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In 2024, the most recent year for which we have data, an estimated 1 million immigrants from Venezuela lived in the United States. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, these Venezuelans constitute about 2% of the total immigrant population.

We are demographers – social scientists who specialize in understanding the changing U.S. population, including changes due to immigration.

With all the coverage of Venezuela in the U.S. news right now, we were interested in looking at the data to learn about this group of immigrants and where they live.

By the numbers

Notably, Venezuelan immigrants have lived in the United States for barely 10 years on average, considerably less than the nearly 23-year average for the total immigrant population. More than half of Venezuelan immigrants report arriving in the U.S. in the past five years, coinciding with the highly disputed 2018 Venezuelan election in which Nicolas Maduro retained power.

Data from the Office of Homeland Security Statistics illuminates this difference, pointing to recent dramatic growth in the Venezuelan population in the U.S. Annual counts of Venezuelans obtaining legal permanent residence permits, commonly called green cards, have more than doubled since 2018. Moreover, the number of green cards going to Venezuelans has increased 600% since 1999, when Venezuela’s previous autocratic leader, Hugo Chavez, took power.

A large number of Venezuelans living in the U.S. arrived within the past five years under temporary protected status. In 2021, just 21,000 Venezuelans were in the U.S. with this status. By the end of 2025, more than 600,000 Venezuelan immigrants had been granted this status, making them the largest nationality with temporary protected status. Of that number, more than 200,000 were living in Florida.

At the same time, the number of refugees and asylum-seekers has also spiked dramatically in recent years. More than 5,000 Venezuelans were granted these statuses in 2023.

In 2023 – the most recent year of data – fewer than 20,000 Venezuelans received green cards, making up less than 2% of all newly granted permanent resident permits. For comparison, over 180,000 green cards were granted to Mexican immigrants in that year.

While there is no reliable data on undocumented immigrants by nationality, the Office of Homeland Security Statistics reports that the federal government removed just 488 Venezuelans from the country in 2022 – a tiny fraction of all reported removals. This suggests to us that most Venezuelans living in the United States have legal status. However, there is no available data yet on removals during the second Trump administration.

At the same time, the share of Venezuelan immigrants who are U.S. citizens is relatively small. Data from the 2024 American Community Survey shows that just a quarter have become citizens, compared to over half of immigrants overall. Because U.S. law requires many green card holders to reside in the U.S. for at least five years before applying for citizenship, this difference likely reflects the fact that most Venezuelans arrived recently.

A highly concentrated population

Venezuelans stand out from other immigrant groups with respect to where they settle after arriving in the United States. The 2024 American Community Survey data indicates that 40% of Venezuelan immigrants live in Florida.

Indeed, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis has asked the state’s Department of Justice to press additional charges against Maduro, claiming that Maduro’s policies are responsible for an outsize population of Venezuelan immigrants in Florida. DeSantis also claims Maduro has encouraged gang activity and drug running in the Sunshine State.

The state of Texas constitutes a distant second, home to 18% of Venezuelan immigrants.

Zooming in geographically, Venezuelans are highly concentrated in just a few cities nationally, with the Miami-Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, Houston, Dallas and New York City metro areas home to the majority of this population.

Like many recently arrived immigrant groups, Venezuelans in the United States tend to be low income. The 2024 American Community Survey tells us that 18% live in poverty, which is nearly double the national average of 10.4%. In addition, 6.9% of adults are unemployed, and 19% lack health insurance of any kind. However, 82% of Venezuelan immigrants speak at least some English, and 44% of adults have a college degree.

What now?

After Maduro’s removal was announced, Venezuelans celebrated in the streets of major U.S. cities, with many expressing the hope of returning to their homeland.

But when or whether that will be possible is unclear. Maduro may be gone, but his administration remains in power, which may make mass migration back to Venezuela difficult.

However, the U.S. government is encouraging Venezuelans to return home. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem revoked TPS status for more than 500,000 Venezuelan immigrants in October 2025, effectively immediately. At this point, it has not been reinstated.

Where the 1 million Venezuelan immigrants in the U.S. who hold various statuses may go next remains unclear. Florida in particular is likely to feel the impact of whatever comes next, given its large population of affected immigrants.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Eileen Higgins won a historic victory in December. She became the first woman ever elected mayor of Miami, as well as its first Democratic mayor since 1997.

Although the stakes in the city’s Dec. 9, 2025, runoff election were high, interest was not − 4 in 5 registered voters stayed home.

Low turnout is common in municipal elections across the country. While much of the nation’s political attention stays focused on Washington, the leaders who control the nation’s streets, schools and neighborhoods are typically chosen by a small fraction of citizens.

Although many Americans can identify their U.S. senators or members of Congress, far fewer can name even one of their local elected officials, such as a city council member. To cite one example, a North Carolina study, found that 86% of state residents could not identify their own elected leaders, including local government officials.

Turnout in local elections regularly falls below 20%, often leaving critical decisions in the hands of small, unrepresentative groups, creating an electorate that’s disproportionately white, elderly and affluent.

My research as a political scientist suggests an overlooked factor explains why some people engage with their communities while others tune out: local patriotism, or how they feel about their town.

The power of local patriotism

For my book “Patriotism and Citizenship,” I commissioned a nationally representative survey of 500 Americans. We asked a simple question: How do you feel about the town you live in? Those who responded could choose from five options, ranging from “hate it” to “love it.”

About half said they “liked” their town, 20% loved it, but a full quarter expressed no positive feelings whatsoever; 3% said they outright “hated” where they lived.

Such attitudes have real-world effects. Even after accounting for factors such as age, education, income and general interest in politics, loving one’s town strongly predicted participation in local politics.

People who loved their town were more likely to attend city council meetings, contact local officials, volunteer for campaigns and discuss local issues with friends. The same pattern held for civic participation – from volunteering with community groups to organizing neighborhood cleanups.

Local patriotism also correlated strongly with trust in local government.

Determining the stakes

To test whether these feelings actually change civic behavior, I ran two experiments.

Participants were first asked to identify the biggest problem facing their town. Some mentioned traffic congestion, others cited crime or homelessness. Then came the test: Would they donate $1 they’d earned for taking the survey to help solve that problem?

In the first experiment, one group was asked “Thinking about feelings of love or hate toward your town, would you like to donate this $1 to help your town solve the problem that you just listed above?” The other group received no such prompt about their feelings and was just asked to donate to solve the problem.

The results were striking. Among those primed to consider their feelings about their town, 18% gave away their payment. In the control group, just 3% donated – a sixfold difference.

A second experiment replicated this finding. When people were prompted to think about loving their town, 8% donated. Even asking them to consider feelings of hate led 5% to give. But in the control group with no emotional prompt? No one donated.

Why this matters for democracy

Local patriotism appears to address a fundamental puzzle in political science: why anyone participates in local politics at all. The time and effort required almost always exceed any tangible benefit an individual would receive.

But when people care deeply about their community, the calculation changes. The emotional reward of helping a place you love becomes a plus. The sacrifice feels worthwhile not because it will definitely make a difference, but because you’re investing in something that matters to you.

This has important implications. The positive feelings people have toward their community translate directly into civic engagement, without the risk of increasing negative feelings such as jingoism or xenophobia.

For local leaders frustrated by low turnout and apathy, the message is clear: Before asking residents to show up, give them reasons to care. Build pride of place, and engagement will follow.

The good news is that local attachment isn’t fixed. My experiments showed that simply prompting people to think about their feelings toward their town could motivate civic action.

A few ways to foster local patriotism

Here are some strategies that can help foster local patriotism:

• Create civic rituals: Regular community events, from farmers markets to fireworks, build emotional ties to place.

• Celebrate iconic places: Whether it’s a waterfall, clock tower or mountain view, promote the landmarks that symbolize your community. These shared images give residents a common point of pride and visual shorthand for what makes their town special.

• Bring children to community events and have them participate in local organizations: Parents who take their kids to town festivals, parades and events, or sign them up for youth art and sports programs, aren’t just keeping them entertained. They’re building the next generation’s emotional connection to place and creating civic habits that can last a lifetime.

The evidence shows that emotional connection to community is a powerful but largely untapped resource for strengthening democracy from the ground up.

In an era of declining civic engagement and deepening partisan divisions, fostering local patriotism might be exactly what the country needs.

Sean Richey does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The U.S. Supreme Court in early 2026 will hear oral arguments in two cases testing the limits of gun rights under the Constitution.

Can a state outlaw carrying a concealed weapon in businesses or restaurants unless the owners post a sign allowing it? And can the federal government criminalize the possession of firearms by a habitual drug user?

The plaintiffs in both cases claim that these laws violate their Second Amendment rights. As a close observer of the Supreme Court, I suspect the rulings will split. The court will likely strike down the limitation on concealed carry and uphold the law denying gun rights to drug users.

History will tell

The Supreme Court recognizes an individual right to self-defense with firearms in public spaces. But it has also upheld the power of the government to enforce legitimate limits on that right.

The question is how can Americans know which limits are constitutional and which are not.

In 2022, the Supreme Court answered that question in a ruling, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, that struck down several states’ limitations on issuing what’s called “concealed carry” licenses. That ruling set a new standard for defining the boundaries on a constitutional right: if the right was allowed at the time of America’s founding and the early republic.

In the view of originalists, who see the meaning of the U.S. Constitution and the subsequent amendments as fixed by the understanding of its authors and ratifiers, the Second Amendment recognizes a preexisting individual right of self-protection. That self-protection right can be restricted but not removed. It can be limited but not eliminated.

In the Bruen ruling, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that current laws must be “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The appropriate method, he wrote, is to examine “how and why” the regulation functions, and see if the same kinds of laws were accepted by the founders.

If so, the current laws in question are legitimate limits to the right. If not, they are unconstitutional infringements.

The first test of the new standard for a constitutional regulation came in the United States v. Rahimi case in 2024. The court upheld the federal law criminalizing gun possession by someone subject to a domestic violence restraining order.

The court examined the historical record and found several examples of laws removing firearms from people who threatened others. The record revealed established law in four states at the time of the founding that fit the same general reason and mechanism as the current federal regulation targeting domestic abusers.

Concealed carry

On Jan. 20, the court will hear arguments in Wolford v. Lopez about what the historical record reveals regarding limitations on carrying concealed firearms in public.

After the Bruen decision, Hawaii and a few other states enacted laws restricting citizens from bringing a licensed firearm on private property held open to the public unless the owner gives permission. Usually that is accomplished by posting “clear and conspicuous signage at the entrance.”

The plaintiffs, Jason and Alison Wolford, argue that the Hawaii ban makes it “impossible as a practical matter to carry a firearm.” Most establishments will not post any sign, meaning it would be a criminal offense to conduct normal errands such as entering a grocery store or shop.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in 2024 upheld the Hawaii law on the grounds that a 1771 New Jersey law and an 1865 Louisiana law are historical “dead ringers” for the Hawaii law. The court found that those laws meet the requirement of “an established tradition” limiting citizens from carrying firearms onto private property without consent.

The Republican-appointed majority on the Supreme Court, I believe, is likely to conclude that this is a misunderstanding of Justice Thomas’ method described in Bruen.

The standard the court has set is not to find any one or two similar laws that were not struck down as unconstitutional. Instead, the standard is to demonstrate a clear pattern of a recognized form of accepted regulation. If the law existed for only a short period of time, in a limited geography, or for reasons we would now see as unacceptable, this does not demonstrate a tradition of legitimate legal limitation.

Advocates for the plaintiff argue that the New Jersey law from the 1770s was intended to deal with the problem of hunters using private land without permission. They say it did not apply to businesses open to the public.

The Louisiana law enacted immediately after the Civil War was part of the Black Codes designed to keep firearms out of the hands of freed slaves. The law was not intended to be enforced against whites but had the clear intent to restrict the civil rights of freedmen. The plaintiffs argue that it is wrong to cite an openly racist post-Civil War regulation as a justification for contemporary law.

The court is likely to agree. The majority of the court will likely rule that these laws are exceptions and not a legitimate pattern of historical regulation.

The legal scholar Neal Katyal describes the objections to these two examples as “flyspecking” – nitpicking small details.

But the historical analogies have clear flaws. If the majority follows the doctrine laid out in Bruen and Rahimi over the past few years, the court will strike down the Hawaii law.

Drug use

The second challenge to gun regulations will be heard in March.

United States v. Hemani addresses the federal law criminalizing firearm possession by anyone “who is an unlawful user” or “addicted to any controlled substance.”

Ali Hemani argues that his prosecution is unconstitutional because U.S. tradition only disarms citizens who are currently drunk or high, not alcohol abusers or addicts who may be clearheaded at other times.

History does not seem to be on Hemani’s side. While illicit drugs such as cocaine or heroin were largely unknown at the time of the nation’s founding, drunkenness was common and alcohol consumption was dramatic.

An amicus brief submitted for the case by a group of Colonial historians argues that “at the Founding, alcohol consumption, unlike drug use, was commonplace, and the Founders were aware of the risk that alcohol could cause a lapse in judgment.”

More importantly, the historians argue that “numerous laws disarmed those under the influence, recognizing that alcohol, which impedes judgment and self-control, is a dangerous combination with guns.”

These laws also applied to habitual drunkards, the mentally ill and others determined to be dangerous to the public.

Given the conservative leanings of the current court, it seems likely that the majority will find these historical laws on alcohol and guns to be close enough in purpose and method to uphold the current federal law on drugs and guns.

These two rulings may come down at the end of term in June 2026, when the most controversial cases tend to be announced. The court’s historical focus seems likely to yield nuanced results, striking down some regulations and upholding others.

Perhaps most importantly, we will see what the historical emphasis reveals about the balance between the constitutional right to self-defense and the collective power to ensure public safety.

Morgan Marietta does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The FBI search of a Washington Post reporter’s home on Jan. 14, 2026, was a rare and intimidating move by an administration focused on repressing criticism and dissent.

In its story about the search at Hannah Natanson’s home, at which FBI agents said they were searching for materials related to a federal government contractor, Washington Post reporter Perry Stein wrote that “it is highly unusual and aggressive for law enforcement to conduct a search on a reporter’s home.”

And Jameel Jaffer, director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, told The New York Times the raid was “intensely concerning,” and could have a chilling effect “on legitimate journalistic activity.”

Free speech and independent media play a vital role in holding governments accountable by informing the public about government wrongdoing.

This is precisely why autocrats like Russia’s Vladimir Putin have worked to silence independent media, eliminating checks on their power and extending their rule. In Russia, for example, public ignorance about Putin’s responsibility for military failures in the war on Ukraine has allowed state propaganda to shift blame to senior military officials instead.

While the United States remains institutionally far removed from countries like Russia, the Trump administration has taken troubling early steps toward autocracy by threatening – and in some cases implementing – restrictions on free speech and independent media.

Public ignorance, free speech and independent media

Ignorance about what public officials do exists in every political system.

In democracies, citizens often remain uninformed because learning about politics takes time and effort, while one vote rarely changes an election. American economist Anthony Downs called this “rational ignorance,” and it is made worse by complex laws and bureaucracy that few people fully understand.

As a result, voters often lack the information needed to monitor politicians or hold them accountable, giving officials more room to act in their own interest.

Free speech and independent media are essential for breaking this cycle. They allow citizens, journalists and opposition leaders to expose corruption and criticize those in power.

Open debate helps people share grievances and organize collective action, from protests to campaigns.

Independent media also act as watchdogs, investigating wrongdoing and raising the political cost of abuse – making it harder for leaders to get away with corruption or incompetence.

Public ignorance in autocracies

Autocrats strengthen their grip on power by undermining the institutions meant to keep them in check.

When free speech and independent journalism disappear, citizens are less likely to learn about government corruption or failures. Ignorance becomes the regime’s ally – it keeps people isolated and uninformed. By censoring information, autocrats create an information vacuum that prevents citizens from making informed choices or organizing protests.

This lack of reliable information also allows autocrats to spread propaganda and shape public opinion on major political and social issues.

Most modern autocrats have worked to silence free speech and crush independent media. When Putin came to power, he gradually shut down independent TV networks and censored opposition outlets. Journalists who exposed government corruption or brutality were harassed, prosecuted or even killed. New laws restricted protests and public criticism, while “foreign agent” rules made it nearly impossible for the few remaining independent media to operate.

At the same time, the Kremlin built a vast propaganda machine to shape public opinion. This control over information helped protect the regime during crises. As I noted in a recent article, many Russians were unaware of Putin’s responsibility for military failures in 2022. State media used propaganda to shift blame to the military leadership – preserving Putin’s popularity even as the war faltered.

The threat to independent media in the US

While the United States remains far from an autocracy, the Trump administration has taken steps that echo the behavior of authoritarian regimes.

Consider the use of lawsuits to intimidate journalists. In Singapore, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his son, Lee Hsien Loong, routinely used civil defamation suits to silence reporters who exposed government repression or corruption. These tactics discouraged criticism and encouraged self-censorship.

President Donald Trump has taken a similar approach, seeking US$15 billion from The New York Times for publication of several allegedly “malicious” articles, and $10 billion from The Wall Street Journal. The latter suit concerns a story about a letter Trump reportedly signed in Jeffrey Epstein’s birthday book.

A court dismissed the lawsuit against The New York Times; that’s likely to happen with the Journal suit as well. But such lawsuits could deter reporting on government misconduct, reporting on the actions and statements of Trump’s political opponents, and the kind of criticism of an administration inherent in opinion journalism such as columns and editorials.

This problem is compounded by the fact that after the Jimmy Kimmel show was suspended following a threat from the Trump-aligned chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, the president suggested revoking the broadcast licenses of networks that air negative commentary about him.

Although the show was later reinstated, the episode revealed how the administration could use the autocratic technique of bureaucratic pressure to suppress speech it disagreed with. Combined with efforts to prosecute the president’s perceived enemies through the Justice Department, such actions inevitably encourage media self-censorship and deepen public ignorance.

The threat to free speech

Autocrats often invoke “national security” to pass laws restricting free speech. Russia’s “foreign agents” law, passed in 2012, forced nongovernmental organizations with foreign funding to label themselves as such, becoming a tool for silencing dissenting advocacy groups. Its 2022 revision broadened the definition, letting the Kremlin target anyone who criticized the government.

Similar laws have appeared in Hungary, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Russia also uses vague “terrorist” and “extremist” designations to punish those who protest and dissent, all under the guise of “national security.”

After Charlie Kirk’s murder, the Trump administration took steps threatening free speech. It used the pretext of the “violence-inciting radical left” to call for a crackdown on what it designated as “hate speech,” threaten liberal groups, and designate antifa as a domestic terrorist organization.

The latter move is especially troubling, pushing the United States closer to the behavior characteristic of autocratic governments. The vagueness of the designation threatens to suppress free expression and opposition to the Trump administration.

Antifa is not an organization but a “decentralized collection of individual activists,” as scholar Stanislav Vysotsky describes it. The scope of those falling under the antifa label is widened by its identification with broad ideas, described in a national security memorandum issued by the Trump administration in the fall of 2025, like anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism, and anti-Christianity. This gives the government leeway to prosecute an unprecedented number of individuals for their speech.

As scholar Melinda Haas writes, the memorandum “pushes the limits of presidential authority by targeting individuals and groups as potential domestic terrorists based on their beliefs rather than their actions.”

Konstantin Zhukov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

In 2018, high-speed passenger trains branded as Brightline started running along the formerly freight-only Florida East Coast Railway. Initial service from Miami to West Palm Beach was extended to Orlando in 2023. Unfortunately, the southern end of the line is in the spotlight because of collisions with pedestrians and motor vehicles.

The safety concerns have received extensive coverage in the Miami Herald, Orlando Sentinel, The Atlantic and on local television and radio stations.

To South Floridians, the furor may be novel. But nationally the debate over how to prevent these incidents has been going on for decades.

Most of the risks of railroading fall on pedestrians and motorists. Over the past decade, an average of 900 pedestrians lost their lives each year in the U.S., and another 150 motor vehicle occupants died in collisions at highway-rail grade crossings.

I’m an economist who has studied transportation safety for 40 years. My research has analyzed why motor vehicle risks have fallen substantially, while there has been hardly any progress for pedestrians.

Reducing motor vehicle crashes

In 1966, 1,700 motor vehicle occupants died at railroad crossings. Nowadays, that number is typically less than 150. Over the same period, the number of vehicles on the road has tripled. By these measures, the risk has fallen by an amazing 97%.

What happened?

In part, the risk fell due to better vehicle technology and reduced drunken driving, which have improved overall highway safety.

The rest was due to actions taken starting in the early 1970s in reaction to the high number of deaths. Notably, the responsibility for deciding on safety features at crossings was taken away from the railroads and given to state and local highway authorities.

A design standards handbook and risk analysis tools were developed by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The analysis tools produce a priority listing of the riskiest crossings. The handbook describes the options that engineers can use to reduce risks, such as installing flashing warning lights and barriers across the road. It also suggests when to consider closing or consolidating dangerous crossings. Federal money supplemented spending by railroads and state and local governments to pay for these improvements.

A public information campaign educating drivers about the risks at crossings was established in Idaho in 1972 under the name Operation Lifesaver. By 1986, the program had spread to every state.

Railways closed many unprofitable lines after they were allowed to do so by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. The reduced number of railroad miles and crossings also dropped the associated risk.

Stagnant risks to pedestrians

A similar analysis of pedestrian deaths is complicated. Pedestrian deaths occur all along the railroad and not just at crossings. Sadly, some deaths are intentional. Federal railroad officials had stopped requiring that suicides be reported in the mid-1950s and resumed doing so only in 2011.

In 1966, there were 730 nonintentional pedestrian deaths. Today, that number is roughly the same. It’s worth noting, however, that the U.S. population is 70% higher than it was in the 1960s, so the risk per person is lower.

Federal data from the past decade shows that about a quarter of the 900 annual pedestrian deaths were ruled by a coroner or medical examiner to be intentional. Coroners often lack sufficient evidence to definitively rule a suicide, so the actual proportion of pedestrians with suicidal intent is likely much higher. My own research in the Chicago area found that about half were confirmed or likely suicides.

Getting to the root cause

While the risk is down, the reduction is nowhere near as large as that of motor vehicles at crossings.

In the past decade the U.S. Department of Transportation has funded development of handbooks on the design of pedestrian crossings and interventions to mitigate risks at places away from crossings.

The latter handbook emphasizes that successful countermeasures need to be tailored to the reasons people are on the tracks in the first place. And, of course, there are many reasons.

Fencing may seem like an obvious countermeasure, but a fence does not prevent access at crossings and stations. Moreover, fences also tend to be destroyed where it is onerous to detour to a formal crossing rather than take a shortcut.

In fact, fencing can be counterproductive if it screens the railroad from public view and encourages nefarious activities, including theft, drug dealing and loitering.

Tackling intentional deaths has been challenging. Countermeasures have focused on signage providing information on mental health services and training rail workers to recognize people displaying symptoms of distress and then intervening or calling for help.

At times, tackling the root of the problem may involve land use and zoning at a local level. For example, a city might decide not to allow a convenience store to be located on the opposite side of the tracks from the population it serves. Or a city or school district might relocate transit or school bus stops to avoid the temptation to take a shortcut.

Florida railroads

South Florida faces several challenges. The primary challenge is its flat land. No hills means there is no natural grade separation between the railroad and intersecting roads and footpaths.

Elevating the railroad would be expensive and would cut communities in two. The effects of such severance should not be underestimated. In fact, the trend in recent times has been to rejoin urban neighborhoods that were bisected by interstate highway construction in the 1960s.

Another challenge comes, ironically, from the original vision behind rail travel in Florida. Standard Oil magnate Henry Flagler developed and built the Florida East Coast Railway in hopes of spurring coastal development. These days, dense communities surround the line, with housing, schools, stores and restaurants scattered on both sides of the tracks.

Development also made it less safe for motor vehicles. Main roads, such as U.S. Route 1 and Dixie Highway, were built parallel to the tracks. Over time, as these roads have become wider and busier, the cross streets have a smaller distance between the railroad and the main road. The space for vehicles waiting to turn onto the main road is limited, and the lights and gates at the railroad crossing must be coordinated with the traffic signals on the main road. This is a major challenge to the state, county and municipal traffic engineers who have inherited these complicated intersections.

It is tempting to suggest that many of these crossings should be consolidated into fewer, well-designed crossings. But this could result in unintended consequences for pedestrians. When too few crossings are available, pedestrians are more likely to take unauthorized shortcuts. Any consolidation of road crossings must be accompanied by alternative ways for pedestrians to cross the tracks safely.

It is important to keep looking for solutions to pedestrian and vehicle safety issues so that South Florida communities can be safer while enjoying the benefits that rail offers, such as reducing the number of trucks on the roads and offering an alternative to passengers who wish to avoid flying or driving on congested Interstate 95.

If you are experiencing suicidal thoughts, you can contact the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (988) or Crisis Text Line (text “HELLO” to 741741) for immediate support.

I was a volunteer member of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine oversight committee as the 2022 “Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way” handbook was developed. As such we could comment on drafts but were not the authors of the report.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Donald Trump has flagged Venezuelan drug trafficking as a key reason for the U.S. military operation on Jan. 3, 2026, that captured President Nicolás Maduro and whisked him to New York to face federal drug charges.

Trump has described Maduro as “the kingpin of a vast criminal network responsible for trafficking colossal amounts of deadly and illicit drugs into the United States.”

In 2025, the administration presented the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and repeated strikes on alleged drug trafficking vessels off Venezuela’s coast as necessary to counter the flow of cocaine into the United States.

But as an international relations scholar focused on Latin America, I know that when assessed against hard data on cocaine production and transit, the U.S. pretense for military action against Venezuela falters.

Venezuela has never been a major cocaine producer. That distinction belongs overwhelmingly to Colombia, which accounts for the vast majority of coca cultivation and cocaine processing in the Western Hemisphere.

That means the arrest of Maduro and subsequent U.S. attempts to control Venezuela’s government are unlikely to stem the influx of cocaine into the U.S.

Justifying intervention

While Venezuela’s geography and governance gaps make it a transit country for Colombian products, most U.S. cocaine originates and flows through corridors north and west of Venezuela. This contradicts the claim that Caracas was the central hub of cocaine trafficking into the United States.

Moreover, the opioid overdose crisis in the U.S. today is overwhelmingly driven by synthetic drugs such as fentanyl, which have supply chains rooted in Mexico and Asia, not Venezuela.

So why did Washington elevate Venezuela’s role in narcotics?

The answer, I believe, lies less in illicit markets than in power. By conflating criminal networks with government authority, an act amplified through legal designations and indictments, the Trump administration could justify military intervention without explicit congressional authorization.

Once Maduro was removed, the substance beneath the rhetoric became clearer. The U.S. has not turned power over to an opposition democratic coalition. Instead, it facilitated the swearing-in of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president, a figure deeply tied to the existing regime and whose network includes people long accused by U.S. authorities of illegal activities.

The release of political prisoners by the interim government and U.S. moves to reopen Venezuela’s oil sector to American interests underscore that what unfolded was not purely a counternarcotics mission but a reconfiguration of governance in Caracas.

Pretext for military action

The role of the Cartel de los Soles – or Cartel of the Suns – in this narrative deserves particular scrutiny. Originally a label for alleged trafficking networks within Venezuela’s security forces, U.S. legal indictments and terrorist designations expanded that concept. That amplified the narrative that Maduro was at the head of a transnational criminal enterprise.

In fact, the Cartel de los Soles is not a structured cartel at all. Yet the narrative of Maduro as head of a narco-terrorist empire was politically and legally potent. It provided a pretext for military action, creating a justification that could be sold domestically and internationally as an effort to defend U.S. citizens from an external criminal threat.

But the U.S. attack in Venezuela was not, in substance, a counternarcotics mission. It was a strategic economic and geopolitical operation framed in the language of law enforcement.

Two days after the Venezuela attack, the Justice Department retreated from its November 2025 claim that Maduro was the head of Cartel de los Soles, underscoring that the link between drug enforcement and regime removal was more instrumental than evidentiary.

Rodríguez said just days after the U.S. attack, “Drug trafficking and human rights were the excuse; the real motive was oil.”

No meaningful reduction

While the U.S. operation in Venezuela undoubtedly disrupted the trafficking networks that operated under Maduro’s umbrella, at least temporarily, the action cannot be convincingly framed as a drug supply intervention.

The reality of drug trafficking itself underscores this point.

Cocaine production and distribution networks are dynamic. When one route is disrupted, traffickers invariably find alternative pathways.

Routes that once used Venezuelan territory have likely rerouted rather than collapsed. This has historically characterized drug flow in Latin America in response to pressure from law enforcement.

Even if Venezuelan transit networks are briefly destabilized, there is no evidence that U.S. intervention will lead to a meaningful reduction in the volume of illegal drugs flowing into the United States. The most significant drivers of U.S. drug problems, including Mexico-based distribution systems and the surge of synthetic opioids, operate largely outside Venezuela.

The U.S. operation may benefit Venezuela politically by toppling a long-standing authoritarian figure. That opens the possibility of political change.

But if the lens through which policymakers view these events is drug policy, they are misreading both the evidence and the incentives. The action was centered on energy and strategic realignment, with counternarcotics rhetoric serving as a justification rather than a driver of the U.S. attack.

And while trafficking networks adapt and survive, these shifts will not reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, which has long been shaped by factors far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

Eduardo Gamarra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Each year on the holiday that bears his name, Martin Luther King Jr. is remembered for his immense contributions to the struggle for racial equality. What is less often remembered but equally important is that King saw the fight for racial equality as deeply intertwined with economic justice.

To address inequality – and out of growing concern for how automation might displace workers – King became an early advocate for universal basic income. Under universal basic income, the government provides direct cash payments to all citizens to help them afford life’s expenses.

In recent years, more than a dozen U.S. cities have run universal basic income programs, often smaller or pilot programs that have offered guaranteed basic incomes to select groups of needy residents. As political scientists, we have followed these experiments closely.

One of us recently co-authored a study which found that universal basic income is generally popular. In two out of three surveys analyzed, majorities of white Americans supported a universal basic income proposal. Support is particularly high among those with low incomes.

King’s intuition was that white people with lower incomes would support this type of policy because they could also benefit from it. In 1967, King argued, “It seems to me that the Civil Rights Movement must now begin to organize for the guaranteed annual income … which I believe will go a long, long way toward dealing with the Negro’s economic problem and the economic problem with many other poor people confronting our nation.”

But there is one notable group that does not support universal basic income: those with higher levels of racial resentment. Racial resentment is a scale that social scientists have used to describe and measure anti-Black prejudice since the 1980s.

Notably, in our research, whites with higher levels of racial resentment and higher incomes are especially inclined to oppose universal basic income. As King well knew, this segment of Americans can create powerful opposition.

Economic self-interest can trump resentment

At the same time, the results of the study also suggest that coalition building is possible, even among the racially resentful.

Economic status matters. Racially resentful whites with lower incomes tend to be supportive of universal basic income. In short, self-interest seems to trump racial resentment. This is consistent with King’s idea of how an economic coalition could be built and pave the way toward racial progress.

Income is not the only thing that shapes attitudes, however. Some of the strongest supporters of universal basic income are those who have higher incomes but low levels of racial resentment. This suggests an opportunity to build coalitions across economic lines, something King believed was necessary. “The rich must not ignore the poor,” he argued in his Nobel Peace Prize lecture, “because both rich and poor are tied in a single garment of destiny.” Our data shows that this is possible.

This approach to coalition building is also suggested by our earlier research. Using American National Election Studies surveys from 2004-2016, we found that for white Americans, racial resentment predicted lower support for social welfare policies. But we also found that economic position mattered, too.

Economic need can unite white Americans in support of more generous welfare policies, including among some who are racially prejudiced. At a minimum, this suggests that racial resentment does not necessarily prevent white Americans from supporting policies that would also benefit Black Americans.

Building lasting coalitions

During his career as an activist in the 1950s and 1960s, King struggled with building long-term, multiracial coalitions. He understood that many forms of racial prejudice could undermine his work. He therefore sought strategies that could forge alliances across lines of difference. He helped build coalitions of poor and working-class Americans, including those who are white. He was not so naive as to think that shared economic progress would eliminate racial prejudice, but he saw it as a place to start.

Currently, the nation faces an affordability crisis, and artificial intelligence poses new threats to jobs. These factors have increased calls for universal basic income.

Racial prejudice continues to fuel opposition to universal basic income, as well as other forms of social welfare. But our research suggests that this is not insurmountable.

As King knew, progress toward economic equality is not inevitable. But, as his legacy reminds us, progress does remain possible through organizing around shared interests.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation