Category: Uncategorized

Martha Gellhorn stowed away on a hospital ship to become the only woman journalist to land on Normandy Beach on D-Day. She carried stretchers before writing her harrowing account of the invasion.

The New Yorker’s famously epicurean writer A.J. Liebling subsisted on military rations and came under fire during World War II to describe what it was like for the soldiers and sailors at war.

Syndicated columnist Ernie Pyle died, in a helmet and Army fatigues, among some of the troops whose names and hometowns he carefully included in his dispatches. “At this spot, the 77th Infantry lost a buddy,” read the makeshift sign posted at the place where a Japanese machine gun bullet felled him.

Those reporters told stories of war in all its gore and its glory, its exhilaration and its ennui. Others have laid bare the anxiety and doubts.

Veteran Vietnam correspondent Neil Sheehan broke the story of the Pentagon Papers, which showed how government officials deceived the public about the Vietnam war. Sheehan won a Pulitzer Prize for his book, “A Bright Shining Lie,” which chronicled the war’s impact on idealists who once believed in it, through the story of his relationship with an inside source.

Well before bombs started dropping on Iran and President Donald Trump began to tease the notion of a ground invasion, his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, began putting obstacles in the way of the reporters with the most experience covering the nation’s military. While Hegseth’s moves haven’t stopped the reporters from doing their jobs, it has made it harder for them to keep the public informed.

As someone who worked as a Washington correspondent for decades, I worry that these obstacles could limit the number of reporters who have the experience with – and trust of – key sources to do the kind of in-depth, nuanced journalism that a war, with its price in lives and resources, deserves.

Corralling the watchdogs

Generally, war correspondents need the cooperation of the military they are covering to get to the front. For the U.S. press, that requires relationships and credibility at the Pentagon.

Early in 2025, Hegseth ordered major news organizations to give up their desks in the Pentagon press room to MAGA favorites. NPR’s desk went to Breitbart News. Roaming the hallways, where reporters sometimes found sources who would deviate from the company line, became verboten.

Eventually, the area in the Pentagon where reporters were allowed was circumscribed to a single corridor outside the press room – even though the public affairs officers who worked most closely with reporters were in an office on the other side of the 6½-million-square-foot building.

Then Hegseth conditioned the issuance of press credentials on reporters, effectively giving military brass the right to censor or sanitize their reports.

As a result, almost the entire Pentagon press corps, which included outlets ranging from The Associated Press to The New York Times to Fox News and USNI News, which covers the Navy, moved out of the building in October 2025. Some have been invited back for the press briefings Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have begun to give on progress of the battle in Iran.

But after the first of these briefings, the Pentagon abruptly banned photographers from attending, reportedly because Hegseth’s staff found some of their images of him to be unflattering.

Secretary on defense

Gone are the off-camera “background” briefings where Department of Defense brass could give trusted reporters greater context and nuance for battlefield decisions. Gone are the impromptu hallway meetings where reporters have, with luck or persistence, picked up information that deviates from an administration’s agreed-upon script.

Also not in evidence, at least not so far: the deployment of the kind of journalistic embed program that the Pentagon used during the Iraq war to give the American people an up-close look at troops in the conflict zone.

How might that affect what you, the public, gets to know? It was a combination of an anonymous tip and insider access that led the legendary investigative reporter Seymour Hersh to break the devastating story of My Lai, the American soldiers’ massacre of civilians during the Vietnam War.

At the made-for-TV briefings he does hold, Hegseth devotes most of the session to questions from outlets such as the Epoch Times, The Daily Caller and LindellTV – owned by Mike Lindell, the head of the well-known pillow company.

At one recent briefing, one of the favored new cadre tossed Hegseth a shameless softball. Referring to American troops in the Middle East, the questioner asked: “What is your prayer for them?”

Yet as hostilities drag on, even some among Hegseth’s chosen press corps have begun to ask irksome questions about the war. The normally Trump-friendly Daily Caller ran a less-than-flattering piece about the president berating a reporter for asking about troop deployments.

On March 4, 2026, Hegseth accused journalists of focusing on war casualties to make “the president look bad.” On March 13, Hegseth castigated as “more fake news” CNN’s report that the Trump administration had underestimated the impact of the war on shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.

“The sooner David Ellison takes over that network, the better,” Hegseth concluded, adding fuel to the speculation that a Trump supporter who won a bidding war for CNN’s corporate parent is going to turn the network into a more administration-friendly outlet.

Soon after, Federal Communications Commission chairman Brendan Carr threatened network broadcast licenses over coverage critical of the administration’s conduct of the war. Echoing Carr’s threats the next day: the president himself.

‘Be a Marine’

The Trump administration is not alone in its disdain for a free press: Israel has long been notorious for restricting press access from areas where it is conducting military operations.

Leaders of the theocratic Iranian regime are even worse; the country is cited by press freedom advocate Reporters Without Borders as “one of the world’s most repressive countries in terms of press freedom.”

But the United States has historically distinguished itself by making freedom its calling card, even – or perhaps especially – in wartime.

“The news may be good, or bad. We shall tell you the truth,” Voice of America, a U.S. government-launched radio network, promised – in German – in its very first broadcast to Nazi Germany in 1942.

Now, however, the Trump administration, is busy trying to undermine the editorial independence of Voice of America, which broadcasts news to countries that don’t have a free press.

Pentagon reporters are continuing to find ways to get around the propaganda. NPR’s Tom Bowman told me that he takes inspiration from a pep talk he overheard a military source deliver to another reporter crestfallen over the lack of access.

“Quit whining and be a Marine,” the official said. “Go over, under or around the obstacle. Find a way to do it.”

Most reporters and their organizations are doing just that, finding sources outside the administration, like the ones in Congress who told The Hill how much money the war is costing taxpayers per day. And they’re continuing to get information from sources on the inside, like the ones who told The Wall Street Journal that Trump’s military advisers warned him that Iran might block the Gulf of Hormuz, but that he opted for war anyway.

So far, neither Hegseth’s obstacle course nor threats from the White House and the FCC have stopped the press from reporting stories or asking questions that the administration would rather not see or hear.

But restrictions on press freedom have a corrosive effect. We already have seen how Trump, using lawsuits and licensing threats, has used his power to make corporate media owners think twice about pursuing news he doesn’t like.

Seasoned Pentagon reporters will still find ways to get to sources they already have. But Hegseth’s tactic of blocking press access to the military keeps reporters from developing new sources and keeps new reporters from building the relationships they need to become seasoned Pentagon reporters.

Americans have long been able to understand the triumphs and tribulations of American troops at war, and to make intelligent decisions about whether they approve of a war’s cost, because a free press has been able to tell the story – good or bad. That tradition is now at risk.

Kathy Kiely does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Americans have a reputation for being bad at world geography, and the current U.S. administration is no exception, particularly when it comes to correctly identifying what is – and is not – part of the United States of America.

President Donald Trump’s April 2025 executive order “unleashing America’s offshore critical minerals” provides an example. It purports to “unleash” seabed minerals both within and far outside U.S. jurisdiction.

The minerals on the U.S. seabed are America’s. The minerals on the international seabed are not “America’s.” The administration plans to authorize companies to mine in international areas, nonetheless.

I have studied the international agreements and customary rules governing the oceans since the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force in 1994. The Trump administration’s attempt to unilaterally exploit the seabed resources of the global commons will severely undermine part of the rules-based international order that the U.S. built and of which it has been the main beneficiary.

The scramble for critical minerals

The U.S. has been trying to secure access to critical minerals that are essential for modern technology. These materials include nickel, manganese and cobalt for large batteries and copper for the power grid. All can be found on land, but some can also be found at the bottom of the sea.

Of particular interest are polymetallic nodules – agglomerations, typically smaller than a potato, containing manganese and other metals and found in the silt of the deep ocean floor. An Australian mining executive described these nodules as “an EV battery in a rock.”

The Clarion Clipperton Zone, in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, contains one of the highest concentrations of polymetallic nodules. But whose nodules are they?

My ocean

In September 1945, President Harry Truman claimed for America a large part of the seabed extending from its shores, areas that, before Truman’s claim, were shared by the international community.

In reaction, countries around the world spent the next five decades hammering out a system to limit how much of the seabed that coastal countries could claim, and establishing rules that would govern the remaining shared areas of the oceans.

The resulting arrangement, finalized in 1994, gives countries that border the ocean authority over the resources in the water and seabed within 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) of their coasts, known as “exclusive economic zones,” and, for some countries, additional areas of seabed beyond that limit.

The United States enjoys one of the world’s largest exclusive economic zones today. It includes an area totaling over 4 million square miles (10 million square kilometers) – larger than all 50 U.S. states combined – and an additional nearly 400 million square miles (1 million square kilometers) of seabed extending even farther offshore.

In those areas, the United States controls the exploitation and management of living and nonliving natural resources, including seabed minerals.

Our ocean

But exclusive economic zones were only one part of what the Law of the Sea Convention negotiators called a “package deal.”

The other part of the deal retains the remaining areas – approximately half of the planet’s seabed – for the international community. It’s known as “the Area,” and its resources are considered the common heritage of mankind. To prevent a free-for-all, no single country can authorize mining in the Area. Instead it is managed by the International Seabed Authority for the benefit of humankind as a whole. To date, the ISA has executed 31 contracts with countries and companies to explore the mineral resources in the Area.

One hundred and seventy-one countries have joined the Convention so far. However, the United States, despite being one of its primary architects, is the only industrialized nation remaining outside the treaty.

Nonetheless, the U.S. has long considered the treaty to reflect rules of customary international law. Where the Area is concerned, the U.S. respected the terms of the package deal – until now.

‘America’s’ offshore critical minerals

Trump’s offshore mining order relies on a U.S. statute enacted in 1980 as an interim measure pending completion of negotiations related to the Area. It authorized the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to license exploration and permit commercial recovery of polymetallic nodules on the seabed in areas outside U.S. jurisdiction.

When that 1980 statute was enacted, there was a spurt of commercial interest. The U.S. issued four exploration licenses. Two were relinquished in the 1990s. In the 30-plus years since the international community finalized the package deal, even the company holding the two remaining NOAA licenses – Lockheed Martin – has considered them largely worthless unless the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Convention.

That changed in April 2025 when Trump, citing the 1980 U.S. law, ordered the NOAA to “expedite the process for reviewing and issuing seabed mineral exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits in areas beyond national jurisdiction.”

A few days later, Canadian mining firm The Metals Company submitted an application via its wholly-owned subsidiary TMC USA to mine polymetallic nodules in the Area under U.S. unilateral authority. TMC USA touted its application for mining areas in the nodule-rich Clarion Clipperton Zone – in the middle of the Area – as a “world first”.

The International Seabed Authority condemned the move and reminded countries that “unilateral exploitation of resources that belong to no single State but to all of humanity is prohibited.”

Is that legal?

So, does the Trump administration’s plan violate U.S. international obligations?

The answer is maybe.

The U.S. is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, so it is not bound by the treaty. But scholars disagree on whether U.S. unilateral mining would violate obligations arising from rules of customary international law.

The United States is not the only player in this game. If any of the 171 countries that have subscribed to the treaty were to participate in or allow their citizens to participate in U.S.-authorized mining activity in the Area, they would violate their treaty obligations. Any other Convention partner could bring them before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany.

Canada, home of TMC, could find itself in that position. So could many nations whose citizens or companies have worked with TMC. If those partners continued their work with TMC USA under U.S. authorization, their home countries could be exposed to legal action.

The Area is not a domestic source

In announcing an expedited seabed mining application process in January 2026, NOAA Administrator Neil Jacobs mischaracterized polymetallic nodules in the Area as “a domestic source of critical minerals for the United States.”

To be clear, the United States has critical minerals on its land territory and within its area of exclusive seabed jurisdiction. It is beginning to explore those resources with an eye to possible future mining. These are domestic American sources of critical minerals – they are “America’s.” The minerals in the Area are not.

Yes, America needs critical minerals, but it should not undermine the system of international ocean governance – a system it engineered and from which it benefits perhaps more than any other nation – to get them.

Coalter G Lathrop does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Nearly one-third of U.S. children reported missing are Black, even though Black people constitute roughly 14% of the U.S. population.

To address one dimension of this problem, Pennsylvania and a few other states, including Alabama and Massachusetts, have in recent years proposed legislation to reform missing child alert systems. Not all missing children cases trigger an Amber Alert – the nationwide emergency alert system for missing children – but those that do receive greater public and media attention. These states suggest implementing an “Ebony Alert” that focuses on children of color.

Pennsylvania state Rep. Gina Curry introduced a bill “specifically tailored to finding missing Black and Brown youth” in June 2024 and reintroduced it in January 2025. It is currently sitting in the Children and Youth Committee.

Pennsylvania and the other states where these laws are pending are taking a cue from California, which started its statewide Ebony Alert program in January 2024. California’s system aims to guarantee that cases of missing Black youth are treated fairly by law enforcement agencies and the public is alerted in similar fashion and through the same venues offered under Amber Alerts.

I am a law professor who studies victimization and inequalities in the criminal legal system. In a recent legal paper, attorney Tanisha Brown and I examined how Ebony-like laws might save more Black children who go missing.

Our study focuses specifically on Black children, though we recognize that the disproportionate number of missing children from Native American and other marginalized communities also deserve attention and further inquiry.

The crisis of missing Black children

Our original data analysis suggests that the probability of Black children going missing is three times that of white children.

The May 2025 Minority and Missing Report – a collaborative effort among leading law enforcement and various civil society groups – also highlighted the disproportionate number of missing Black, American Indian and Alaska Native children.

These disparities extend beyond reporting rates for missing children.

Black children are also more vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation than white children. Structural inequalities, such as poverty, housing instability and overrepresentation in the foster care system, compound their risks.

Amber’s role in the disparities

The Amber Alert system was adopted in the early 2000s. Amber stands for America’s Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response. It is a powerful and comprehensive alert infrastructure that distributes information about a missing child through radio, television, text messages, highway signs, email notifications and major online platforms, including Google and Facebook.

Many of the kids who go missing are victims of crime – abducted from their neighborhoods, homes and schools, subjected to physical and psychological abuse, and, in some tragic cases, killed. Amber Alerts mobilize communities to assist in the search process.

To issue an Amber Alert, law enforcement must determine that specific statutory conditions are met, including the age of the child, law enforcement’s belief in imminent danger of serious injury or death, and the sufficiency of existing information to assist in recovery. Crucially, children who are categorized as “runaways” are excluded from Amber eligibility.

Advocacy groups for missing children argue that for a host of reasons, including implicit and explicit racial bias, Black children who go missing are disproportionately labeled as runaways. This excludes them from the protections of the Amber system and reduces the likelihood of them being found.

Even when an Amber Alert is initiated, some data suggests that Black children are less likely to be recovered than white children.

States respond with Ebony Alerts

California’s Ebony Alert system ensures that all cases involving missing Black youth receive public notification comparable in scope and visibility to Amber Alerts. It offers different criteria for the initiation of the alerts. For example, an Ebony Alert may be issued when law enforcement determines that an individual went missing under “unexplained and suspicious circumstances.”

The Pennsylvania proposal generally follows California’s provisions, while stating that it is intended for “young people of color.”

These efforts publicly acknowledge and attempt to address the disproportionate impact of missing-child crises on Black communities. They also shine light on the limitations of formally colorblind frameworks like Amber, as Amber’s race-neutral design has, in practice, produced racially disparate outcomes – with potential life-or-death consequences.

Addressing Amber’s structural flaws

In order to fix the Amber Alert system in states without Ebony Alert legislation, we propose three reforms that would reduce flaws in its design.

1. A more holistic evaluation of missing child cases: Currently, all Amber factors must be present to initiate an alert. Our approach suggests that no single factor should stop an alert from being issued. Doing so will require law enforcement agents to approach each case with more complexity and nuance, including recognizing particular community needs.

2. A broader spectrum of “at risk” conditions: Law enforcement can issue alerts in cases beyond the most typical cases of “serious risk to bodily integrity or death.” This might include “unexplained and suspicious circumstances” or recognizing that the missing person might be subject to trafficking.

3. Shift the burden within law enforcement decision-making: To mitigate bias in alert initiation, we propose that law enforcement bear the burden of explaining why not to initiate an alert – instead of why to – when they cannot explain circumstances behind a child going missing.

Together, these reforms could significantly address existing problems within the Amber system itself.

Equal protection challenges

The design of Ebony Alert laws, however, raises a constitutional question: Can such laws withstand equal protection challenges?

Under current doctrine, Ebony Alert laws would likely be considered a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny, an almost impassable legal hurdle. The 2020 Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, in which the Supreme Court ruled that several race-conscious admission programs at Harvard and the University of North Carolina violated the equal protection clause, might have further challenged this type of legislation.

To pass strict scrutiny, laws must be narrowly tailored interventions that serve a compelling state interest.

As Brown and I argue, the interests and context of Ebony Alert laws differ meaningfully from those in the Students for Fair Admission case. Ebony is law-enforcement legislation aimed at protecting children who are victims of crime. Courts have long recognized that “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” is a compelling interest.

Ebony Alert laws also address documented racial disparities in the Amber system that undermine equal protection and public safety. According to case law, race-conscious measures may be deemed compelling when “essential to accomplishing criminal system objectives within a community served,” including maintaining trust and perceptions of fairness. These points are developed more fully in our paper.

To be sure, Ebony Alerts are not a panacea. As the Minority and Missing Report emphasizes, there are broader issues, such as inconsistent reporting protocols, inadequate training and strained relations between marginalized communities and police.

Nonetheless, Ebony Alert proposals invite a broader reckoning with how race-neutral systems can produce racially unequal outcomes. Carefully designed race-conscious remedies may be necessary to fulfill the criminal legal system’s most basic promise: protecting children’s lives.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

Itay Ravid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Childhood poverty in the U.S. fell to its lowest level in history in 2021. The fall was largely due to the expanded child tax credit and other COVID-19 pandemic supports that put cash directly in the hands of parents and lifted millions of children out of poverty.

Once these safety net changes expired at the end of 2021, childhood poverty rebounded, surging from 5% in 2021 to 13% in 2024.

While federal anti-poverty initiatives like the child tax credit expansion have stalled, states like Colorado are increasingly leveraging their tax codes to combat poverty. The Colorado Family Affordability Tax Credit took effect in tax year 2024. It is one of the most substantial and accessible state-level programs designed to support families, potentially offering thousands of dollars to low-income Colorado parents.

As economic policy researchers, we are conducting a three-year evaluation of the Colorado Family Affordability Tax Credit. We estimate that the credit reduces child poverty in Colorado by about 20%, and that reduction increases to 37% when combined with other state tax credits for low-income families, moving roughly 52,000 children above the poverty line.

Colorado’s approach is projected to have one of the strongest anti-poverty effects among state refundable child tax credits. If Colorado’s design were implemented in every U.S. state, child poverty nationwide could be reduced by more than one-third.

However, due to the complicated funding structure of the Colorado tax credit, the program is at risk. Changes in federal legislation created tax breaks for Colorado businesses, reducing state revenue projections. Since the credit is only available when Colorado state revenue growth is above 3%, these tax breaks caused the Family Affordability Tax Credit to be suspended for 2026, meaning the credit may not be part of families’ 2027 tax refunds.

Changes put Colorado families at risk

State anti-poverty programs are more vital now as planned cuts to federal safety net programs may substantially reduce the benefits available for low-income families. The 2025 federal tax breaks and spending cuts package expanded work requirements for the Supplement Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, and Medicaid – programs that millions of families rely on to meet their food and healthcare needs.

Following this change, most working-age adults enrolled in these programs must work 80 hours per month. Previously, Medicaid had no work requirements and SNAP had work requirement exemptions for older working-age adults. The law requires states to implement these changes by Jan. 1, 2027, though some states, such as Georgia and Ohio, are starting earlier. Proponents argue that work requirements encourage labor force participation and reduce government spending.

However, research finds that stricter work requirements reduce program participation more than they increase work. Changing enrollment systems requires retraining staff and providing outreach and education to enrollees, which is costly to implement.

As a result, many Americans may lose benefits not because of an unwillingness to work, but because of complex rules and red tape, which are difficult to manage while juggling unsteady jobs, caregiving obligations or health issues.

Federal changes to the safety net will hit Colorado especially hard. Early estimates from simulation models applying the new requirements show that roughly 298,000 Colorado families could lose their SNAP benefits, and 154,000 could lose Medicaid coverage. These cuts will disproportionately affect families with children, low-wage workers and families already struggling to make ends meet.

Amid soaring costs of living in the state, tighter eligibility doesn’t eliminate need. Instead, it forces families into difficult trade-offs. Those could include skipping meals, delaying medical care or falling behind on rent.

Using the tax system to support families

Colorado’s Family Affordability Tax Credit was implemented in 2024. The credit provides US$3,200 per child under age 6 and $2,400 per child ages 6 to 16, making it one of the most substantial state child tax credits.

Married couples filing jointly with eligible children who earn up to about $95,000 per year qualify for a portion of the credit. It is fully refundable, meaning families can receive the credit as a tax refund even if they do not owe anything in state taxes. Delivered through the tax system, access is simple and largely automatic for most households.

Parents who received the credit consistently told us in interviews that it made it easier for them to afford paying for their basic needs, such as food, housing, utilities and transportation. The reduced financial strain also improved their emotional well-being and family dynamics. As one caregiver noted, lower stress meant they weren’t in “hustle mode” just to keep the lights on.

The credit is “more than a dollar amount,” another said. It provides “peace of mind.”

Parents also highlighted the positive effects that receiving this tax credit had on children. The money allowed some to take their kids to activities and on outings, and allowed many parents to feel more present with their children.

“If I’m relaxed and my own cup is full, I can fill theirs,” said one parent. “It’s a ripple effect.”

More than 60% of the families we surveyed said they preferred the tax credit to other kinds of government benefits, citing its flexibility and ease of use. Unlike programs that require frequent reporting or compliance checks, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Colorado’s Family Affordability Tax Credit was often described as straightforward.

“I never feel it’s that difficult to get,” said one participant we interviewed.

Why tax credits work — and where this approach can fall short

Colorado’s tax-based approach to fighting poverty, which includes the Family Affordability Tax Credit, the Colorado Earned Income Tax Credit and the Colorado Child Tax Credit, offers flexible support via a familiar system. However, this approach has limitations.

Millions, including about 1 in 4 workers eligible for the federal Earned Income Tax Credit in Colorado, don’t file taxes. That means they may miss out on the tax credits.

Another issue is that lump-sum payments can be difficult to budget for people who rely on government benefits to make ends meet. Our research suggests that one-third of Colorado respondents preferred monthly payments. We’ve also found that two-thirds of federal child tax credit recipients in 2021 preferred monthly payments for budgeting reasons.

Why state investment in children matters

Although the full impacts of the Family Affordability Tax Credit on Colorado’s children are not yet known, a robust body of research points to the powerful role state policies can play in shaping young children’s development. Increased family income benefits children by enabling greater family resources, such as educational spending, and reducing parental stress.

Importantly, increasing spending that supports families with children can yield long-term benefits for society by improving children’s health, education, employment and economic stability later in life. Research shows a 10-to-1 return on investment from providing refundable tax credits to these families.

As federal support wanes, state policies, like Colorado’s, could be crucial for providing the stability children need to grow, learn and thrive. Unless Colorado makes the Family Affordability Tax Credit a permanent and reliable fixture of the state budget – as a recent proposal aims to do – the progress the state has made in reducing child poverty may only be temporary.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

Stephen Roll receives funding from Gary Community Ventures.

Jenn Finders has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, North Central Regional Center for Rural Development, and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Leah Hamilton receives funding from Gary Community Ventures.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The Department of Homeland Security issued a policy memo in February 2026 that could lead to the detention of refugees who are legally in the country.

The new policy states that “DHS may arrest and detain a refugee who has lived in the United States for at least one year and has not yet acquired” lawful permanent resident status. Approximately 100,000 refugees could be at risk for such arrest and detention.

The policy rescinds a 2010 DHS policy that limited the agency’s ability to arrest refugees. The 2010 policy was cited in a 2026 court order that temporarily prohibited agents with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement from arresting refugees in Minnesota in an effort to root out cases of fraud in the refugee admissions process.

As an immigration scholar, I believe the new DHS memo constitutes a massive departure from previous policy – one that could result in the detention of thousands of people who have lawful immigration status.

To better understand the new DHS policy and the change it represents, it’s helpful to clarify what it means to be a refugee.

Refugees flee persecution

Refugees flee their countries to escape persecution due to their race, religion, nationality or political opinion. Under U.S. immigration law, a refugee is someone who arrived in the U.S. through an official U.S. resettlement process.

After registering as a refugee abroad, the process for being resettled in the U.S. can take years – sometimes decades – and requires rigorous background checks.

Upon arrival, refugees are permitted to live and work indefinitely in the U.S. They are also eligible to “adjust” their immigration status to lawful permanent resident, also known as a “green card,” after one year in the country.

At issue with the new DHS policy is the interpretation of Section 209 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the statute that governs refugee adjustments and moves them from refugee status to lawful permanent resident.

Section 209 states that refugees who have been physically present in the U.S. for one year and haven’t yet received lawful permanent resident status “shall, at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of DHS for inspection and admission” as a lawful permanent resident.

Historically, this has meant that refugees are required to undergo a secondary screening, through an interview or paper application, before receiving their green cards.

But DHS is now interpreting the language in Section 209 to impose a duty on refugees to voluntarily return to DHS custody – which it defines as detention – after one year in the country. This is despite the fact that refugees are not even eligible for legal permanent resident status until they have been in the country for a full year, putting refugees in an impossible situation.

Essentially, every refugee could face imprisonment unless immigration officials review and approve their green card applications at exactly the one-year mark.

History of refugee policy

The language in Section 209 arose after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, a law that created our current refugee resettlement framework. Prior to this, there was no fixed legal mechanism for resettling refugees in the U.S.

Instead, the government responded to humanitarian crises largely on an ad hoc basis. It temporarily allowed people into the U.S. from Vietnam and Cuba.

Once here, those individuals had no long-term legal status unless Congress managed to pass after-the-fact legislation authorizing them to apply for green cards, as it did for Cubans with the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.

The Refugee Act of 1980 was meant to solve this problem. It established a legal mechanism for refugee resettlement. It created a new refugee immigration status and ensured that refugees are eligible for permanent residency.

The earliest regulations implementing Section 209 show the “returned to custody” language was satisfied by attending an interview at a local immigration office. It was part of the green card process that was eventually replaced with a paper application.

The regulations implementing that change state that the “‘custody’ requirement for refugees applying for adjustment of status” can be met by filing an application.

What the DHS memo means for refugees

So, what normally happens if a refugee fails to submit their application?

Usually, nothing.

Until relatively recently, refugees weren’t even permitted to file for lawful permanent residence until after living in the country for a year.

Previous ICE guidance recognized that even if a refugee fails to file a green card application at all, they still maintain their lawful refugee immigration status. The failure to submit an application did not create any basis to deport a refugee. Therefore, absent other factors, immigration detention was inappropriate.

What will refugees do now?

Immigration attorneys are advising their refugee clients to file for lawful permanent status immediately, if they have not yet done so, to reduce the risk of detention. But that may not be enough.

The DHS memo states that a refugee “may be considered to have voluntarily returned to custody” if they filed their application and complied with any interviews. But the wording of the memo leaves open the door to detain anyone who has not yet had their application approved.

This leads to another issue, which is DHS administrative delays. The government currently takes approximately 12 months to approve refugee green card applications for requests it’s willing to process.

In January 2026, another DHS policy put an indefinite hold on all applications for individuals from a list of 39 countries. Consequently, applications for refugees from countries including Haiti, Afghanistan and Republic of the Congo are not being reviewed at all.

This means that refugees who have done everything right could be imprisoned indefinitely under this policy, because the U.S. government is refusing to judge their applications.

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration has capped refugee admissions for 2026 to a record low of 7,500.

At least one federal lawsuit has already been filed to challenge this new policy.

What happens now depends on how far DHS is willing to go and whether the courts allow it to do so.

Ashley Sanchez is the director of the Notre Dame Immigration Clinic, where she and her students represent refugees seeking permanent residency. She was previously the Supervising Attorney at Cleveland Catholic Charities, Migration and Refugee Services.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Despite the scale of its military assault on Iran, the Trump administration’s reasons for entering into war have been inconsistent and vague, from regime change to the destruction of nuclear weapons, preempting military action by Israel, or the more chilling decree of following “God’s divine plan.”

Politicians, pundits and even social media users have been quick to point out the contradictions of these justifications – regime change is impossible from the air, especially when you kill the alternatives, and weren’t those nuclear weapons already destroyed?

But the “why” for entering into war matters beyond scoring political points.

Why, and how, a president engages in military action has serious implications for the constitutional authority of any wartime action and, specifically, whether Congress has any hope of checking the warmaking of a president.

War powers and ‘imminent threats’

Under Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, only Congress has the authority to declare war.

One way around this, as the Trump administration and congressional Republicans have half-heartedly attempted, is to avoid calling this conflict a “war.” The messaging didn’t stick. In fact, President Donald Trump has already used the term repeatedly.

The more viable option for sidestepping the need to have Congress declare a war is for the president to claim authority under the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which grants a president the power to involve the armed forced in “hostilities” or “potential hostilities” without congressional approval only under extraordinary conditions of “imminent threat.”

At least one member of the administration appears to understand this nuance: Secretary of State Marco Rubio – notably, a former member of Congress himself. Rubio used the specific terminology “imminent threat” when discussing why the Trump administration began the bombing.

Absent a truly imminent threat, the president is required by the resolution to “consult regularly” with Congress before and after engaging in military action. Importantly, the military action is limited to 60 days, during which the president must “report to the Congress periodically” with updates to keep the legislative branch informed.

After 60 days, the president must, the resolution says, “terminate any use of United States Armed Forces.” If a president wants to wage a war longer than that, that requires an additional declaration by Congress. Such a declaration would require votes similar to a bill being passed.

In 2002, for example, after initiating a “war on terror,” President George W. Bush eventually turned to Congress to pass the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq. This permitted Bush to send troops into Iraq and further pursue a war that would last a decade.

In today’s case, by claiming that the Iranian regime was posing an imminent threat to the United States, the president can more easily circumvent congressional approval for military action and then turn to Congress after the fact if further action is needed.

As we recently discussed on our podcast about Congress, “Highway to Hill,” Congress has been continually ceding its power to the executive branch for decades. Deflection on military authority goes back even further: Congress hasn’t formally declared war since World War II – yes, despite involvement in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and many other places. But the Constitution doesn’t mince words on who’s responsible for entering the U.S. into war: Congress.

And how this war is ultimately framed by the White House has implications for the types of oversight Congress can perform to limit or curtail military action.

The limited powers of the war powers resolution

Congress, seemingly caught off guard by the Trump administration’s actions in Iran, has responded in a few ways. Perhaps unsurprisingly, responses have fallen largely along party lines.

Following the initial bombings, U.S. Sen. Tim Kaine, a Democrat from Virginia, introduced a war powers resolution to prevent further military action in Iran. In the House, U.S. Reps. Ro Khanna, a California Democrat, and Thomas Massie, a Republican from Kentucky, introduced a similar bipartisan resolution. The votes failed in both chambers despite overwhelming support from Democrats.

On the Republican side, Rubio’s explanation for the military action seemed to appease many key members of Congress. Senate Majority Leader John Thune, a South Dakota Republican, claimed the president had the authority to move forward with military action in Iran.

Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, a Louisiana Republican, said that any congressional attempt to limit the president’s warmaking power would be “frightening” and “dangerous.”

Public accountability in congressional hearings

But Congress has two more traditional and frequently used oversight tools at its disposal: oversight hearings and the power of the purse.

Oversight hearings provide members of Congress an opportunity to not only question and investigate the executive branch’s activity, but also to provide their constituents with this fact-finding work and draw attention to policy issues. As some recent oversight hearings indicate, these can also be opportunities for partisan jabs and “made for TV” moments.

But there is evidence that they produce results.

Following tense oversight hearings on excessive spending in the Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Kristi Noem was fired from her position in early March 2026.

In the 1970s, the Church Committee – named for its formidable chair, U.S. Sen. Frank Church of Idaho – held extensive hearings that included eye-opening testimony about clandestine U.S. intelligence activities abroad and domestically. The Church Committee recommended, and Congress subsequently enacted, dozens of sweeping reforms to foreign intelligence collection activities, as well as restraints on future efforts by the U.S. government to assassinate people.

Although the Trump administration has provided closed-door briefings to members of Congress, Democratic senators are asking for more. They are calling for Department of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Rubio to come before congressional committees to explain their reasoning and plans for the Iran war.

Not only do oversight hearings provide members of Congress with an opportunity to investigate and question an administration’s actions, but they bring that discussion to the public. This transparency provides constituents with information about how their tax dollars are being spent, what their members of Congress think, and may even sway public opinion.

Power of the purse

But perhaps the most powerful tool that Congress has is its power of the purse, outlined in Article 1 of the Constitution.

Military actions in Iran are already costing an estimated US$1 billion a day, or as U.S. Rep. Tom Cole of Oklahoma, the Republican House Appropriations Committee chair, put it: “a lot.”

As the war drags on, the Trump administration will need more money – money that only Congress can dole out. Unlike war powers resolutions, which in this case would limit military action after the fact, new spending cannot occur until Congress writes and passes legislation appropriating additional funds.

But this would constitute a blank check for a foreign war. And that might be too much to ask of members of Congress in both parties, particularly as the U.S. faces a historic deficit and cuts to safety net programs.

And as public opinion on both military action in Iran and the state of the economy continues to sour, a vote for more military spending might well overtax any remaining goodwill of voters and members of Congress alike.

In fact, the political pressure on Congress to put its foot down could become so immense that lawmakers may have to do something – like their job.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The Continental Army’s winter encampment at Valley Forge, between December 1777 and June 1778, is the stuff of legend. Chased out of Philadelphia by the British Army, George Washington and over 12,000 American troops retreated to Valley Forge, where they spent six long months harried by hunger, disease and the bitter cold.

In this context of frayed nerves and short tempers, a scuffle arose when some of the native-born soldiers antagonized the Irish recruits by dragging an effigy of a “stuffed Paddy” through camp on St. Patrick’s Day, March 17, 1778. The Irish, outraged at the sight of their patron saint being mocked, rose up to meet the challenge with their fists.

But George Washington quickly responded by claiming, “I, too, am a lover of St. Patrick’s Day.” He ordered an extra glass of grog for every man, “and thus all made merry and were good friends.”

By the late 1770s, people had been commemorating the anniversary of St. Patrick’s death – reputedly on March 17, 461 – for over a thousand years. Irish immigrants brought the tradition with them when they moved to North America, and officers in the Continental Army regularly used the holiday to bring glimmers of cheer to their cold and gloomy camps.

‘Till the nation is free’

In Morristown, New Jersey, in 1780, for example, Col. Francis Johnston insisted that “the celebration of (St. Patrick’s) Day should not pass by without having a little rum issued to the troops,” and he bought a small barrel to prove it. Accounts of the party were published in local newspapers.

“The whole army celebrated the day with that decorum which is characteristic of them, and which evidenced their attachment and unfeigned regard to the valiant Irish nation,” said an eyewitness. The soldiers’ dual loyalties to Ireland and America were reflected in the toasts they drank that day.

Cheers were raised for George Washington and “the American army,” but also for Irish patriots such as Henry Grattan and Henry Flood. “May the field pieces of Ireland bellow,” proclaimed one soldier, “till the nation is free.”

As the author of a forthcoming book on the global history of St. Patrick’s Day, the wartime popularity of St. Patrick’s Day does not strike me as surprising. Irish immigrants made up a sizable fraction of George Washington’s Continental Army during the American Revolution, partly because the war came on the heels of the first wave of modern mass migration from Ireland, which lasted from the early 1720s to the mid-1770s.

As a result, Irish newcomers, especially Presbyterians from Ulster, were overrepresented in the Middle Colonies of Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York and New Jersey when the war broke out. Their disproportionate enlistment accounts for the fact that Pennsylvania’s collection of infantry regiments and companies was nicknamed the “Line of Ireland” during the conflict.

Yet focusing on Irish patriots tells only half the story of what St. Patrick’s Day meant during the Revolutionary War era.

Plenty of Irishmen served as British redcoats throughout the war too.

‘Naturally gallant and loyal’

On March 17, 1779, 2½ years after capturing New York, the British army published a recruiting advertisement in the city’s Royal Gazette newspaper.

“All Gentlemen Natives of Ireland are invited to join the Volunteers of Ireland, commanded by their Countryman, Lord Rawdon,” the ad announced. Francis Rawdon, the scion of a wealthy Anglo-Irish Protestant family from County Down in the north of Ireland, was a dynamic army officer in his mid-20s and the perfect figurehead for this new regiment.

Later that evening, these Irish loyalists celebrated St. Patrick’s Day “with their accustomed Hilarity,” noted a local journalist. Lord Rawdon’s Volunteers of Ireland regiment led the way with a parade, followed by a banquet.

“The soldierly Appearance of the men, their Order of March, Hand in Hand, being all NATIVES OF IRELAND, had a striking effect,” gushed the New-York Gazette. Being “naturally gallant and loyal,” the Irish will always “crowd with Ardour to stand forth in the Cause of their King, of their Country, and of real, honest, general Liberty.”

To be Irish in New York in 1779 meant being loyal to the crown. But when the British evacuated New York four years later, they took their red coats – and their loyalist St. Patrick’s Days – with them.

Irish America’s many stories

In time, memories of these pro-British parades and banquets proved unseemly in the fledgling republic. They were subsequently written out of most histories of Irish America. The official website of the world-famous Manhattan St. Patrick’s Day parade, for example, makes no mention of these loyalist processions.

Yet taking a closer look at these forgotten chapters of history is important because it reminds us that there has always been a debate over what it means to truly “be Irish” in America.

In the 1770s, it was a conflict over loyalty to the crown. Today, it can mean disagreements about abortion, gun control or immigrants’ rights.

The truth lies buried in the many stories of Irish America.

Cian T. McMahon received funding for this project through a Hibernian Research Award from the Center for the Study of American Catholicism (CUSHWA).

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

It’s clear that regime change is among the biggest objectives of the U.S. war in Iran.

“I have to be involved in the appointment” of Iran’s next leader, President Donald Trump said on March 5, 2026.

Trump has also said he might put U.S. boots on the ground to get the job done.

Trump now joins a long list of modern U.S. presidents – from Franklin Roosevelt to Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, George W. Bush and Barack Obama – who started wars to either overthrow hostile regimes or support embattled friendly governments abroad.

For all the parallels to history, though, Trump’s Iran war is historically unique in one critically important way: In its early stages, the war is not popular with the American public.

A recent CNN poll found that 59% of Americans oppose the war – a trend found in poll after poll since the war began.

As an expert on U.S. foreign policy and regime change wars, my research shows that what’s likely generating public opposition to the Iran war today is the absence of a big story with a grand purpose that has bolstered public support for just about every major U.S.-promoted regime change war since 1900. These broad, purpose-filled narratives generate public buy-in to support the costs of war, which are often high in terms of money spent and lives lost when regime change is at stake.

Two historical examples

In the 1930s and ’40s, a widely accepted – and largely true – story about the dangers of fascism spreading and democracies falling galvanized national support in the United States to enter and then take on the high costs of fighting in World War II.

Likewise, in the 2000s a dominant narrative about preventing a repeat of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and stopping terrorism brought strong initial public support for the war in Afghanistan, with 88% support in 2001, and the war in Iraq, with 70% support in 2003.

With no comparable narrative around Iran today, Trump and Republicans could face big problems, especially as costs continue to rise.

No anti-Iran narrative

Iran has been a thorn in the side of many American presidents for a long time. So, what’s missing? Why no grand-purpose narrative at the start of this war?

Two things.

First, grand-purpose narratives are rooted in major geopolitical gains by a rival regime – the danger to the U.S. For the anti-fascism narrative, those events were German troops plowing across Europe and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. For the anti-terrorism narrative, it was planes crashing into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Gains like these by rivals prove traumatic to the nation. They also dislodge the status quo and provide the opportunity for new grand-purpose narratives with new policy directions to emerge.

Today, most Americans see no existential danger around Iran. A Marist poll from March 3, 2026, found that 55% of Americans view Iran as a minor threat or no threat at all. And the number who see Iran as a major threat, 44%, is down from 48% in July 2025.

By contrast, 64% of Americans saw Iraq as a “considerable threat” prior to the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq.

The poll numbers on Iran aren’t surprising. Iran is far from a geopolitical menace to the United States today. To the contrary, it’s been in geopolitical retreat in the Middle East in recent years.

In the summer of 2025, Iran’s nuclear nuclear enrichment facilities were significantly damaged – “completely and totally obliterated,” according to Trump, though there is no confirmation of that claim – during the 12-Day war between Iran and Israel.

And in recent years, Tehran has lost a major ally in Syria and witnessed its proxy network all but collapse. Iran has also faced crippling economic conditions and historic protests at home.

As the polls show, none of that has sparked a grand-purpose narrative.

Missing a good story

The second missing factor for narrative formation today is any strong messaging from the White House.

In the months prior to World War II, Roosevelt used his position of authority as president to give speech after speech, setting the context of the traumatic events of the 1930s, explaining the dangers at hand and outlining a course going forward. Though less truthful in its content, Bush did the same for nearly two years before the Iraq War.

Trump did almost none of this storytelling leading up to the Iran war. Five days before the war started, the president devoted three minutes to Iran in a nearly two-hour State of the Union Address.

Prior to that, he made a comment here and there to the press about Iran, but no storytelling preparing the nation for war. Likewise, since the war began, the administration’s stated reasons for military action keep shifting.

No wonder 54% of Americans polled disapprove of Trump’s handling of Iran and 60% of Americans say Trump has no clear plan for Iran. Also, 60% disapprove of Trump’s handling of foreign policy in general.

By comparison, Americans approved of Bush’s handling of foreign policy by 63% in early 2003.

Absent a cohesive, unifying story, it’s also no surprise there is lots of political fracturing today.

Partisan divides run deep – Democrats and independent voters strongly oppose the war. But Trump’s MAGA coalition is cracking too, with people like Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene sharply criticizing the war.

The way out

If he opts for it, there is an off-ramp for Trump from the Iran war. It’s one he knows well.

When U.S. leaders get caught up in costly regime change wars that outrun national support, they tend to back down, often with far fewer political costs than if they’d continued their unpopular war.

When the disaster referred to as Black Hawk Down hit in Somalia in 1993, killing 18 U.S. Marines, President Bill Clinton opted to end the mission to topple the warlords that ruled the country. Troops came home six months later.

Likewise, after the Benghazi attack killed four Americans in Libya in 2012, Obama pulled out all U.S. personnel working in Libya on nation-building operations.

And just last year, when Trump realized that U.S. ground troops would be necessary to topple the Houthi militant group in Yemen, he negotiated a ceasefire and ended his air war in that country with no significant political fallout.

With Trump’s Iran war, gas prices keep rising, more soldiers are likely to die, and stocks are highly volatile.

Backing down makes a lot of sense. History confirms that.

Charles Walldorf is a Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

By all measures, the ability to see what the government is up to in the United States has plummeted to new depths since the beginning of the second Trump administration.

For National Sunshine Week in 2025, I wrote about secrecy creep, the adoption of federal secrecy protections implemented by state and local authorities. In Florida and throughout the United States, this threatens the public’s right to be informed about its government.

A year later, this creep toward secrecy has become an all-out slide.

As director of the Joseph L. Brechner Freedom of Information Project at the University of Florida, I track the state of government transparency in the U.S. What has changed since January 2025 is unprecedented.

Clouds in the Sunshine State

Florida is a good example of this slide. Once viewed as a leader in transparency, the Sunshine State now charges exorbitant copy fees that discourage average people from requesting public records.

According to the nonprofit MuckRock, 24% of public records requests in Florida come with a copy fee, averaging US$1,623. Only Oregon charges fees more often, at 28% of the time. Fees are intended to help agencies cover the cost of large requests, but they tend to be arbitrary and are often used as a way to get pesky people to go away.

And that’s assuming you even get the information you want. One of my own studies from 2019 indicated that, on average, if you requested a public record in Florida, you would receive it about 39% of the time, placing the state 31st in the nation.

In 2025, MuckRock put the percentage dipping lower, at 35%. In March 2026, it was at 34%.

In Florida, more and more government agencies are thwarting the public’s right to know, including attempts to hide the details behind Alligator Alcatraz, the temporary immigrant detention center built in the Florida Everglades in June 2025. The state’s Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, office has pushed cities to be more transparent while withholding its own records.

Members of the state Legislature are attempting to strengthen the public records law. This would improve transparency in Florida’s state government, but I’d argue it doesn’t go far enough. Other states, such as Ohio, Pennsylvania and Connecticut, have implemented stronger laws, including independent enforcement of their sunshine laws, to ensure their governments comply.

It starts at the top

State and local governments appear to be taking their cues from the federal government.

President Donald Trump’s administration heralds itself as the most transparent in history, pointing to the president’s willingness to talk informally to the press or directly to the public through social media.

While that may be one definition of transparency, the federal government’s willingness to provide documents that show what the government is doing – not just what it says it is doing – has been eviscerated under the second Trump administration. Examples include:

• Refusing to provide tax returns, again, unlike every other president in modern history, and then suing the IRS for $10 billion when some returns were leaked.

• Removing government websites and databases.

• Firing the national archivist and the director of the Office of Information Policy, the agency within the U.S. Department of Justice that oversees government agencies’ compliance with requests under the Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA.

• Firing and pushing out experienced staffers assigned to handle FOIA requests as part of the 2025 U.S. DOGE purges. This led some agencies, such as the Department of Energy, to apply unorthodox practices, including closing out pending requests.

• Axing the new Open Government Federal Advisory Committee, which was launched to find ways of improving FOIA.

• Pulling out of the Open Government Partnership, which the U.S. helped found in 2011 to foster transparency around the globe.

Typically, the Department of Justice releases annual statistics on FOIA requests every March. When I examined initial reports posted in January, when just 11 agencies had provided their reports, backlogs – that is, requests that remain unresolved after a year – had increased 67% from the previous fiscal year. The time to process simple requests nearly doubled.

Plummeting to historical depths

In order to understand how secrecy in the United States now compares to historical precedent, I reached out to people who have researched freedom of information for decades, some going back to the 1970s.

I asked them a simple question: How does the current state of affairs in freedom of information compare historically?

Here is what they told me:

Jane Kirtley is a longtime FOIA scholar from the University of Minnesota who wrote in 2006, “The Bush administration’s contempt for the public’s right to know amounts to an organized assault on freedom of information that is unprecedented since the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 40 years ago.”

Today, in comparison? “Abysmal,” she wrote to me via email. “It was abundantly clear from the moment Elon Musk and his ‘musketeers’ invaded and pillaged government electronic records that we have entered a new era of deletion, obfuscation, fabrication and utter contempt for the concept of data integrity and the public’s right to know.”

Thomas Susman, who helped craft the 1974 FOIA amendments and currently assists the American Bar Association, wrote in 2005 that increasing delays and backlogs threatened FOIA’s intended purpose.

In February 2026, he wrote to me that the “arc of the FOIA universe has for six decades bent toward greater public access to government information − until now. If ‘democracy dies in darkness’ (according to The Washington Post’s official slogan), America’s democracy is threatened with becoming dead meat. We’ve survived the Civil War, the Great Depression, Vietnam, Watergate and more. If we fight back hard enough, this too shall pass, though not quickly, and likely with lasting scars.”

Patrice McDermott directed Open the Government from 2006 to 2017 and pointed in 2007 to an underlying tension throughout government: “the ability – and willingness – to harness the promise of digital information for public access and accountability while not abusing its potential for control of that information.”

Today, she writes that, as Benjamin Franklin put it, we “have a Republic … if (we) can keep it” and are committed to the fight for our constitutional form of government.

Perhaps advances can be made to reverse the secrecy trend and carry out the intentions of the Freedom of Information Act, as expressed by Lyndon B. Johnson upon its adoption nearly 60 years ago: “I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the United States is an open society in which the people’s right to know is cherished and guarded.”

David Cuillier has received funding from the Democracy Fund and John S. and James L. Knight Foundation to study the state of freedom of information. He is a board member of the National Freedom of Information Coalition and he coordinates national Sunshine Week.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation