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The war that the U.S. and Israeli governments launched against Iran on Feb. 28, 2026, is unprecedented in its scope across the Middle East. With the Arab Gulf states under Iranian attack, and Israel targeting Iran’s militia ally Hezbollah, even experts on the Middle East like me cannot predict the war’s course and especially its likely political consequences.

Still, to better understand this complex situation, I am paying particular attention to four major questions. How these specific issues play out will shed light on how this war might end and what it will mean for Iran, the rest of the Middle East and the world.

What does the US hope to accomplish?

One leader who began the war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been dead set for decades on crippling, and ideally toppling, Iran’s Islamic Republic. Iran has a long track record of sponsoring militant threats to Israel and American Arab allies.

Yet U.S. President Donald Trump has not been clear on what the goals of this war are and has said even less about what conditions would lead the U.S. to cease hostilities.

Early signs are that Iran’s capacity to project force across the Middle East is now diminished. What amount of damage to Iran’s military might be enough for the White House to believe that its mission was accomplished? Or does Trump expect Iran’s current authoritarian, theocratic political system to be removed, and for Iranians to establish a government more favorable toward American interests?

Any clarity from Washington on the true aims of this war will help observers understand under what circumstances it can end and what future Iranian-American relations might look like.

How will the war affect Gulf states’ short-term or long-term relations with Washington?

The U.S. has long prioritized deep economic and strategic relationships with the Gulf Arab states, especially Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These relationships have grown closer under Trump’s presidency.

So far, Iranian attacks have not caused significant casualties or damage to oil or commercial infrastructure in Gulf Arab states, collectively the source of 10% of the oil used in the U.S.

Indeed, some Gulf Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, already collaborate enough with Israel that being subjected to attacks from Iran has solidified their current alliance with it and the U.S.

At the same time, Gulf Arab states value long-term political stability to preserve their status as major exporters of oil and natural gas, centers of global commerce and trade and global travel hubs. While each country has its own geopolitical priorities, none wants conflicts that leave it vulnerable.

Iran’s military strategy seems designed to raise the economic and human costs for Gulf Arabs who support the U.S. and Israel.

Greater pain for citizens of the Arab Gulf could fuel leaders there to pressure Washington to stop the war. It’s also possible that Gulf leaders will rethink or rebalance their relations with the United States or Israel should the end state of the war undermine their sense of security.

Such a rethink is more likely if the war continues for weeks and creates major shocks to the global economy. Even if the war ends well for Gulf leaders, by ending concerns about Iranian regional aggression, Washington’s willingness to put Gulf states in the path of destabilizing conflict may lead them to seek less alignment with the U.S.

Who will likely rule Iran?

Mojtaba Khamenei, the hard-line son of the previous supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has just been named his father’s replacement. This is a clear signal that Iran is not yet moving toward the more cooperative government that the Trump administration wants. But with the fluid state of the war and its effects in Iran, perhaps the most important question is who will ultimately govern the country. Given Iran’s large size, predicting a long-term political outcome at this point makes little sense.

However, several factors do not bode well for a democratically representative government that could benefit ordinary Iranians. First, the Islamic Republic has been in power for decades, going to great lengths to prevent unified political opposition. Iranians’ recent waves of protests have not meant consensus on a future political order.

Second, Iran’s political system may still have support, including among members of the clergy and army. Third, the Trump administration may hope that Iranian ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds, may attack or dislodge the remnants of the government. Yet such groups lack the level of military force to ensure success.

For these reasons, the current government or a similarly authoritarian one may well remain in place after this war.

How do Iranians and people throughout the region view the war?

The Islamic holy month of Ramadan runs this year from Feb. 18 to mid-March. It changes the basic rhythm of life for most Muslims to one in which they fast from dawn to dusk and enjoy family and communal festivity late into the night. Throughout Iran and the Arab Gulf countries, these longtime practices have been disrupted by war and nighttime bombings.

Religion is not the primary driver of this war. Still, that war began during a sacred time is one example of an issue that might influence how the people in the middle of this conflict experience it. A less militaristic, more democratic Iranian government is a desirable outcome from a devastating war launched in violation of international law.

How popular attitudes in the region unfold will matter both to Iran’s political outcome and to whether Iran has better relations with Washington in the future.

For now, it is hard to know whether Iranians’ support for the government is growing during a major foreign attack, as it did when Iraq’s Saddam Hussein began a war against Iran in 1980. Certainly, a large swath of Iranians are content with the end of decades of Ayatollah Khamenei’s stifling rule.

Gulf Arabs may be frustrated with Washington and Tel Aviv for starting the war but also want Iran to end up with a less militant government. Most Lebanese have no love for Israel. Yet many also blame their local Iran-backed Hezbollah faction for dragging their country into the current war.

The experiences and views of these diverse populations matter. Trump has launched a war that is different from earlier American wars in the Middle East, both in the number of countries directly experiencing attacks and in the degree of direct coordination with Israel.

In addition to this war’s illegitimacy under international law, Washington has a long record of failing to achieve political results favorable to American interests after using military force in the Middle East. Given this, it is hard to believe that Operation Epic Fury will be an epic success in the long run.

However, how these four questions come to be answered in the weeks ahead will provide better indication of what this new war’s political consequences will actually be.

David Mednicoff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

It has been said that trust is like glass: Once it is shattered, nothing will ever be the same. In the case of the enduring hostility between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States over the past 47 years, even this metaphor may be an understatement.

The tone of the relationship is indicative of this fact.

In 2020, Iran’s supreme leader denounced President Donald Trump as a “clown” who only pretends to support the Iranian people while ultimately plunging a “poisonous dagger” into their backs.

And in a U.S. version of this hostility, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff said on Feb. 23, 2026, about the president’s approach to Iran: “I don’t want to use the word ‘frustrated,’ because he understands he has plenty of alternatives, but he’s curious as to why they haven’t … I don’t want to use the word ‘capitulated,’ but why they haven’t capitulated.”

The war that began on Feb. 28, 2026, hews to a familiar but dangerous pattern. Deep, historical mistrust, incompatible strategic interests, domestic political constraints on both sides, miscommunication and misperception, zero-sum thinking and repeated diplomatic overreach gradually pushed the relationship between Iran and the U.S. toward open conflict.

Rhetoric, not reality

When Tehran refused to yield to Trump’s demands, he described Iranian leaders in blunt terms: “They’re sick people. They’re mentally ill. Sick people. They are angry. They are crazy. They are sick.”

For a deeper understanding of Iran, policymakers in Washington could have looked to the insights of John W. Limbert, a distinguished diplomat with four decades of experience in Iranian affairs and a hostage during the Iran hostage crisis.

In 2008, as part of a U.S. Institute of Peace study of Iranian negotiating style, Limbert outlined 15 principles for Americans seeking successful negotiations with Iranian counterparts. Among his most important observations was that each side tends to assume the worst about the other, viewing its adversary as “infinitely devious, hostile, and duplicitous.”

Little evidence suggests that such hard-earned wisdom has informed recent rhetoric.

Instead, American leaders’ and media’s discussions of Iran over the past few decades have often relied on a familiar narrative: the portrayal of Middle Eastern leaders as irrational or “lunatic” figures − first, revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then Saddam Hussein, followed by Moammar Gadhafi, Bashar Assad, and now Ali Khamenei.

This narrative conveniently overlooks inconvenient facts.

Getting to breakdown

It was Trump who withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran during his first term. It was also the United States that during renewed negotiations in 2025 and 2026 chose to bomb Iranian targets twice while talks were still underway.

Nor were the negotiations ever strictly bilateral. There was always an unoccupied chair at the table metaphorically reserved for a ghost participant: Israel. In my view, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu skillfully used political leverage and diplomatic pressure to shape the process publicly and privately.

When it came to Iran, Trump often violated a basic principle of diplomacy: asking Iran to concede without any reciprocity. Meanwhile, Netanyahu would repeatedly move the goal posts − asserting that Iran was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, insisting it had no right to enrich uranium on its own soil, demanding the dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure, calling for the elimination of its ballistic missile capability, and ultimately advocating regime change.

The extent to which Israeli pressure shaped successive American policies is a question historians and investigative journalists will continue to debate.

Yet responsibility for the breakdown cannot be placed on Washington and Jerusalem alone. Iranian leaders contributed significantly to making the conflict with the United States so intractable.

A corrupt, repressive and economically struggling regime relied heavily on performative anti-American politics for domestic legitimacy. Tehran matched American and Israeli rigidity with intransigence and strategic overreach of its own.

Limiting inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, failing to provide credible answers about past nuclear activities, constructing secret facilities and attempting to negotiate from a position of weakness ultimately proved disastrous when dealing with an impatient and impulsive American president.

The unknown unknowns

What comes next?

If regime change does not occur in Tehran, the two sides will almost certainly find themselves negotiating again once the fog of war dissipates.

The hostility between them will not disappear, and diplomatic niceties may become rarer. Yet diplomacy rarely requires trust; it requires interests.

I believe that future talks are therefore likely to be transactional rather than transformational. Technical and legal parameters will still need to be negotiated. Hawks and doves will continue to compete for influence in both capitals.

And the oldest rule of bargaining will remain unchanged: When you lack leverage, acquire it – then negotiate.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The United States military achieved every objective it set when it went to war in Iraq in 2003. Decapitation: Saddam Hussein was captured, tried and hanged. Air dominance: total, within days. Regime collapse: The Iraqi government fell in 21 days.

Now, consider Iraq more than 20 years after the U.S.-Iraq war. Iraq is still an authoritarian state governed by political parties with deep institutional ties to Tehran. Iranian-backed militias operate openly on Iraqi soil – some holding official positions within the Iraqi state.

The country the U.S. spent US$2 trillion and 4,488 American lives to remake is, by any reasonable measure, within the sphere of Iran’s influence.

As an international security scholar specializing in nuclear security and alliance politics in the Middle East, I have tracked the pattern of U.S. military success across multiple cases.

But the military outcome and the political outcome are almost never the same thing, and the gap between them is where wars fail.

Two and a half millennia ago, Thucydides recorded the Athenian empire at its most confident in his “History of the Peloponnesian War”: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Athens then destroyed Melos and launched the Sicily Expedition with overwhelming force and no coherent theory of governance for what came next.

The lesson, then and now, is not that empires cannot destroy. It’s that destruction and governance are entirely different enterprises. And confusing them is how empires exhaust themselves.

The U.S. military can destroy the Iranian regime. The question that the Iraq precedent answers – with brutal clarity – is what fills the power vacuum when it does?

The military and political ledger

In April 2003, American L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which served as a transitional government, and issued two orders that would define the next two decades.

Order 1 dissolved the ruling Baath Party and removed all senior party members from their government positions, purging the administrative class that ran its ministries, hospitals and schools. Order 2 disbanded the Iraqi army but did not disarm it. Approximately 400,000 soldiers went home with their weapons and without their paychecks.

Washington had just handed the insurgency – the Sunni-led armed resistance that would turn into a decade-long war – its recruiting pool. The logic behind Bremer’s de-Baathification was intuitive: You cannot build a new Iraq with the people who built the old one. The logic was also catastrophic

Political scientists have long observed that countries are held together not by ideology but by organized coercion. That is, by the bureaucratic machinery, institutional memory and trained professionals who keep the lights on and the water running. Destroy that machinery, and you do not have a clean slate. You have a collapsed state, and collapsed states do not stay empty of leadership.

They fill, and they fill with whoever has the most organizational capacity on the ground. Iran had been building that capacity in Iraq since the 1980s, cultivating Shia political networks, exile parties and militia groups during and after the Iran-Iraq War and beyond with the explicit goal of ensuring a post-Saddam Iraq would never again threaten Iranian security.

Tehran did not need to build infrastructure in Iraq after the U.S. invasion, because it had spent the previous two decades building it. When the old order collapsed, Iran’s networks were ready.

The opposition the U.S. had cultivated in Iraq – Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress – had Washington’s ear but no Iraqi constituency. They had not governed the country, or built networks inside it.

The lesson is that military success created the precise conditions for political catastrophe, and that chasm is where American strategy has gone to die – in Iraq and in Libya, where the Obama administration helped bring about regime change in 2011, but where political instability has endured since. And perhaps now in Iran.

The vacuum is not neutral

The fundamental misunderstanding at the heart of American regime-change strategy is the assumption that destroying the existing order creates space for something better.

It does not.

It creates space for whoever is best organized, best armed and most willing to fill it. In Iraq, that was Iran.

The question now is who fills it in Iran itself.

In Iran, the group that meets all three criteria – organized, armed and willing – is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Revolutionary Guard is not simply a military institution. It controls an estimated 30% to 40% of the Iranian economy and runs construction conglomerates, telecommunications companies and petrochemical firms. And it has cultivated a parallel state infrastructure for decades.

Since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death at the start of the U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign, the Revolutionary Guard has taken effective control of decision-making. As one Iran expert told NBC News: “Even if they replace the supreme leader, what is left of the regime is the IRGC.”

The succession confirmed it: Mojtaba Khamenei, with deep ties to the Revolutionary Guard, was named supreme leader on March 8, 2026. It’s a Revolutionary Guard-backed dynastic succession that represents maximum continuity with the old regime, not regime change.

You cannot dismantle the Revolutionary Guard without collapsing the economy, and a collapsed economy does not produce a transition government; it produces a failed state. Washington has already run that experiment in Libya.

You cannot leave the Revolutionary Guard in place without leaving the regime’s coercive core intact. There is no clean surgical option of dropping bombs, killing certain people and declaring it a new day in Iran.

The Iranian opposition in exile, the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq; the monarchists who support the return of the late-shah’s son to lead the country; and the various democratic factions all present the same problem Chalabi did in 2003: Washington access, no domestic legitimacy.

The Mujahedeen-e-Khalq is listed as a terrorist organization by Iran and is widely despised inside the country. The monarchist movement has not governed Iran since 1979, and its corrupt, despotic leader was overthrown in the revolution. The democratic reform networks that had been building momentum inside Iran were not saved by the U.S. strikes. The regime had already crushed the movement in January, detaining and killing thousands.

Decades of research on rally-around-the-flag effects confirm what common sense suggests: External attack fuses regime and nation even when citizens despise their leaders. Iranians who were chanting against the supreme leader are now watching foreign bombs fall on their cities.

Iraq in 2003 had 25 million people, a military degraded by 12 years of sanctions, and no active nuclear program. Iran has 92 million people, proxy networks that would not disappear if Tehran fell – in fact, they would activate – and a stockpile of over 880 pounds of highly enriched uranium that the International Atomic Energy Agency has been unable to fully account for since the 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes.

The question Washington hasn’t answered

Who governs 92 million Iranians?

President Donald Trump has said whoever governs Iran must receive Washington’s approval. But a veto is not a vision.

Approving or rejecting candidates from Washington requires a functioning political process, a legitimate transitional authority and a population willing to accept an American imprimatur on their leadership — none of which exists.

Washington has a preference; it does not have a plan. If the objective is eliminating the nuclear program, then why does Iran still hold an unverified stockpile of weapon-usable uranium eight months after the 2025 strikes? The strikes have not resolved the proliferation question. They have made it more dangerous and less tractable.

If the objective is regional stability, why has every round of strikes produced a wider regional war?

Washington has no answer to any of these questions – only a theory of destruction.

Farah N. Jan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

When Secretary of Defense James Mattis addressed the intensification of U.S. combat operations against the Islamic State group in 2017, he assured the American public of his commitment to “get the strategy right” while maintaining “the rules of engagement” to “protect the innocent.”

Mattis’ professional tone was a stark contrast to Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks following the first days of the joint U.S.-Israeli combat operations in Iran.

On March 2, 2026, after bragging about the awe-inspiring lethality of U.S. “B-2s, fighters, drones, missiles,” Hegseth casually brushed aside concerns about long-term geopolitical strategy, declaring “no stupid rules of engagement, no nation-building quagmire, no democracy building exercise, no politically correct wars. We fight to win.”

Admonishing the press for anything less than total assent, he commanded, “to the media outlets and political left screaming ‘endless wars:’ Stop. This is not Iraq.”

Two days later, Hegseth gloated about “dominance” and “control,” while asserting that the preoccupation of the “fake news media” with casualties was motivated by liberal media bias and hatred of President Trump.

“Tragic things happen; the press only wants to make the president look bad,” he said. He dismissed concerns about the rules of engagement, declaring that “this was never meant to be a fair fight. We are punching them while they are down, as it should be.”

I’m a communication scholar who has studied MAGA rhetoric for a decade. I have observed how Hegseth and other officials in the second Trump administration refuse to abide by what recurring rhetorical situations – urgent public matters that compel speech to audiences capable of being influenced – typically demand of public officials.

The theme of this administration is that no one is going to tell it what to say or how to say it. It will be encumbered neither by norms nor the exigencies that compel speech in a democratic society.

The big man

When the U.S. goes to war, the public expects the president and the defense secretary to convince them of the appropriateness of the action. They do this by detailing the justification for military action, but also by addressing the public in a manner that conveys the seriousness and competence required for such a grave task as waging war.

But during the first week of the Iran war, Hegseth’s press briefings deviated from the measured tone expected from high-ranking military officials.

Hegseth flippantly employed villainous colloquialism – “they are toast and they know it,” “we play for keeps,” and “President Trump got the last laugh” – delivered with a combative tone that communicated masculine self-assurance.

Many observers were taken aback by his haughty tone, hypermasculine preoccupation with domination, giddiness about violence and casual attitude toward death.

During Trump’s first term, this penchant for rule-breaking was by and large isolated to the president, whose transgressions were part of his populist appeal.

Although Trump’s first cabinet members agreed on most political objectives, they attempted to rein in what they saw as the president’s more dangerous whims.

But with loyalty as the new bona fide qualification for administration officials, Trump’s second cabinet is populated with a large contingent of right and far-right media personalities like Hegseth, including Kash Patel, Sean Duffy and Mehmet Oz.

The anti-institutional ethos of far-right media explains why these officials refuse to conform to “elite” expectations and instead speak in a manner that is bombastic, outrageous and perverse.

Among them, there is little reverence for what they may perceive of as emasculating rules of tradition and politeness in a media marketplace where “owning,” “dominating,” and “triggering” your enemy is precious currency. Far-right media personalities are adept at commanding attention with showmanship and swagger.

Trump appears to have chosen Hegseth for precisely this reason: He performs the role of the big man to perfection.

‘Kill talk’

Hegseth’s language choices and petulant tone do not demonstrate an ignorance of what rhetorical situations demand of him; instead, they reflect a refusal to be emasculated by such cumbersome norms.

When making statements about the first week of the war, Hegseth grinned as he delivered action-movie one-liners, like “turns out the regime who chanted ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel’ was gifted death from America and death from Israel.”

Hegseth engaged in what is known as “kill talk,” a verbal strategy, typically directed at new military recruits, that denies the enemy’s humanity and disguises the terrible costs of violence. His repetition of words like “death,” “killing,” “destruction,” “control,” “warriors” and “dominance” framed violence in heroic terms that are detached from the realities of war.

In my view, Hegseth addressed the public as a squad leader addresses military recruits. Hegseth apparently delighted in dispensing death and elevating and glorifying war. He said virtually nothing of long-term strategy beyond “winning.”

In the MAGA media world, winning is really all that matters. If winning is the only goal, then war is, by profound inference, a game, a test of masculine fortitude.

This point was made clear when the White House posted a video that interspersed footage of airstrikes on Iran with “killstreak animation” from the popular video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare. In the game, when a player kills multiple opponents without also dying, they are rewarded with the ability to conduct a missile strike to exterminate an opposing team. Again, this message gamifies violence and obscures the destructive toll of war.

Informed by the contemptuous hypermasculinity of far-right media culture, all this taboo behavior and glorified portrayals of death convey one fundamental message: When the public most needs explanation and justification for the actions of their government, the powerful owe the public neither explanation – nor comfort.

Casey Ryan Kelly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The Trump administration’s aggressive policies on immigration are receiving pushback not just on Capitol Hill but across the country. Democratic leaders in multiple states are refusing to cooperate with immigration arrests.

In response, the federal government is refusing to share evidence with state investigators in the deaths of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, who were killed by federal officers while protesting immigration enforcement in Minneapolis.

Throughout U.S. history, there have been many moments of conflict between the federal and state governments, such as on slavery, racial segregation, school testing requirements, health care, abortion and climate change. Conversely, there has also been a long history of cooperation between the different levels of government in matters such as disaster relief, law enforcement and antiterrorism efforts.

But what happens when the various states and the federal government see the same legal issue differently? Which side wins in a dispute? This is an ongoing and open question, as evidenced by the frequent lawsuits being filed against Trump administration policies by state attorneys general.

As a legal scholar, I study issues related to constitutional law, including federalism, or the division of power between the various levels of government in the U.S. system. Ultimately, the question of who prevails when there’s a dispute depends on whether the issue is more national or local in scope. It may also matter whether the issue affects fundamental rights, which no government may justly infringe.

Layers of authority

The framers of the Constitution saw the division of power between the states and federal government as part of the U.S. system of checks and balances. Just as the judicial, executive and legislative branches check each other, so do the different levels of government. “The true barriers of our liberty in this country are our state governments,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1811.

Still, it’s easy to assume that the federal government has greater power. The U.S. Constitution states that federal laws are “the supreme Law of the Land.” This is a model known as vertical federalism – in essence, putting the federal government above the states and localities.

There are areas of law where that framework clearly prevails. For example, immigration is an issue that the Constitution places squarely under the authority of the federal government. States cannot nullify, or invalidate, federal law. That is vertical federalism.

But the 10th Amendment says “powers not delegated to the United States … are reserved to the States respectively.” There are areas where states retain authority and the relationship between the levels of government is more horizontal, or flat or equal.

Consider cannabis. In 1996, California voters approved a ballot initiative making their state the first to allow the medical use of marijuana since prohibition started in the early 1900s. This was despite the fact that federal law viewed all cannabis as contraband. But California determines its own criminal code.

Californians could not stop the federal government from enforcing a valid federal law in their state, but that did not mean that California – or the vast majority of other states that have since passed their own medical or recreational marijuana measures – have to participate in a federal policy choice.

Federal agencies have continued occasional cannabis raids in California. But for state law enforcement officials, failing to punish a person for the medical use of cannabis is not a federal crime. In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government cannot force a state “to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.” That is horizontal federalism.

Constraints on all governments

The federal government is limited to its enumerated powers – which is to say, the powers spelled out directly by the U.S. Constitution. But states possess “police powers,” which is a broader authority to regulate health, safety and morality.

The federal government is responsible for foreign policy and regulating interstate commerce. But states and localities regulate vaccine mandates, police and fire services, and operate or oversee water and sewer systems, as well as taking stances on moral issues, including alcohol and gambling, due to their potential to cause harm.

But both the federal government and the states are limited by the Constitution. Neither can justly violate the freedom of the press, for example, under the First Amendment.

And the reality is that, at least at this point in history, there is no neat division between federal and state authority on a broad range of issues. The federal government, for example, pays for the bulk of interstate highway construction. But those roads are actually paved by states.

When the federal government is paying a share of the cost of carrying out its policies, the Supreme Court has ruled that it can, in fact, tell states what to do, such as enforcing a legal drinking age of 21 or risk a share of federal highway funds. But it has also found that federal demands on states can be unconstitutionally excessive or “coercive,” as with a mandate under the Affordable Care Act to expand Medicaid, which the court struck down, even though Washington was paying most of the bill.

Federalism and the question of which level of government has the ultimate say is often complex and messy. But for that reason, as the framers foresaw, it remains an important safeguard of liberty, preventing too much power from residing in one place.

Kenneth Michael White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

As the U.S. and Israel launched strikes on Iran, American citizens living in or visiting the Middle East found themselves stranded in countries facing bombing attacks by Iran. The State Department on March 2, 2026, urged Americans in 14 Middle Eastern countries to leave via “available commercial transportation, due to serious safety risks.” But commercial air travel and airports were shut down in many of those places and the U.S. wasn’t offering to evacuate its citizens.

Media reports featuring frustrated and frightened Americans stuck in places where danger was mounting, as well as growing criticism that the U.S. hadn’t handled the situation well or according to normal procedure, led the State Department to scramble and send charter flights to evacuate U.S. nationals from a handful of countries.

The Conversation’s politics editor Naomi Schalit interviewed former ambassador Donald Heflin, a veteran diplomat who now teaches at Tufts University’s Fletcher School, to understand how such situations are normally handled – and how the current situation diverged from longstanding practices.

What is the customary way that the United States and the State Department deal with U.S. nationals who are abroad in an area that becomes dangerous?

Over my 35-year career, I was ambassador to a small country and I worked a lot on African affairs. But most of my time was spent in consular affairs, which is the part of the State Department that does this work. And over the last 20 or 30 years, we’ve made a lot of progress. We’ve developed a model that works pretty well.

When you’re in a country with instability, what you want to do is to get the population of Americans down as small as you can. So the first thing that happens is you have some instability, and you tell Americans, “Listen, we advise against traveling here.” See if you can discourage everybody except missionaries or people whose employers really want them to go there to make money or people visiting family members, but get rid of the casual tourist.

Then, a little more time goes by and things start to get bad, and you say, “You should consider leaving.” And then, a little while later, the embassy gives its own employees and their families what they call “authorized departure,” which is, “It’s OK for you to go back to the U.S., and in fact we’ll help pay for it.” And we tell the public that, and we hope that that’ll help spur more people to leave.

And the step after that?

Next step: We order departure, where we tell parts of the embassy, “You’ve got to go home. You can’t make the decision to stay here, you and your kids go home.” And we tell the public that, and hopefully that makes the number of Americans remaining in the country smaller and smaller.

Then – and it doesn’t always happen – the last step is we evacuate. We say, “We’re getting our people out of here on planes, we’ve got space for you on the planes, you should have listened to us before.”

That’s the standard model. Unfortunately, it didn’t get followed very well this week.

What did you see this week, and how did it diverge from the normal procedure?

We went from zero to 60 very quickly. Look, the Mideast is unstable on a good day, but there had not been a new instability where people should be getting scared and going home. And then what happened was we launched the attack, and all of a sudden there was that instability.

Logically, you would think, there were two places that Americans should be getting out of. One was Iran, where we’ve told people not to be for many years. The other was Israel, because Israel is going to be attacked.

But no, the Iranians attacked over half a dozen countries. So now, all of a sudden, you’ve got Americans who feel unsafe in places that have never really been considered unsafe, like Oman, Cyprus or Turkey.

So now you have a long list of countries where you want to encourage Americans to leave and where they want to leave. There’s some demand, and you haven’t got that drawdown, where it makes things smaller, and also you haven’t done anything about arranging charter flights or military flights to get them out. So they’re going to have to stay where they are and feel unsafe for X number of days.

That’s when this started generating news stories.

This led to lot of people calling a member of Congress, a lot of people talking to the press, saying, “We got to get us out of here.” That’ll continue until the evacuation is arranged. There’s a bit of an analogy to COVID. When COVID first took off, we had a lot of Americans stuck overseas. They wanted to get home to their families. They figured U.S. health care to be the best that’s available, and it took us awhile to arrange charter flights. It was a very expensive process to get everybody home. They just kind of had to hunker down. That’s where we are right now.

Do you think this problem that’s being faced by Americans in the Middle East now should have been anticipated by the State Department?

Yes and no. I think a big part of the problem here was that the Trump administration kept the knowledge of the impending attack to a very small circle of people for operational security reasons. You can’t launch a surprise attack if half of Washington knows about it.

You can see a scenario by which a very trusted State Department officer has to eventually talk to a charter plane company about chartering a whole bunch of planes. They’re going to figure out pretty quickly what’s going to happen, and then you’ve got a security leak.

At the same time, I think going back weeks and months, maybe people should have been arranging charter flights and military flights, kind of on spec so that you could flip the switch and get that going right away. They’re kind of starting from scratch this week.

You’ve got people who are stranded, afraid and can’t get on with their lives. What should happen next?

All these Iranian strikes, the casualty numbers aren’t high. So objectively speaking, I think that very few of the Americans over there are in actual, real danger.

But casual tourists do get afraid, and they don’t travel overseas that much. This may be their first time in the Mideast, and all of a sudden this is happening. They want out bad. They’re scared, whether, objectively speaking, they have a good reason to be scared or not. And it’s better for everybody – the U.S. embassy, the host country, for people in Washington – if we get them out of there and get them home.

This will sort itself out. There will be planes, we’ll get all the people out who want to get out, but it’s going to take at least a few days, maybe a week.

Donald Heflin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Northeast Park Hill, a Denver neighborhood, has a long history of violence. During Denver’s summer of violence in the early 1990s, it was considered ground zero for gang conflict.

From the late 1990s through 2014, violent crime in Northeast Park Hill declined from its peak in the early ’90s but remained persistently higher than city averages. In 2016, Northeast Park Hill recorded 1,086 youth arrests per 100,000 young people. The arrest rate for the combination of the other 76 Denver neighborhoods was 513.

With a population of approximately 9,600, 19% of families in the neighborhood lived below the federal poverty line, 39% of residents identified as Black, and 27% identified as Hispanic.

Yet, Northeast Park Hill is also a community defined by collective action. In 2013, residents started organizing in response to a series of violent events. They laid the foundation for an emerging movement committed to rebuilding community safety.

Building on these community strengths, researchers at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence partnered with local leaders to implement Communities That Care in 2016. The program is a science-based prevention process designed to help communities use data, evidence and collective action to reduce youth violence.

As a sociologist and director of the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence, my work examines the root causes of youth violence. I study how community-led, data-driven prevention efforts can reduce risk and build supports that help young people stay safe and connected. Working alongside leaders and residents in Northeast Park Hill, I’ve seen firsthand what’s possible and what their remarkable success can teach all of us.

A welcome change

After just five years, the youth arrest rate in Northeast Park Hill fell to 276 per 100,000 – a 75% reduction.

This drop in youth arrests reflects a decades-long nationwide trend. Across the country as a whole, juvenile arrests peaked in 1996 and then began a steady decline.

But not all neighborhoods benefited equally. To measure the impact of local prevention work in Northeast Park Hill, we compared its arrest rate to a carefully constructed “look-alike” community made up of similar Denver neighborhoods that did not receive the intervention. We found Northeast Park Hill saw a sharper and earlier decline than its comparison community – pointing to an impact beyond national trends and tied to the local interventions.

Impacts of youth violence

Youth violence is a major cause of harm.

This is especially true for urban communities that have endured decades of chronic disinvestment. That includes neglected infrastructure, deteriorating housing and long-standing environmental and health inequities. Such environments often lack the opportunities, resources and support that are essential for healthy youth development.

Young people in these neighborhoods are more likely to face increased exposure to violence and daily challenges associated with navigating violent communities, such as witnessing shootings near their homes and schools. They also face ongoing experiences of marginalization and discrimination. Many young people move through daily life in a constant state of vigilance. Some youth withdraw, carry weapons for protection or turn to substances to cope with chronic anxiety.

Building a prevention infrastructure

As part of Communities That Care, the community formed a prevention coalition of approximately 25 members, known as Park Hill Strong, to guide the work.

Three Black leaders, Troy Grimes, Jonathan McMillan and Dane Washington Sr., who grew up in the neighborhood and experienced the violence of the 1990s firsthand, chaired the coalition.

Following the Communities That Care model, they began by creating a community profile. They used local data, including youth and parent surveys, and neighborhood indicators, such as access to safe parks, after-school programs and healthy foods. The data helped the coalition identify the biggest sources of risk and what protective supports were available in the community.

That data pointed to several factors that increase the likelihood of youth violence. Many youth felt disconnected from their community and had limited supervision or inconsistent support at home. The data also highlighted early and persistent problem behaviors among youth, including aggression and defiance, which can place young people on a pathway toward later violence.

The data also revealed protective supports to build on. It showed that opportunities for young people to participate in positive activities were limited. Community recognition of youths’ healthy and constructive contributions was also low — highlighting important areas for improvement.

Once the profile was complete, the coalition developed a community action plan describing the community prevention strategies the coalition would use to address their prioritized risk and protective factors.

Community-level prevention strategies

The coalition selected three community-level prevention strategies.

First, a youth-led media campaign called the Power of One (PO1) addressed the risk factor of low neighborhood attachment. The campaign challenged the idea that young people themselves are the cause of violence, instead highlighting how decades of redlining, concentrated poverty and limited access to quality schools and jobs have shaped the conditions they are navigating. The campaign also highlighted positive stories about young people and their communities. The Power of One has reached more than 3,000 youth and adults through social media and hosted six community block parties.

Second, the coalition selected Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies, known as PATHS. This evidence-based program aims to reduce early and persistent problem behaviors. It was implemented in all three of the elementary schools in Northeast Park Hill. PATHS helps students learn social and emotional skills, including managing strong emotions by recognizing when they are feeling angry and using calming strategies before reacting. Strengthening these competencies is associated with lower rates of aggression.

Third, pediatric health care providers identified youth at risk for carrying out future serious violence through the violence, injury protection and risk screening tool. Youth identified as high or medium risk after completing a 14-item screening tool that assesses violence and victimization history and other risk factors are referred to appropriate services. A total of 222 youth ages 10 to 14 were screened between 2016 and 2021.

Funding is in jeopardy

For more than two decades, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has funded the National Academic Centers of Excellence in Youth Violence Prevention, which includes programs like ours. But recent CDC funding cuts threaten the continuation of this work.

Since 2000, these efforts have contributed to reductions in violence in communities across the nation, including Chicago; Denver; Flint, Michigan; Richmond, Virginia; and Youngstown, Ohio.

In Flint, community groups mowed and removed trash from vacant lots between 2009 and 2013. The surrounding areas saw 40% fewer assaults and violent crimes between the months of May and September compared to areas surrounding unmaintained lots.

Likewise, in Youngstown, during the summer months from 2016 to 2018, violent crime fell at twice the rate on streets surrounding vacant lots transformed into gardens and play spaces by community residents than on streets where professional mowers did the greening.

Funding for programs like these is critical for neighborhoods where resources are already scarce and the burden of violence has been concentrated for generations. Without continued investment, communities risk losing hard-won gains and the capacity to create safe and supportive environments for young people.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

Beverly Kingston receives funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Centers of Excellence in Youth Violence Prevention under Cooperative Agreement Number, 5 U01 CE002757. The findings and conclusions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, not the president. But most modern presidents and their legal counsel have asserted that Article 2 of the Constitution allows the president to use the military in certain situations without prior congressional approval – and have acted on that, sending troops into conflicts from Panama to Libya, with no regard for Congress’ will.

Congress has for the most part registered only feeble and ineffective opposition to such executive action. The current move in Congress to deny President Donald Trump the ability to continue the war with Iran – led by Democrats, but with some Republican support – will likely fail, as have previous efforts during other conflicts.

But there was a time when Americans saw Congress stand up to a president who unilaterally took the country to war.

It was at the tail end of the Vietnam War, when Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, asserting that it was legislators – not the president – who had the power to declare war.

Once it passed both houses, President Richard Nixon vetoed it, claiming it was unconstitutional.

In response, the legislative branch overturned the veto with the two-thirds majority vote needed to prevail.

Compared to Congress’ limp response to Trump’s actions in Iran, and its similar failure to assert itself during Trump’s military action in Venezuela, it was a breathtaking act of legislative assertion.

Congress asserts itself

When they debated the War Powers Resolution, members of Congress were seeing the erosion of their control over the decision to engage in military operations large and small. With a strong bipartisan consensus, they determined they had to collectively use their powers, including the power of the purse, to thwart executive overreach.

Congress’ actions came in response to the growing protests against the Vietnam War in general and Nixon’s decision to expand the war by sending U.S. troops to invade the neutral country of Cambodia to disrupt the supply lines of the Viet Cong, the communist guerrilla force that accounted for a large number of the 58,000 Americans killed in the war.

Nixon had begun covert carpet bombing of Cambodia in 1969, and then announced in 1970 that he would send ground troops into the country the next year.

Congress – and the country– reacted extremely negatively. Members of Congress collaborated across party lines to draft legislation in an attempt to assert their power. It was a slow process, however, involving long periods of deliberation.

They used many different methods to attempt to constrain the president. Within months of the introduction of troops to Cambodia, Congress attempted to pass amendments that would restrict his ability to invade neighboring countries. Prompted by protesting and the illegal actions in Cambodia, Congress began crafting legislation that would draw down troops in Vietnam.

With these moves, lawmakers placed immense pressure on the president. This eventually led to the drafting and eventual signing of the peace agreement ending the Vietnam war in 1973.

This was not enough for Congress, however.

Rules – and flexibility

Congress wanted to create a document ensuring presidents could not unilaterally make war. They wanted legislative consultation.

They intended the War Powers Resolution to act as a permanent constraint. So, in the resolution they spelled out the specific actions in which presidents can start a conflict:

• First, if there is an invasion of the United States, the president can respond. In this instance, the president can act prior to congressional authorization.

• Second, if Congress provides an “Authorization for the Use of Military Force,” the president can assume he has authorization – but only as long as it is in effect.

• Finally, if Congress declares war, the president can act.

Lawmakers did, however, provide some flexibility. In the War Powers Resolution, they said a president can initiate and carry out hostilities for 60 days and has a further 30 days to draw down the troops. Once the executive has initiated hostilities, Congress must receive information about that action within 48 hours.

This opens the door for presidents to engage in smaller-scale or short operations without stepping outside the lines set in the law.

Presidents from both parties have availed themselves of this flexibility. As far back as 1975, when President Gerald Ford rescued the SS Mayaguez, the merchant ship captured by Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, presidents have acknowledged the law and dutifully reported their military actions to Congress.

Like his predecessors, Trump sent a letter to Congress after his June 2025 missile attacks against Iran, as well as at the start of the currently open-ended conflict.

Presidents since the passage of the War Powers Resolution have not, however, acknowledged that they have to get congressional approval of their actions, with few exceptions. Predominantly, without congressional approval, they limit their actions to the 60-to-90-day window.

President Barack Obama, however, attempted to circumvent the window when his bombing campaign in Libya in 2011 dragged on, as well as when he bombed the Islamic State group in 2014. In the first instance, he claimed the War Powers Resolution did not apply. In the second, he claimed each bombing campaign was discrete, rather than part of a larger campaign.

Exploiting authorizations

The balance of power between the legislative and executive branches changed considerably with the passage of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force related to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force that gave legislative permission for President George W. Bush to invade Iraq.

Because Congress did not put sunset dates into these authorizations, subsequent presidents Obama, Trump and Joe Biden used those same authorizations for a host of later military actions in the Middle East and elsewhere.

And legislators are deeply divided in the current discussions about demanding the cessation of hostilities against Iran.

Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson says that limiting the president at this time is “dangerous.” Former congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene – who has fallen out of favor with Trump’s MAGA base and the president himself – took the opposing view, posted on social media, “Now, America is going to be force fed and gas lighted all the ‘noble’ reasons the American ‘Peace’ President and Pro-Peace administration had to go to war once again this year, after being in power for only a year.”

Has the U.S. entered a moment when members of Congress reassert themselves the way they did at the tail end of the Vietnam war?

It is possible that they will follow James Madison’s advice about the power relationship between Congress and the president. Writing in the Federalist Papers, Madison said that “ambition” has “to counter ambition.” He continued, “The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”

As I explain in my book about congressional war powers, the constitutional system creates an invitation to struggle. Now, as the U.S. wages war on Iran, Congress must decide whether it wants to struggle, as it did during the Vietnam War, or remain compliant and in the president’s shadow.

Sarah Burns has received funding from the Institute for Humane Studies.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

A bureaucratic shift in Washington is threatening to undo years of progress in Detroit’s fight against homelessness, potentially forcing thousands of the city’s most fragile residents back onto the streets.

In November 2025, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development revised how it would allocate funding through its flagship homelessness program, the Continuum of Care.

The change reduced the share of funding available for permanent subsidized housing and increased funding for transitional short-term housing.

HUD officials described the shift as a move away from a “housing first” model toward a “treatment first” approach that emphasizes participation in services, such as drug addiction disorder treatment, before or alongside housing placement.

The administration has argued that this promotes self-sufficiency. Critics contend that stable housing is the foundation that makes treatment and recovery possible.

The policy revision has been challenged in court by 20 states, including Michigan, as well as city and county governments and advocacy organizations. They argue it could destabilize individuals and families across the country, state and here in Detroit.

I am an urban and regional planning scholar who studies housing policy, and I serve on the research council of the National Alliance to End Homelessness.

In December 2025, I joined 77 other homelessness researchers who sent a letter to Congress analyzing the likely impacts of HUD’s revised funding approach. That analysis draws on decades of peer-reviewed research evaluating which housing interventions reduce homelessness and which do not.

That same month, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction that temporarily pauses HUD’s efforts to shift funding away from permanent supportive housing.

HUD officials stated that the agency intends to apply the changes in future funding rounds, once the order is no longer in effect.

Homelessness in Detroit

Detroit’s homelessness crisis is both long-standing and worsening.

The number of people who experience homelessness in Detroit, Hamtramck and Highland Park increased by about 16% from 2023 to 2024, with roughly 1,725 people experiencing homelessness on a single January night, including hundreds of families. Children in particular have been hit hard by this crisis. One data snapshot shows 2,579 children reported being doubled up, staying in a shelter, staying in a hotel or motel or being unsheltered. This was a record number for the Detroit Public Schools Community District.

While permanent supportive housing has strong outcomes for those who receive it, overall homelessness has continued to increase due to rising rents, economic instability and the limited housing supply, which has historically outpaced the number of available supportive units.

Detroit’s homelessness response system is coordinated through the federally funded local Continuum of Care led by the Homeless Action Network of Detroit.

In recent years, Detroit has taken steps to strengthen coordination, expand shelter capacity and increase housing placements. But the system heavily depends on federal funding to provide permanent supportive housing.

What could change in federal homelessness funding

The Continuum of Care program began in 1994 and was later codified in 2009 by the Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing Act. It is the largest federal funding stream dedicated to addressing homelessness in the United States.

Last year alone, Detroit received US$40 million from the HUD program.

Those funds pay for emergency shelters, transitional housing and rapid rehousing programs – which provide temporary rental assistance and the assistance of a social worker, without preconditions – and permanent supportive housing.

Like other cities nationwide, Detroit has built its homelessness response system around HUD’s funding priorities.

For more than a decade, HUD has emphasized permanent housing. A strong body of evidence shows that stable housing leads to better long-term outcomes than temporary programs.

Prior Continuum of Care funding cycles allocated roughly 85% to 90% of funds to permanent housing, according to the National Alliance to End Homelessness.

The revised funding priorities announced in late 2025 would substantially reduce that share and redirect funding toward transitional housing and short-term interventions.

According to the Homeless Action Network of Detroit, this means that Detroit area providers could go from about $34 million per year allocated for permanent supportive housing under the current allocation to no more than about $11 million under the new priorities.

Local advocates warn that capping permanent housing at roughly 30% of Continuum of Care dollars would drastically reduce the number of supportive units available and place hundreds of households at risk of returning to homelessness.

Why permanent supportive housing matters

Permanent supportive housing is one of the most rigorously studied homelessness interventions in the United States.

It is an evidence-based intervention that provides long-term rental assistance paired with voluntary supportive services for people who have experienced chronic, or repeated, homelessness, particularly those with disabilities or chronic health conditions.

Under the current Continuum of Care framework, households typically pay no more than 30% of their income toward rent, with the subsidy covering the remainder. Assistance can continue as long as eligibility criteria are met.

Programs also offer staff to help with coordination of health care and behavioral health services and assistance identifying and applying for relevant benefits to promote long-term housing stability. Tenants hold standard leases and have the same legal protections as other renters.

Research shows that permanent supportive housing using a housing-first approach consistently reduces homelessness and improves health outcomes for people with disabilities.

Greater investment in permanent supportive housing is also linked to reductions in chronic homelessness, meaning individuals or families who have been homeless for long periods or repeatedly over time.

A long-term study published in Social Service Review in 2014 found that communities that increased permanent supportive housing capacity experienced measurable declines in chronic homelessness over time.

Local data from the Detroit Continuum of Care indicate that at least 160 new permanent supportive housing units have been made available in the past year, and another 235 units are projected for 2026. These units help people exit homelessness and maintain stable homes amid rising rents and affordability challenges.

How transitional housing compares

Transitional housing typically requires residents to participate in supportive services or programming as a condition of stay. This can include regular meetings with a social worker, employment readiness classes, substance use treatment or financial literacy workshops, for example.

The model is often used for survivors of domestic violence or young adults aging out of foster care. While transitional housing can provide short-term stability and support during these transitions, it differs from permanent supportive housing in that it is time-limited and may require program compliance as a condition of continued residency. Transitional housing placements typically last from about six months up to two years.

However, research consistently finds that transitional housing is less likely than permanent housing to produce long-term housing stability. This is particularly the case for families and people with disabilities.

HUD’s Family Options Study in 2016 found that families offered permanent housing experienced significantly better long-term housing stability than those offered transitional housing, despite transitional housing costing more per household.

Follow-up research conducted by the Urban Institute, a nonprofit organization that studies economic policy, similarly found that many families who leave transitional housing once their time limit expires struggle to maintain stable housing. These findings are especially relevant for individuals with disabilities, chronic illnesses or mental health conditions, all groups that are typically prioritized for permanent supportive housing.

Why Detroit is especially vulnerable

Research shows that housing instability increases reliance on emergency services such as shelters, hospitals and public safety systems. This drives up taxpayer costs and additionally strains already overextended local services.

Detroit area homelessness service providers are pushing back against the potential federal changes, which they identify as “radical.”

In response, many organizations are turning to state and philanthropic partners for support while continuing to develop housing locally to help offset possible reductions in federal funding.

Deyanira Nevárez Martínez has received funding from the State of Michigan, the Latino Policy and Politics Institue at UCLA, the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and the Freedom Together Foundation (formerly the JPB Foundation). She is an Assistant Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at Michigan State University and is an elected member of the Lansing City Council representing ward 2.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation