.

Early in 2025, Trump signaled an end to much of U.S. multilateral engagement, pulling the country out of many international bodies, agendas and treaties.

The administration proposed eliminating its contributions to U.N. agencies like the fund for children. It is also allocating only $300 million this year to the U.N., which is about one-fifth of the membership dues it owes the organization by law. A looming budgetary crisis has now consumed this sole worldwide deliberation body.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration says migration and drug trafficking, including from Venezuela, pose the greatest security threats. Its solutions – continuing U.S. economic and military might in the Americas – ignore shared challenges like corruption and human trafficking that drive these threats and also undermine U.S. economic security.

There is also evidence that the Trump administration is not only disregarding international law and retreating from America’s long-standing respect for international cooperation, but it’s also seeking to reshape policy in its own image and punish those it disagrees with.

For example, its call to reframe global refugee protections – to undermine the principle that prohibits a return of people to a country where they could be persecuted – would alter decades-old international and U.S. domestic law. The Trump administration has already dismantled much of the U.S. refugee program, lowering the cap for 2025 to historic levels.

Even for those who work in international institutions, there could also be a price to pay for an illiberal America. For instance, the Trump administration has economically sanctioned many judges and prosecutors of the International Criminal Court for their work.

And the administration has threatened more sanctions unless the court promises not to prosecute Trump – a more salient challenge now with the apparent U.S. aggression against Venezuela, which is a party to the International Criminal Court.

Some democracy experts worry that the U.S. military action in Venezuela not only undermines international law, but it may also serve to reinforce Trump’s project to undo the rule of law and democracy at home.

Until July 1, 2025, Shelley Inglis served in the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance at the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D).

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Colorado is the sixth-least affordable state for child care in the nation. Costs for center-based care average 14% of a two-parent household’s median income and 45% of a single parent’s median income. The federal affordability benchmark is just 7%.

Colorado also faces significant shortages in access to slots in licensed child care programs. In 2023, more than 40,000 Colorado parents reported quitting a job, turning down a job or significantly changing a job because of problems with child care.

Recently, several Colorado counties passed measures to subsidize child care through local taxes. Despite these advancements, Colorado’s child care system is facing a fiscal crisis that is likely to affect families and children for years to come.

Child care disruptions for families with infants and toddlers are estimated to cost the state more than US$2.7 billion in lost economic productivity and revenue. Ensuring access to affordable child care supports workforce participation and enhances the well-being of children and families.

I study early care and education policies and programs that promote children’s cognitive, behavioral and social-emotional learning. My research lab at Colorado State University has been investigating the consequences of a lack of access to high-quality, affordable child care on child and family outcomes.

Colorado’s Child Care Assistance Program

Since the late 1990s, the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program has subsidized the cost of child care for parents and caregivers with lower incomes who are working, searching for work or pursuing education. My research shows these subsidies are a critical lifeline that help lower-income families access child care.

Subsidies allow families to prioritize factors other than cost, such as location, in their search for child care. From 2023 to 2024, the Colorado subsidy program served more than 30,000 children in the state. That’s about 10% of those who qualified, which is typical for most states.

A federal March 2024 rule from the Administration for Children and Families caps family co-payments at no more than 7% of household income. It also requires reimbursement rates to reflect the full cost of care, whereas previously subsidy payments were based on what families could afford to pay.

Although intended to improve affordability for families and adequately compensate child care programs, the rule included no additional federal funding. In Colorado, meeting these new requirements is projected to cost the subsidy system approximately $43 million more per year.

These changes, combined with the expiration of COVID-19 relief funding that provided Colorado an additional $465 million to stabilize and expand child care assistance, has created growing financial instability for the subsidy system.

Approximately one-third of Colorado counties are experiencing an enrollment freeze for their child care subsidies. This means new applicants cannot access subsidized care until the freeze is lifted. There is no set timeline for when that will occur.

Without additional funding that would allow the freeze to be lifted, enrollment in Colorado’s Child Care Assistance Program is estimated to decline by 64%, falling from about 30,000 to just 10,000 enrollees. As children age out or families no longer qualify, spots that would normally open up for new enrollees will remain unfilled during the freeze.

Zooming in on Larimer County

I have been studying the impacts of the enrollment freeze in my hometown of Larimer County, Colorado. It’s a geographically diverse region that includes urban centers such as Fort Collins and Loveland, mountain destinations such as Estes Park, and rural agricultural communities. Like elsewhere in the state, child care costs pose a significant financial strain on local families.

A household in Larimer County with a median income of $64,919 and two children under the age of 5 spends approximately 37% of its income on child care. Due to budget constraints, Larimer County has had an enrollment freeze in the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program since February of 2024. The county has effectively paused the intake of new applicants for subsidies.

Recently, we administered surveys to 88 families in Larimer County. Approximately half of those surveyed were currently receiving a subsidy and half had applied but were unable to access it because of the freeze. We compared families using advanced statistical modeling that controlled for any differences between groups, allowing us to isolate the effects of the subsidy freeze on family outcomes.

In unpublished research that is being prepared for peer review, we found families affected by the freeze used fewer paid child care hours, faced higher costs, expressed greater concerns about costs, and reported more difficulty paying for care. They also had less reliable and stable arrangements, were less satisfied with their care, experienced higher child care-related stress and displayed greater risk of depression.

But that’s not all. Families without a subsidy reported missing twice as many workdays. When extrapolated across the 425 families in Larimer County affected by the freeze, this translated to over $2.2 million in lost annual earnings.

Local initiatives driving solutions

Recognizing the gaps in affordable child care, counties across Colorado introduced ballot measures to fund local solutions through tax revenue.

These measures come after the state established a universal preschool program in 2022. The following year, the program provided up to 15 hours per week of tuition-free, high-quality preschool for more than 85,000 children.

Measures in Larimer, San Miguel, Garfield, Pitkin and southwest Eagle counties will directly fund child care through sales or property taxes. Measures in Gilpin, Hinsdale, Ouray and Eagle counties will generate funds through lodging taxes.

In Larimer, voters passed a measure that established an additional countywide sales tax of 0.25%, or 25 cents per 100 dollars. The measure is expected to generate $28 million annually for child care assistance and workforce compensation.

In San Miguel, voters passed an existing property tax of 75 cents for every 1,000 dollars of assessed property value, allowing the county to collect and use all the revenue it generates instead of being limited by a new state cap. This will allow the county to retain nearly $1 million annually to support local child care affordability.

In Eagle County, voters passed a measure approving a lodging tax increase from 2% to 4% on hotel stays and short-term rentals that will raise approximately $4.5 million annually to lower child care costs.

Revenue from these initiatives will provide child care tuition to families, expand child care slots, support quality improvement and raise wages for child care workers.

These local investments cannot by themselves resolve Colorado’s statewide child care funding deficit, but they have the potential to transform access and quality within communities where they are implemented.

Colorado is not alone in these issues. Many other states are facing subsidy enrollment freezes and are exploring regional solutions to stabilize funding.

For example, ballot measures in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Seattle, Washington, also recently passed, providing reliable funding for child care assistance, preschool quality and workforce compensation.

With the uncertainty of the state and federal funding landscape, municipalities across the country may look to Colorado as a model for locally driven strategies that address community needs.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

Jenn Finders has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, and North Central Regional Center for Rural Development.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation