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Florida’s proposed property tax amendment will require trade-offs – and some residents could end up with higher costs

Florida voters will decide on a major property tax amendment this November. JJ Gouin/iStock via Getty Images Plus

Between inflation, rising car and property insurance premiums and the costs of contending with extreme weather, many Florida homeowners are feeling financially squeezed.

While the ballot box can’t change the risk of floods or hurricanes, a constitutional amendment on the November ballot could reduce homeowners’ costs in the form of lower property taxes. Sixty percent of voters must approve the amendment in order for it to become part of the Florida Constitution.

The average home in the state is worth about US$378,000 as of July 2026, with the median sale price slightly higher, at around $395,000. This corresponds with property taxes of just over $3,000 annually. Floridians in more expensive houses may pay double – or more – than the taxes on a median-priced home.

As an economist living in Florida, I’ve spent the past decade teaching about the economics of government and public finance, analyzing and breaking down policy, policy proposals and their impacts on the Sunshine State.

It can be difficult to navigate all the conflicting information and argumentation surrounding this proposed amendment, so I wanted to dig into what it would mean for Florida residents.

What the proposed amendment would change

Current Florida homeowners can apply for a homestead exemption on their primary residence. This exemption allows homeowners to deduct up to $50,000 of their home’s assessed value, which reduces their annual property taxes.

The proposed Amendment 3, officially known as the Homestead Tax Exemptions, Property Assessments, and Spending Restrictions Amendment, does not eliminate all property taxes, but it does substantially reduce them. It would increase the current homeowner’s homestead tax exemption to $150,000 in 2027 and to $250,000 in 2028.

New Florida homeowners would qualify for a smaller exemption on their primary residence, which would increase after five years of residency.

Amendment 3 does not provide special tax relief for renters. Landlords could still see meaningful tax increases on an annual basis as their properties increase in value.

The ballot initiative’s language theoretically limits how tax dollars should be used by county and municipal governments, with the idea that such provisions ensure continued funding for essential services. Indeed, the ballot language provides a list of acceptable expenditures, such as public safety, infrastructure or obligations for employee retirement benefits.

However, the proposed amendment also says funds may be used for “expenditures approved” by local and county governments. This broad language on local spending authority may render the earlier stipulations toothless. The overall implication, therefore, is unclear.

If passed, Amendment 3 would lower the cap on annual property assessments on rental and commercial properties from a 10% increase to a 5% increase. Since property taxes are based on an asset’s assessed value, this effectively limits tax rate increases for businesses. The same caps would apply to second homes, which do not qualify for a homestead exemption.

A win for taxpayers?

The Florida Revenue Estimating Conference, which is the Florida Legislature’s research arm, estimates the bill would reduce revenue from property taxes by $11.8 billion per year.

The bill’s legislative proponents argue the measure is a win for taxpayers, citing reductions in the cost of homeownership while maintaining funding for schools and other essential services.

Detractors in the Legislature, meanwhile, cite projected budget shortfalls, concerns over the loss of critical services and the bill’s failure to address the primary drivers of increased living costs as their basis for opposition.

Fire trucks and an ambulance on their way to an emergency
Emergency services are the largest line item in most local governments’ budgets.
Michelle Eve Sandberg/AFP via Getty Images

Taxpayers may not end up paying much less

Current homeowners would see their property taxes fall. Others, however, would almost certainly pay more. Florida businesses, landlords and owners of other non-homestead properties would almost certainly see their taxes increase. Research shows that when governments cut property taxes for some groups, taxes shift to other groups.

If the state or local governments want to maintain the same revenue, Amendment 3 would necessitate tax increases in other areas, or more federal dollars to make up for the shortfall. This could include increases in state and local sales tax, expanding the list of goods subject to sales taxes, or increasing “documentary stamp taxes,” required on documents such as deeds, bonds and mortgages.

Local consequences

Florida property taxes are levied and collected by some 640 local government entities. There is no state income tax. This means that any reductions in property tax revenue directly affect local and county governments.

Local governments could replace declines in tax revenue in several ways. First, they may increase the tax or “millage” rate on less-protected property categories. These include non-homestead properties and large rental properties.

While Amendment 3 lowers the cap on property assessments for these other property categories, it does not mean taxes on these assets cannot or will not increase. And even small increases in the tax rate can be significant. A 1% increase in taxes on a $15 million commercial property, for example, equates to an increase of $150,000 on the owner’s tax bill. Though Florida’s Senate president, Republican Ben Albritton, stated that the bill would protect small businesses from tax increases, the ballot language does not support this claim. A small tax increase is still a tax increase.

Second, local governments may impose special assessments or implement higher fees for specific services, such as solid waste and stormwater utilities. They may also choose to levy additional taxes on permits and inspection fees, fuel taxes, or other service charges such as vehicle registration fees. State law even allows for possible increases in local sales taxes, though there are meaningful constraints.

Local governments may also increase taxes related to tourism, such as on food, beverages and hotels. It’s worth noting, however, that this is not a viable avenue for counties with limited tourism, and such revenues would fluctuate depending on tourism trends.

Finally, the state government could transfer additional funds to local governments from other state revenue sources. Such mechanisms already exist, though Amendment 3 does not make specific provisions for increased state-provided funding.

kids playing basketball at a park
Many public parks are cared for by local governments and funded by property taxes.
Drazen_/E+ via Getty Images

Schools and essential services

School-related property taxes are explicitly exempt from Amendment 3’s tax cuts.

And according to Albritton, the amendment would also ensure funding for critical services, such as infrastructure and public safety.

However, essential services would almost certainly be affected. For most Florida counties, these services make up the largest line item in their annual expenditures. Reducing property taxes has direct implications for essential service budgets.

Impacts on services would be uneven across the state. While some funding for police, fire and emergency medical services comes from state and federal sources, these services are primarily the responsibility of local governments. Local property taxes also fund services and facilities such as libraries and public parks.

Smaller, less-populated counties would be disproportionately vulnerable to service cuts compared with their larger counterparts. They lack a large tax base and are less able to generate revenue from other sources.

Providers of essential services have raised these concerns. In a rare position paper, the Florida Fire Chiefs’ Association has directly opposed Amendment 3, saying it would “create substantial uncertainty” around emergency services funding throughout the state.

Other considerations

This legislation hinges on several assumptions.

Amendment 3 assumes the caps on non-homestead properties will prevent overly burdensome tax increases on those properties. It also assumes that public safety and other key services can be protected through top-down rules on local spending. Implementing this legislation will also require the necessary personnel and infrastructure to effectively administer the law. If any of these assumptions is incorrect, the implications for businesses, local governments and Floridians are significant.

There are also some questions about the legality of classifying current and future Florida homeowners differently. This is particularly relevant when considering questions of residency and duration of residency.

In the past, Florida policymakers have drawn new residents and businesses to the state with the promise of no income taxes, a low cost of living and lower overall taxes compared to other states.

Amendment 3, while aligned with this “low tax” ideal, reveals real tensions when it comes to tax policy. The state can reduce property taxes, but those reductions would require trade-offs, such as raising other taxes or reducing government services to Floridians. The question is not whether these trade-offs exist, but whether they are acceptable in exchange for lower property taxes. Voters will decide Nov. 3.

The Conversation

Abigail Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Open Channels FM: Signal – Issue 18

Talk about personal journeys in web development, the complexities of fame, and the benefits of open source, emphasizing enriching content options for listeners beyond traditional podcasts.

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Better guacamole? How avocado import rules helped cut Mexico’s water pollution – it holds lessons for future US trade deals

Growing avocados can contribute to water pollution, but there are ways to reduce the harm. Estúdio Bloom/Unsplash, CC BY

At picnics and World Cup watch parties across the United States this summer, people have been reaching for bowls of chips and guacamole. Most of that guacamole is made from avocados grown in Mexico – on orchards that, in what might come as a surprise, contribute less water pollution today than they did a decade ago.

There’s a story behind how these creamy fruits started to clean up their act. It begins with a big avocado deal between the U.S. and Mexico in 2016. And it provides evidence of how well-designed trade partnerships can do much more than promote trade.

Those benefits are worth remembering as officials from the U.S., Mexico and Canada negotiate the future of their free trade agreement.

How a trade deal cut Mexico’s farm pollution

Growing avocados on a commercial scale requires a lot of nitrogen fertilizers and other agrochemicals. Rain often washes those chemicals and fertilizers into nearby rivers and streams. Nitrogen downstream feeds algal blooms that starve rivers of oxygen and kill fish, and it can contaminate the drinking water that local communities rely on.

Avocado trees grow on newly planted land next to deciduous forest.
Expanding avocado plantations can increase water pollution and drive deforestation if there is no incentive to clean up production.
Brian Overcast/picture alliance via Getty Images

Economists have long argued that trade can exacerbate these environmental consequences: Wealthy countries with strict rules for their own growers buy the dirtiest goods from poorer countries with weaker regulations, relocating the pollution. Based on this “pollution haven” theory, America’s growing appetite for Mexican avocados should have left Mexico’s water dirtier.

Instead, research my co-author and I conducted shows the water got cleaner. We believe the requirements of a 2016 U.S.-Mexico trade agreement were a big reason why.

Bar charts show avocado consumption jumping with the addition of Mexican imports. Other avocado sources also expanded.
A 2016 trade deal boosted Mexican avocado shipments to the U.S. and the overall avocado market.
USDA

In 2016, the U.S. began allowing avocado imports from across Mexico as long as the Mexican farms met the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s strict production standards. Prior to 2016, Michoacán was the only Mexican state that exported avocados to the U.S.

The new standards required orchards to be certified before exporting their fruit to the U.S., multiple inspections at packing houses and ports, and phytosanitary certificates, which confirm that the fruit is free of the pests U.S. regulators target, such as avocado weevils and fruit flies.

To ensure the absence of pests, growers scout their fields and employ trapping devices, but they try to treat only where surveys turn up a problem. That’s because growers who rely on heavy spraying risk exceeding U.S. limits on pesticide residues, which can get shipments refused at the border.

A sticker with a barcode and the words 'avocados from Mexico' in red and green.
An avocado shipment from Mexico, marked with a barcode for tracking.
Brian Wangenheim/Unsplash, CC BY

With a permanent monitoring program tracking avocados at every stage of production, the risk of losing access to the lucrative U.S. export market incentivized farmers to shift away from routine spraying toward a more watchful management approach that, in turn, lowered their use of pesticides and agrochemicals.

Pesticides and fertilizers go together in avocado production, so we believe the pesticide reduction made each extra unit of fertilizer less worthwhile, leading growers to apply less nitrogen and phosphorus.

As farmers applied less nitrogen and phosphorus, less of it washed off their land and into nearby waterways, meaning less water pollution was flowing downstream.

Why the avocado stipulations worked

I’m an environmental economist. Working with agribusiness researcher William Townsend at California Polytechnic State University, we compared water quality in Mexican municipalities that grow avocados with otherwise similar municipalities that don’t, both before and after the 2016 rules took effect.

If something other than the trade agreement changes were driving the change, we’d expect both sets of places to respond similarly. However, they didn’t. In fact, after the 2016 program, nitrogen concentrations in waterways near avocado-growing areas fell by about 10% in the span of a few years compared to declines in similar non-avocado-growing areas in Mexico.

This is a meaningful improvement for rivers where agricultural runoff is one of the dominant sources of water pollution. A 10% reduction in nitrogen pollution in water corresponds to about a 6.6% reduction in use of nitrogen fertilizers. With the high cost of fertilizer today, being able to reduce fertilizer need helps farmers as well as surrounding ecosystems.

An open avocado, seed pointed out
Avocados can be a lucrative crop, but they also come with drawbacks, including the risk of expanded plantations driving deforestation and the involvement of drug cartels.
John Vid/Unsplash, CC BY

There are some caveats, of course.

The U.S.-Mexico market for avocados is unique. It has large demand for a high-value crop with a single dominant buyer – about 90% of the 1.2 million metric tons of avocados Mexico produced in 2025 went to the U.S. – and a credible system of phytosanitary certification for Mexican avocados. So, the same trade policy in conjunction with enforceable standards might not be as effective for other crops in other developing countries.

Avocado farming in Mexico also has some other serious drawbacks, including connections to drug cartels in some regions. The expansion of avocado groves has also driven deforestation and increased water use, which can be a problem in regions where water is already scarce. But the 2016 agreement showed that trade policies can help reduce avocado growers’ environmental impact.

Lessons for the new trade deal talks

As the U.S., Canada and Mexico negotiate the next iteration of a free trade pact or pacts, agriculture is one of the negotiating topics. Our research shows that the conditions stipulated by the U.S. on products it buys can ripple across the border.

So, as you reach for the chips and guacamole, remember that you’re dipping into evidence that what Americans choose to import – and the conditions trade deals impose – can shape the environment far beyond the U.S. border.

The Conversation

Jayash Paudel does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Mail-in voting: Trump administration appeals to Supreme Court to revive executive order setting limits, rejected by lower courts

Workers in the vote-by-mail processing area at the Orange County Registrar of Voters in Santa Ana, Calif., on May 27, 2026. Paul Bersebach/MediaNews Group/Orange County Register via Getty Images

John Jones knows about voter suppression. Currently the president of Dickinson College, Jones – nominated in 2002 by President George W. Bush and confirmed unanimously by the U.S. Senate – served for almost two decades as a federal court judge.

In that role, Jones presided over a case, filed just prior to the November 2020 presidential election, in which a conservative legal foundation sued Pennsylvania’s top election official, alleging that she had allowed 21,000 dead people to remain on the voter rolls. The group asked Jones to stop those people from voting.

Jones denied the request. “In an election where every vote matters, we will not disenfranchise potentially eligible voters based solely upon the allegations of a private foundation,” he wrote in his memorandum on the case.

In this interview with The Conversation politics and legal affairs editor Naomi Schalit, Jones discusses President Donald Trump’s March 31, 2026, executive order to wrest control of mail-in voting from states and give it to the U.S. Postal Service and the Department of Homeland Security; how the constitutional design of U.S. voting bars such federal control; and how Trump’s order would disenfranchise voters and has been the subject of lawsuits by voting rights groups and 23 states.

Trump’s executive order has in large part been blocked by a lower court, and on July 27, 2026, his administration appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to allow his order to be implemented.

Article 1, Section 4, of the Constitution says, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” When you first saw the executive order by the president, what did you think?

My first thought was, this executive order is dead on arrival. It assumes two problems that really don’t exist.

States are empowered under Article 1, Section 4, of the Constitution to conduct elections and set the time, place and manner of those elections.

The president’s March order asserts that states don’t maintain active and appropriate voter rolls. That’s just not true. State after state takes that very, very seriously, and it’s a principle of federalism that states are given the responsibility for conducting elections. This includes maintaining accurate voter rolls, which, despite the noise to the contrary, states have historically done very well.

The second inaccuracy that undergirds this executive order is that there is rampant fraud in mail-in voting. There is absolutely no evidence to show that that is true.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly claimed there is pervasive fraud in mail-in voting, despite a lack of evidence.

So you have those twin rationales that are, in my view, demonstrably untrue. And as someone who believes that we need to defer to the laws and the Constitution, not to mention find accurate facts, this is deeply troubling. It’s just beyond the president’s authority to do this.

There are other problems. They are less critical but equally fatal.

President Trump said on signing the executive order that “the cheating on mail-in voting is legendary.” So the order gives the U.S. Postal Service the job of determining who may cast mail ballots, in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security. Is that one of the problems you see?

That is not what the post office is equipped to do. I could joke here that they have a hard enough time at the U.S. Postal Service getting the mail delivered. Now they’re supposed to develop a program in concert with Homeland Security so that they could work to disqualify voters because they’re not on the list that Homeland Security provides to them that supposedly contains U.S. citizens. Homeland Security is simply not equipped to do this either. This is out of their skill set as well.

What’s the upshot?

Setting aside all the legal and constitutional hurdles that have been raised by lower courts, if this were to survive judicial scrutiny at the U.S. Supreme Court, it clearly would disenfranchise voters. We have a country that has an increasing group of citizens who really like to vote by mail – including, by the way, the president of the United States.

And now the administration is in effect saying, “We want to make it really, really difficult for you to vote by mail,” because of these contrived and, quite frankly, false premises that have to do with voter rolls and fraud in elections. There were legal challenges over this order in federal courts in D.C. and Massachusetts. After the latest ruling against the policy, the Supreme Court now has the case.

A group of protesters holding signs about mail-in voting fraud, outside a large building.
Victoria Beraja, center, and her mother, Lisa Burgess, right, both of Nevada, protest the passage of a mail-in voting bill during a Nevada Republican Party demonstration at the Grant Sawyer State Office Building on Aug. 4, 2020, in Las Vegas.
Getty Images

Why does anybody have to sue if this is simply not in the president’s power to make happen?

Because if they don’t sue to enjoin this, since these agencies – the Postal Service and Homeland Security – are under the executive branch, they’ll just go ahead and implement this cumbersome and impossible initiative.

Secretaries of state have pushed back against this. In a separate move by the administration, the Department of Justice has asked states to turn over their voter rolls, and many have refused to do so, standing on the principle that it’s beyond the executive to demand those. Various federal courts have backed the states so far. One of the problems with the request is a lack of confidence that the information can be kept safe by the federal government. And states work very, very hard to do that.

When I was on the federal bench and denied the injunction in the lawsuit filed by a conservative legal foundation that sought to take 20,000 plus voters off the rolls, I did so because there was no good proof that they were, in fact, deceased, which is what the suit asserted. Subsequent to the election, at the now infamous Four Seasons landscaping press conference, Rudy Giuliani was waving my decision in the air and decrying the fact that dead people voted in Pennsylvania. That was simply not true.

These types of hyperbolic claims, made up out of whole cloth, stoke fears. This recent executive order is a solution that is looking for a problem that doesn’t exist.

Why did the framers of the Constitution set up a process where states run elections and not the federal government?

Well, first of all the federal government didn’t have the apparatus to conduct elections. And states had been running elections; they knew how to do it. There was a great deal of trust in the states’ ability to run elections. And there was the core debate of federalism, as to what powers states could retain, and they didn’t want to abdicate many of those powers. There was also a debate about the potential for fraud, that if there was a single entity controlling all the elections – that is, if you centralize elections under one politically motivated executive – it’s a really fraught situation which can be abused.

The Constitution is clear, and unless amended, Article 1, Section 4, is – to use the trite phrase – what it is. The power rests with the states, absent congressional action. There is no mention of the president. None. This executive order is thus, in my view, patently unconstitutional, and I harbor little doubt that it will be found to be so.

So you think that the Supreme Court will, as the lower courts did, rule against Trump?

As a practical matter, we’re down to just over three months before the midterms. I very much doubt a majority of the high court will want to wade into this controversy, given the virtual impossibility of implementing the order even if they granted the requested relief. With the caveat that you never know what the Supreme Court will do, I predict that they will not come to the president’s rescue in this matter.

This is an updated version of an interview originally published on April 22, 2026.

The Conversation

John E. Jones III does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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How the Trump administration’s rhetoric promotes anti-transgender views

In the past few years, the Trump administration and state legislatures have restricted trans people’s rights and protections, from access to healthcare to passports. Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images

Whether in an Oval Office proclamation signing about commercial fishing or during a Fox News interview while discussing Iran, President Donald Trump finds opportunities to share his views on transgender people.

During a June 2026 signing event, Trump claimed, in response to a question about proposed legislation regarding election procedures, called the SAVE America Act: “We are talking about saving America, right? No men in women’s sports.” He continued, “And we have no mutilization of your children for transgender purposes … where your child leaves your house, and they take your child from you. … In six states, they take the child and do what they want to do. What they do is, is I don’t even want to talk about it. No transgender mutilization of your children.”

Highlighting Trump’s ongoing use of the made-up word “mutilization,” criticism quickly followed his false claims about states forcibly transitioning children. Misrepresentations like these help fuel the transgender moral panic that Trump has provoked since he started instituting restrictions on trans people in his first term.

As a rhetoric scholar for nearly two decades, I have studied how emotions propel rhetoric that goes viral on public platforms like social media and how politicians use emotions for varying purposes, including to bolster anti-trans legislation.

Throughout the Trump administration’s second term, I’ve followed how its officials have invented threats and used provocative language and repulsive imagery to stimulate anti-trans disgust and paranoia in audiences, contributing to public misconceptions and declining support for trans rights and people.

Changing views of trans people and issues

The Trump administration’s anti-trans agenda has flourished since his first term.

Following Republicans’ US$21 million anti-trans and anti-LGBTQ advertising campaign that helped pave Trump’s way to victory in 2024, the administration and its allies have been busy. The White House has denied the existence of trans identity, and states have introduced a deluge of legislation that restricts trans people’s rights and protections, from access to healthcare to passports.

Presidential rhetoric can have a significant impact on public opinion. Since reaching a peak in the early 2020s, overall support for LGBTQ+ issues has since declined in the U.S. Likewise, surveys have shown a decline in support for trans healthcare for minors, a preference for using birth sex on IDs, and increasing support for restrictions in sports for trans people.

Meanwhile, public approval of Trump’s approach to trans issues is relatively high, as compared with his approval ratings on other issues.

A 2024 report by the Human Rights Campaign decried an “epidemic of violence” against trans and gender-expansive people. A 2025 Pew report found that 70% of trans adults have feared for their personal safety, and only 13% of LGBTQ respondents reported social acceptance of trans people.

Though the causes for changing trans views are complex, research suggests Trump’s rhetoric and policies have powerful influence, the ramifications of which are clear. Anti-LGBTQ+ laws and debates negatively affect young queer people, according to the Trevor Project’s 2025 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young People, and are associated with increased stress, discrimination and suicide attempts.

People stand with linked arms in a crowd facing the U.S. Capitol, transgender pride flags among them
Trans people and their allies have pushed back against a recent wave of restrictions. Here, supporters rally for the Transgender Day of Visibility in March 2025.
Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images

Moral panic as political strategy

From the Salem witch trials in the 17th century to the war on drugs in the 20th century, moral panics have emerged across history to stoke fear against a perceived threat to a society’s values or well-being.

Moral panics, coined by sociologist Stanley Cohen in 1972, follow a similar pattern: a threat is defined, media exaggerates the threat, public concern increases, authorities respond with laws and policies, and society is transformed.

Research on anti-trans moral panics illustrates their success in propelling anti-trans lawmaking in the U.S. and suggests they are often initiated by people with power, who use their platforms to shape public discourse.

Moral panics elicit a range of negative emotions, but disgust and paranoia are especially potent. Originally a response meant to protect us from disease and spoiled food, disgust has evolved to also express social inappropriateness. Disgust asserts that its object is inherently bad. Since disgust is culturally dependent, it can also be used to marginalize groups of people.

Meanwhile, paranoia focuses on visualizing and preparing for future threats. When experienced as an emotion – outside of psychiatric disorders – paranoia has a righteous undertone, as it seeks to uncover perceived enemies.

Disgust and paranoia are a powerful combination for sustaining moral panics. While disgust produces an intense, immediate physical feeling, paranoia is long-lasting, stewing and existential.

Stimulating disgust and paranoia

Trump’s offhand remarks often invoke disgust and paranoia against perceived enemies – for example, toward immigrants, whom he has repeatedly described as dangerous criminals. These same patterns emerge in the Trump administration’s formal communication regarding trans issues.

The March 31, 2026, White House press release “President Trump Ended Democrats’ ‘Transgender for Everybody’ Insanity,” which touts the administration’s reversal of protections for trans people, offers several examples.

The release asserts that former President Joe Biden’s 2024 Proclamation of Transgender Day of Visibility “desecrated Easter Sunday with a ‘transgender’ message that elevated radical leftist ideology over faith, family, and biological truth.” Rousing paranoia, “radical leftist ideology” (and later in the release, “gender ideology”) is portrayed as an existential threat that puts Americans and their beliefs in danger.

The release also claimed that “the Trump Administration is celebrating a decisive victory: the swift and unrelenting dismantling of subversive, woke policies that endangered children, eroded women’s rights, assaulted common sense, and dragged America toward moral and cultural decline.”

As a rhetoric scholar, I read these allusions to religion and war – using words like “desecrate” and “victory,” respectively – as implications that the U.S. is in a battle between good and evil. Schools, hospitals, bathrooms, locker rooms, sports facilities and military bases are spaces declared under attack.

The release also condemns “the chemical and surgical mutilation of minors” and “child mutilation programs” – revolting imagery that misleadingly depicts gender-affirming care and incites shock, concern and disgust.

Similarly, invoking images of nonconsenting, victimized children and women, the release denounces “the un-American indoctrination of schoolchildren” and “the unfair, demeaning practice of forcing women to compete against biological men in sports.” Stimulating anger and moral panic, these descriptions encourage anti-trans views and discrimination.

Recognizing these rhetorical patterns is key to understanding how politicians use inflammatory language to denigrate trans people and other marginalized groups, including women, Black people and immigrants.

The Conversation

Julie D. Nelson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

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Why ‘democratic neutrality’ is an overlooked threat to American democracy

In recent years, a growing number of elected officials have questioned or outright denied the results of elections, sought to undermine freedom of speech, and attempted to bend electoral rules to benefit themselves.

Only a sliver of Americans say they support these kinds of antidemocratic actions. For example, just 8% of Americans support making it harder for their political opponents to vote.

So how do politicians who espouse antidemocratic views continue to win elections if these policies are so unpopular?

As scholars affiliated with the Rooney Democracy Institute at the University of Notre Dame, we analyzed surveys of over 48,000 Americans conducted by YouGov, NORC at the University of Chicago and Bovitz between September 2022 and July 2025 to try to get an answer.

A key finding emerged: A significant swath of Americans were actually indifferent toward antidemocratic practices.

This is an important distinction. Prior research tended to assume that if a person doesn’t support antidemocratic practices, then they must oppose antidemocratic practices. In other words, if only 8% of the public supports making it harder for political opponents to vote, then roughly 92% of Americans must oppose making it harder for opponents to vote.

However, our research shows that there is actually a big chunk of Americans – at times a proportion as large as 52% of voters – who neither support nor oppose antidemocratic practices. While only a small number of Americans outright support violating core democratic norms, many Americans express no opinion about politicians who undermine democracy.

We call this attitude toward antidemocratic practices “democratic neutrality,” and we believe it’s an overlooked and understudied threat to democracy.

Ambivalence is not the same as opposition

We see democratic neutrality as key to explaining the success of antidemocratic politicians in America.

To illustrate: Only about 1 in 10 Americans agree that politicians should be loyal to their political party over the Constitution. But politicians who flout constitutional norms have won races at all levels of the government.

Dozens of Republicans won 2026 primary elections despite continuing to reject the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. The group includes Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, who asked the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate the certified election results in four states won by Joe Biden. In May 2026, Paxton defeated incumbent GOP Senator John Cornyn to become the party’s nominee.

Middle-aged man wearing a suit jacket gestures and speaks into a microphone in front of a massive banner reading 'Paxton for Senate 2026.'
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed a lawsuit with the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to invalidate the certified presidential election results in four states won by Joe Biden in 2020. Paxton is now the GOP nominee in Texas’ 2026 U.S. Senate race.
Richard Rodriguez/Getty Images

We show that this apparent contradiction has a straightforward explanation.

Around 25% of the public expresses neutrality when asked whether politicians should be more loyal to their party or the Constitution. When those who prioritize their party over the Constitution and those who are neutral toward the idea are considered together, more than one-third of Americans are open to voting for a politician who prioritizes partisan, rather than constitutional, loyalty.

One-third of the population is more than enough to win a partisan primary. And given the deeply polarized political climate and declining electoral competition in the U.S. – including increases in gerrymandered legislative districts – winning a partisan primary is often tantamount to electoral victory.

The prevalence of democratic neutrality is troubling because in survey experiments with hypothetical candidates, most Americans who express neutrality toward antidemocratic policies vote the same way as the small number of Americans who outright support antidemocratic policies.

We were also able to show that when candidates for elected office take antidemocratic stances, only Americans who explicitly oppose antidemocratic practices punish those candidates at the ballot box. Americans who are neutral toward or supportive of antidemocratic practices do not.

When we accounted for neutrality across multiple antidemocratic practices, from political violence to voter suppression, the picture became even more dire. Nearly two-thirds of Americans express neutrality or support for some form of antidemocratic practice.

In other words, a clear majority of the public is willing to tolerate a politician who undermines core aspects of American democracy.

Neutrality is not a passive stance

Using what’s called regression analysis, we were able to dig deeper into the behaviors and attitudes associated with democratic neutrality. We found that democratic neutrality appears to be tied to a variety of factors.

Some Americans appear willing to tolerate politicians undermining democracy if it means those politicians enact policies they support. Others seem ambivalent about democracy, indifferent to the issue or unsure what qualifies as an antidemocratic policy. And consistent with prior research, some people may actually support antidemocratic policies but express neutrality because of social pressure.

Regardless of why Americans express neutrality, those who do so are just as likely to vote for authoritarian politicians as the relatively small number of Americans who explicitly support undemocratic practices in some form.

Our research indicates that fringe extremists and the few politicians who actively promote authoritarian ideas are not solely to blame for America’s democratic troubles.

The millions of Americans who simply remain neutral when democracy is threatened are a greater threat to the country’s system of government. These democratically neutral voters are, in our view, complicit in the continued erosion of democratic norms in the U.S, even if they do not openly express support for antidemocratic policies.

Indeed, our research indicates that neutrality is not a passive stance. Preventing further democratic erosion requires voters to reject candidates who undermine basic democratic principles, even – and especially – if they are candidates from one’s own party. As former President Theodore Roosevelt warned, “… to be neutral between right and wrong is to serve wrong.”

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The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Air Force One is more than transportation – it has defined how presidents run the country and meet the world

President Donald Trump boards Air Force One on July 1, 2026, at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. Finn Gomez/Getty Images

Air Force One used to be a high-flying symbol of American technology, ingenuity and power. For many, it was also a source of national pride.

The current Boeing 747s that serve as Air Force One are a combination transport vehicle, command center, press room, medical center and apartment, complete with bedroom and office for the nation’s chief executive.

Now, to many, Air Force One has become scandalous.

On July 8, 2026, The New York Times reported that the latest version of the presidential aircraft – presented by Qatar as a gift to President Donald Trump – lacks the sophisticated countermeasures that were a ready defense for the 747s that had been in service since 1990. Critics immediately revived earlier claims that the new 747 was a corrupt transaction from the start. Trump later said the plane would be sent to be “maxed out” with upgrades.

This article is not part of that story. Nor is it the standard story of Air Force One that appears in numerous documentaries, which tend to be gee-whiz accounts of the amazing capacities of the president’s airplane.

I am a historian writing a book about the technologies that have shaped the long history of the American presidency, in which Air Force One looms large. I believe it is important to see Air Force One as more than a cool gadget or political flash point. Von Hardesty, a curator at the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum, certainly understood this when he wrote that “by the end of the 20th century, Air Force One had evolved into an essential arm of the American Presidency.”

Put simply, the presidency as we know it today would have been impossible without Air Force One, which has shaped and defined that role for decades.

A man, waving, and a woman at the top of a stairway leading down from an airplane with 'UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' painted on its side.
President Richard Nixon waves to the crowds from Air Force One with his wife, Pat, as they arrive at Ireland’s Shannon Airport on Oct. 3, 1970.
Daily Mirror/Mirrorpix via Getty Images

Horse-drawn carriage to the ‘Sacred Cow’

It was only recently that Americans or their presidents could imagine things this way. When presidents left the capital throughout most of the nation’s history, it was a lengthy, at times arduous, process that severed their connection with government offices.

As a result, presidents rarely traveled while in office and were more likely to depart Washington for extended vacations than for official business. Likewise, no serving president left the United States until Teddy Roosevelt visited the construction of the Panama Canal in 1906. Woodrow Wilson became the first sitting president to cross the Atlantic when he boarded the USS George Washington in 1918 to join the negotiations in Versailles at the end of World War I.

If few presidents got away from Washington to see the country and its residents before 1900, the flip side was also true: Few Americans saw presidential candidates or incumbents in person, especially Americans who lived outside the eastern third of the United States. Instead, the connection between presidents and average citizens was mediated through political parties, the press and eventually through broadcast media.

The first designated presidential aircraft arrived in 1933, but Franklin Roosevelt never flew on it. His first flight as president came in 1943, when American Airlines loaned a flying boat called the Dixie Clipper to ferry Roosevelt to meet with other Allied leaders at the Casablanca Conference. In 1945, Roosevelt traveled to Yalta on a Douglas VC-54C called the Sacred Cow, the first plane specifically built for presidential travel.

Two men, one in a suit and the other in a military uniform, sitting next to each other and talking on an airplane.
President Franklin Roosevelt and Gen. Dwight Eisenhower on the president’s plane en route to the Tehran Conference in December 1943.
George Rinhart/Corbis via Getty Images

Despite these flights to important international meetings, Roosevelt and successors Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower made limited domestic use of aircraft, preferring instead to travel by railroad. International trips remained lengthy journeys in loud, propeller-driven aircraft that encountered the greater turbulence of lower altitudes.

All this changed in 1962, when President John Kennedy acquired a brand-new Boeing 707, the first jet-powered Air Force One.

Presidential ubiquity

Flying higher, faster and quieter than their predecessors, the jet aircraft used for Air Force One made possible one of the central facets of the modern presidency: The nation’s chief executive could be a ubiquitous player in national politics and world affairs.

Presidential travel increased dramatically, both in its frequency and in the number of stops on each trip. This was not simply the result of the growing use of air travel worldwide. Where Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower understood world leadership as their ability to coordinate American power from Washington, Kennedy and his successors sought to make themselves the center of the story.

This seemed particularly important during the Cold War. As the United States asserted its leadership in the struggle against the Soviet Union, American presidents positioned themselves as the symbols of freedom in opposition to communism.

Consider President Richard Nixon traveling to China in 1972 to normalize relations, or Ronald Reagan flying to Iceland for the 1986 Reykjavík conference with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to negotiate the future of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The presence of a president at these conferences elevated both the importance of the event and the image of the president as a statesman who was able to quickly pivot back and forth from national to international leadership.
As American presidents struggled to maintain their power and their relevance after the end of the Cold War, their international travel only increased. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama each made over twice the number of international trips as Ronald Reagan did.

These trips ranged from goodwill visits to maintain old alliances to attempts to build new connections after the collapse of the Soviet empire.

Presidents specifically visited international hot spots, positioning themselves as global peacemakers. The sight of the American president descending the long stairs from Air Force One, smiling and waving along the way, became a symbol of American diplomacy.

A group of people seated on an airplane listening to a man speaking and gesturing with his hands.
President Jimmy Carter meets with reporters aboard Air Force One on July 1, 1979, while flying from Seoul, South Korea, to Honolulu.
AP Photo/Ira Schwarz

Official business – and campaigning

If Air Force One enabled presidents to announce themselves as statesmen abroad, it also revolutionized politics at home.

During the 1970s, the two major parties moved from selecting their nominees at national conventions to a system where state primaries decided who would lead the ticket.

This change emerged from demands that political power move from party leaders to party members. But a primary system would have been unimaginable without aircraft to shuttle candidates around the country. That was particularly important for incumbents, as air travel enabled them to be both sitting presidents and active candidates.

Presidents and their handlers learned how to combine official government business, which permitted the use of Air Force One, with campaign opportunities. These moments not only changed how presidents operated; they changed how Americans understood their presidents.

This change began with Kennedy’s use of the jet-powered Air Force One for domestic travel, including the tragic decision to visit Texas in November 1963, where he was assassinated. In just his first year in office, Bill Clinton visited 37 states over the course of 73 days.

Air Force One is a symbol of presidential power, but its problems only reinforce the fact that technology shapes the presidency.

The clearest demonstration was on 9/11. President Bush was in Florida that morning. Air Force One whisked him into the air, delivering him first to the safety of an Air Force base in Louisiana and then to the fortified headquarters of the U.S. Strategic Command in Nebraska, and still had him back at the White House by the end of the day.

It was a grim reminder of the other task for Air Force One: a safe transport for the president during a national crisis or nuclear armageddon. While the aircraft fulfilled its promise to keep the president safe in a crisis, its legendary communication systems faltered. Crucially, Bush struggled to coordinate with senior officials in Washington, leaving him momentarily out of the loop at a terrifying historical juncture.

The role that presidents have assumed at home and abroad, as well as the ways Americans interact with their presidents, have taken form throught the possibilities – and the limitations – of presidential aircraft. Air Force One is not just a great way to travel or a nifty gadget, nor is it peripheral to the presidency. It is central to it.

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Peter Kastor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Texas prosecutors are calling a teenage shooting spree ‘terrorism’ – the case could reshape American criminal law

Texas broadened its terrorism law in 2023; a new prosecution is testing how far it reaches. Bo Zaunders/Getty

For decades, terrorism researchers have generally distinguished terrorism from other forms of violence by one defining feature: the intention to intimidate a wider audience beyond immediate victims.

That distinction has shaped both academic research and criminal prosecutions in the U.S. Yet scholars have long debated a deceptively simple question: Is terrorism defined by why violence is committed, or by what the violence is intended to achieve? A new prosecution in Austin, Texas, may test whether that understanding is beginning to change.

The question is now before Texas courts following charges against 17-year-old Cristian Fajardo Mondragon, who, along with two juveniles, is accused of carrying out a two-day series of shootings, vehicle thefts and burglaries across Austin in May 2026. In Texas, 17-year-olds are charged as adults, not juveniles.

According to investigators, the group allegedly fired nearly 150 rounds during 13 separate shootings. They struck homes, occupied vehicles and two fire stations, injured multiple people and prompted shelter-in-place orders.

The case initially involved charges including aggravated assault, deadly conduct and firearm theft. Later, investigators recommended a first-degree terrorism charge, a rarely used offense in a case involving a juvenile suspect.

As a scholar of extremism, I believe this decision reflects a shift in how some prosecutors are applying terrorism laws. Rather than requiring proof of an offender’s political ideology, charging documents often focus on whether the alleged violence was intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, create widespread fear or influence government or public behavior.

No single federal crime

There is no single federal crime called “domestic terrorism.”

Federal law defines it as dangerous criminal acts intended to intimidate or coerce civilians or influence government policy. However, Congress has never created a standalone federal domestic terrorism offense.

Instead, federal prosecutors generally rely on statutes covering murder, firearms offenses, conspiracy, hate crimes or civil rights violations. In many domestic terrorism cases, terrorism is not itself the criminal charge. Rather, terrorism designations can affect investigative priorities and may have specific legal consequences where particular statutes apply.

As my own research on terrorism and political violence has found, legal definitions of terrorism have never been static. They evolve as governments confront new forms of violence and seek legal tools to address them. The question has always been where to draw the boundary between terrorism and other forms of serious violent crime.

This legal gap has existed for decades. Scholars have argued that while the U.S. developed extensive legal tools to prosecute international terrorism after 9/11, fewer mechanisms exist for prosecuting domestic political violence.

As a result, states have enacted their own terrorism statutes. Texas amended its terroristic threats statute in 2023, expanding the circumstances under which certain underlying offenses can be elevated to a terrorism-related offense. It allows prosecutors to charge individuals who commit specified violent crimes with the intent to intimidate the public or influence government policy through coercion or intimidation.

Unlike traditional conceptions of terrorism that emphasize ideological motivation or affiliation with extremist organizations, the Texas statute focuses on the defendant’s intent to intimidate or coerce the public or influence government through intimidation.

Texas’ approach reflects a shift away from proving ideological motivation, or why someone committed violence, toward proving what the violence was intended to accomplish – for example, public intimidation or governmental coercion. That distinction is central to current debates over domestic terrorism law and may prove crucial in the Austin prosecution.

Why the Austin case is unusual

According to public reporting on the investigation, Texas investigators have not identified a manifesto, ideological writings or evidence linking the suspects to a recognized extremist movement.

One consistent lesson from terrorism studies is that investigators should avoid assuming motive before evidence becomes available. Mass violence can emerge from multiple pathways. They include extremist beliefs, criminal opportunism, interpersonal grievances or thrill-seeking. And distinguishing among them is crucial.

Instead, prosecutors appear to argue that the shootings themselves created widespread fear throughout Austin while disrupting emergency services after gunfire struck multiple fire stations. The alleged terrorism lies less in an established ideological motive than in the prosecutors’ claim that the defendants intended to intimidate the public and disrupt or influence government operations. That approach represents a significant departure from many of the country’s most widely publicized mass shootings.

The 2022 Buffalo supermarket shooting resulted in a New York state conviction for domestic terrorism motivated by hate under a statute specifically addressing certain mass attacks motivated by hatred based on characteristics such as race, religion or national origin.

Likewise, the 2019 El Paso Walmart shooting in Texas, which killed 23 people, involved federal hate crime charges alongside state capital murder charges because investigators alleged an explicitly anti-immigrant motive.

Other mass-casualty attacks – including those in Boulder, Colorado, in 2021; Highland Park, Illinois, in 2022; and Waukesha, Wisconsin, in 2021 – were prosecuted primarily as homicide cases by state authorities despite generating widespread public fear.

Similarly, the Pearl Street Mall firebombing in Boulder was prosecuted at the state level as a first-degree murder case, while federal prosecutors separately charged the defendant with a hate crime to address the alleged bias-motivated nature of the attack. In each of these cases, state prosecutors relied primarily on homicide statutes rather than state terrorism laws, either because no applicable terrorism offense existed or because homicide charges provided the principal support for prosecution.

Unlike Colorado, Illinois and Wisconsin, Texas has a standalone terrorism statute that enhances liability when violent crimes are committed with the intent to intimidate the public or influence government policy. This statutory framework gives Texas prosecutors an additional charging option that was generally unavailable in those earlier prosecutions.

The Austin case tests whether prosecutors can prove the intent required by Texas’ terrorism statute without establishing an ideological or political motive.

An aerial view of downtown Austin, Texas, with high-rise towers
The charging documents in this case focus on whether the alleged violence was intended to intimidate the public, generate widespread fear and disrupt community life across Austin, Texas.
halbergman/Getty

A broader criminal justice debate

Legal scholars have long debated whether terrorism should be defined by motivation or consequences.

In a seminal work on the subject, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman argues that terrorism has historically involved politically motivated violence intended to communicate a broader ideological message. Brian Michael Jenkins, one of the nation’s leading terrorism scholars, similarly emphasizes that terrorism is violence intended to influence audiences beyond immediate victims.

Others argue that legal definitions should focus less on ideology and more on the deliberate creation of fear.

Former Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security Mary McCord has argued that the absence of a standalone federal domestic terrorism statute creates inconsistencies. Similar acts of mass violence may be prosecuted differently depending on the perpetrator’s ideology and the available criminal statutes.

The Austin prosecution illustrates this tension.

If Texas courts conclude that prosecutors need only demonstrate an intent to terrorize the public through indiscriminate violence, future cases involving serial shootings, coordinated attacks on infrastructure or prolonged community-wide violence may be prosecuted as terrorism even when investigators never establish a political objective.

Are younger offenders becoming more violent?

The Texas defendants’ ages have also attracted national attention. Juvenile violent crime has declined substantially since the mid-1990s. Arrest rates for homicide, robbery, aggravated assault and other violent offenses remain well below their historical peaks.

At the same time, firearm violence presents a more complicated picture. Firearms have become the leading cause of death among American children and adolescents, and firearm homicide rates among young people increased sharply during and immediately after the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Some researchers have argued that youth violence increasingly involves fluid peer networks, sometimes connected or intensified through social media, rather than only traditional street gangs.

At present, investigators have released little evidence explaining what motivated the Austin shootings. Without additional evidence, it would be premature to classify the case as ideological extremism, organized gang violence or another form of criminal activity.

Why this case matters

From the perspective of terrorism research, the most important question may not be whether the Austin defendants are convicted. Instead, it is whether courts accept a legal understanding of terrorism that does not require proof of an ideological motive.

If they do, the Austin case could become an important precedent, encouraging prosecutors elsewhere to consider terrorism charges in cases that previously would have been prosecuted as attempted murder or homicide. That would mark an important example of how state terrorism statutes are being applied to nonideological mass violence.

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Art Jipson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Is withholding federal counterterrorism funds from states – as FEMA has threatened – legal?

FEMA has threatened to withhold funds from states for noncompliance with Trump administration election directives. Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has issued new grant guidelines that threaten to withhold counterterrorism funds from states that do not comply with President Donald Trump’s election security directives.

The agency told states they must “reconcile the number of voters who voted in federal elections with the number of ballots cast. They must use the federal SAVE database to verify the citizenship of everyone in the state’s voter registration database.” States also have to verify the citizenship status of poll workers or anyone operating election systems.

The SAVE database helps government agencies “determine citizenship and immigration status of individuals within their jurisdiction for the purpose of granting benefits, licenses, as well as for other lawful purposes.” For states that comply, the database allows the federal government to review the citizenship of everyone registered to vote. It also enables the government to determine which state residents are allowed to vote, a power the U.S. Constitution reserves for the states.

The funds FEMA threatened to withhold for noncompliance would otherwise be used by state and local governments to pay for cybersecurity, emergency planning, training and equipment.

As someone who has studied the interplay of law and politics, I recognize the important role federal grants play in state funding and the legal standards that govern the establishment of conditions like those announced by FEMA.

Federal funding for local governments

In the federal system, states and localities rely on the federal government for a wide range of grants and other funding. In any one year, they amount to more than US$1 trillion and provide between one-quarter and one-third of state and local revenues.

Louisiana, Arkansas, Arizona and Montana are most dependent on revenues from the federal government. They get about 30% of the money they need to run their governments from Washington, D.C.

California, Connecticut and New York are less dependent on federal funding. Nonetheless, they each get more than 20% of their revenue from the federal government.

That is why threats to withhold federal funding have real bite. However, such threats from previous administrations have been targeted and rare.

In 2014, law scholar Eloise Pasachoff identified arguments scholars use to explain federal agencies’ reluctance to cut off funds. Agencies worry that withholding funds will “undermine the agency’s ultimate goals.” In addition, she notes that “political dynamics among state governments, Congress, the White House, and the agencies themselves make funding cut-offs difficult to achieve.”

But that long-standing reluctance seems to have changed after Trump returned to the Oval Office. Since then, the cancellation of funds, or threats to do so, for disfavored places or programs have become commonplace.

A week into the president’s second term, the White House’s Office of Management and Budget issued a memo that temporarily froze federal assistance and grants to all states, including funding that supports nursing homes and hospitals. Some of that funding has been restored after courts intervened.

A January 2026 report from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities called these threats to withhold funds “extraordinary and politically motivated.” The report said they are designed “to punish residents of states President Trump considers political enemies or who disagree with the President, particularly on immigration enforcement.”

The center argued that “the Administration’s actions poison the long-standing, productive, and necessary partnership with states, local governments, and nonprofits to provide critical services that people in every state depend on.”

Several people work in front of computers in a large office.
FEMA staff work at the agency’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., on Jan. 24, 2026, as a massive winter storm brings frigid temperatures, ice and snow to nearly 200 million Americans.
Al Drago/Getty Images

What the law allows

In 1988, law scholar Jeffrey S. Koppelmaa pointed out that federal funding cutoffs undermine the autonomy of states even as they help Congress ensure that those funds are spent for “the general welfare.”

The previous year, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed that tension in South Dakota v. Dole. The case involved congressional legislation that “ordered the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age.” In South Dakota, state law permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol.

The court found that the imposed condition was reasonable because it was related to highway safety. However, it noted that the authority to impose conditions was not unlimited.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained that “the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’” He wrote that “if Congress desires to condition the States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously … enabling the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”

Rehnquist wrote that the government cannot impose conditions on federal grants if they “‘might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”

In 2012, the court used the Dole test to strike down a provision of the Affordable Care Act that required states to expand their Medicaid programs and threatened to revoke the entire federal Medicaid funding if any state did not comply. It labeled such a condition “coercive” because of the impact such cuts would have on the entire budget of such a state.

Chief Justice John Roberts put it this way: “The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget … is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”

The Dole decision is still the law. But even so, some commentators argue that when executive branch agencies rather than Congress impose conditions on federal funds, courts should give these cases special scrutiny.

The FEMA threat

In August 2025 a federal district court stopped the Trump administration from “withholding or freezing federal funding from, or putting conditions on, municipalities and counties it labels as so-called ‘sanctuary jurisdictions,’” or places that limit cooperation with federal immigration authorities.

The court stopped the administration’s efforts to punish those jurisdictions “by using unrelated federal funding as leverage to enforce unlawful immigration policy.”

In June 2026 a federal judge in New Jersey followed similar logic in a case involving the Trump administration’s effort to stop funding for a $16 billion rail tunnel under the Hudson River. The complaint in that case had described those attempts as illegal and argued that “the Federal Government suddenly suspend(ed) the Project … because President Trump is engaged in political retribution.”

The federal judge seemed to agree, citing Trump interviews where he pointed out, “It’s billions and billions of dollars that (Sen. Chuck) Schumer has worked 20 years to get. It’s terminated. Tell him it terminated.’”

She ordered the funds restored.

That brings us back to FEMA’s recent threat. Congressional Democrats quickly denounced it as “potentially unlawful.”

They wrote: “As we approach the 25th anniversary of September 11th, it is deeply alarming that DHS and FEMA, under Donald Trump, continue to manipulate the very funding born out of a national tragedy.” They accused the agencies of “playing political games.”

Whether courts will agree remains to be seen.

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Austin Sarat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Mail ballot mirages aren’t fraud, but mail ballot fraud isn’t a complete myth

A worker inspects a ballot the day after California’s primary election at the Los Angeles County Ballot Processing Center on June 3, 2026. Jae C. Hong/AP Photo

The 2026 primaries are resurfacing controversies about mail-in ballots that were at the heart of election disputes in 2020.

California’s June 2 primary – in which candidates from every party ran together and the top two advanced to the general election – raised eyebrows because of its so-called “red mirage.” A mirage is a misleading early count that can temporarily show a candidate ahead in a race, sometimes by a significant margin.

For example, early Election Day returns showed Republican Steve Hilton leading for California governor and Republican Spencer Pratt among the top two candidates for Los Angeles mayor. However, 4 out of 5 California voters return their ballots by mail, so as additional mail ballots were counted, leads changed. Hilton narrowly held on to second place, but Pratt fell into third place and off the November ballot entirely.

Rumors swirled that a late “ballot dump” in Los Angeles had seen Pratt receiving zero votes out of 24,000. These reports were debunked by PolitiFact, but they were reminiscent of claims six years ago.

In the 2020 presidential election, when Donald Trump led early in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and other crucial states, only to have that lead evaporate under the weight of mail ballots, he claimed a rigged election. This year, those claims returned, as Trump declared on Truth Social, his social media platform, on June 8: “Not possible for Spencer Pratt to have lost the L.A. runoffs after the big lead he had. 3rd World Nation. Rigged Elections!”

I am the associate director of the Institute of American Civics, and my teaching and research focuses on American political institutions, elections and public policy. I’ve been writing about American elections since 1992, and over the past three decades, I’ve followed with interest the growth of mail voting.

The controversy over mail ballot elections has become a microcosm of our polarized politics, with one narrative assuming mass fraud lies behind every electoral mirage, and another denying that there can be legitimate concerns about mail ballot elections. Both narratives warrant scrutiny.

The national picture

Today, eight states use all mail ballot elections: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington. In those states, registered voters are automatically sent a ballot. Voters may deliver their completed ballots in person to an early voting station or to an Election Day polling place. Most, however, simply return the ballot the same way it came, via the U.S. Postal Service.

Another 29 states require voters to submit a request for a mailed absentee ballot but do not require an excuse such as illness or absence.

Three dozen states require mailed ballots to be received by election officials on or before Election Day, while the remainder allow votes to arrive later, as long as they are postmarked by Election Day.

More than two dozen states, including California and most other mail-ballot states, either explicitly or implicitly permit a practice referred to as “ballot harvesting” or “ballot collection,” in which activists can collect ballots from voters and deliver them to election offices or official collection boxes.

The Trump narrative

Trump argues that the “red mirage” is by itself evidence of election rigging. However, there is good reason to challenge such a claim.

Pratt, the Los Angeles mayoral candidate, was running in a city where Democrats outnumber Republicans roughly 4 to 1. Pratt’s defeat does not require extraordinary explanations. To the contrary, his defeat has a very ordinary explanation – as do most mirages.

Even without mailed ballots, states where there was a systematic lag between vote counts in rural and urban areas could experience dramatically shifting results, too.

In the mail-ballot era, analysts know that different groups of voters sometimes cast their ballots in different ways. California, for example, will regularly experience a pronounced red mirage because Democrats are more likely than Republicans to return their votes by mail, while GOP voters are more likely than Democrats to vote in person.

Additionally, mail ballots are often accepted after Election Day, Democratic-affiliated advocacy groups are more experienced than Republicans in ballot harvesting, and in-person early and Election Day ballots, along with mail ballots received before Election Day, are counted first. Mail ballots received on or after Election Day are counted later.

Other states, with different party norms and election rules, experience different results. In “Divided We Stand,” a book about the 2020 elections, my co-author, John J. Pitney Jr., and I discuss blue mirages that have appeared in Texas and Ohio.

These mirages are not a new phenomenon: In 1982, Democrat Tom Bradley’s Election Day lead for governor of California was proved a mirage after Republican George Deukmejian overtook him as absentee ballots came in. Back then, Republicans were most likely to vote by mail.

Rows of long desks fill a large room where workers are sitting and inspecting ballots. One worker stands in the foreground.
Ballots are inspected the day after California’s primary election at the Los Angeles County Ballot Processing Center on June 3, 2026.
Jae C. Hong/AP Photo

The problems with mail ballots

These easily explained mirages don’t necessarily mean that mail-ballot fraud is a nonissue and that there is nothing to be concerned about.

One June 2026 analysis in The Guardian contends that California’s election system “is working as designed: to protect against fraud and assure every vote is counted.” Like Trump’s claims, however, this too requires scrutiny.

In 2005, a bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform, headed by former president Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State James Baker, found absentee voting to be susceptible to fraud, intimidation and vote-buying, and recommended that states prohibit third parties from handling absentee ballots as one solution.

In reality, fraud in ballots sent and returned by mail – either all-mail ballot or absentee – has occurred on a large enough scale to invalidate a 2018 U.S. House election in North Carolina, a 1997 mayoral election in Miami and a 2020 municipal election in Paterson, New Jersey, among others. It’s also produced numerous absentee vote scandals in Texas.

Mail-in critics also note that none of the eight all-mail ballot states require a copy of photo identification when completing a ballot, though supporters argue that other fraud prevention measures – like signature verification and online ballot tracking – are sufficiently rigorous.




Read more:
Mail-in voting is safe and reliable – 5 essential reads


Absentee or mail-in ballot vote fraud estimates vary. A November 2025 Brookings Institution analysis of the 2016 through 2022 general elections found about four cases of mail-voting fraud out of every 10 million mail votes. The Heritage Foundation found roughly 400 cases since 2000.

There are reasons to believe this understates the problem, though. In cases of large-scale organized fraud – the kind that can challenge the integrity of the electoral system – it is typical that only candidates or political organizers are charged with a crime. In the 1997 Miami mayoral race vote fraud scandal, for example, after several hundred absentee ballots were proved fraudulent, courts invalidated them all; still, only about 57 individuals were charged. Further, it would be unrealistic to assume every instance of election fraud is detected and results in even one arrest.

Other concerns

Electoral mirages are not by themselves proof of fraud, but fraud in mail ballot elections is a valid concern – and it is not the only valid concern.

Ballot harvesting, for example, lends itself to social pressure, can impinge on the secret ballot and gives outsize influence to organized interests.

The potential for fraud and long delays in tabulation can undermine confidence in elections, especially when voters have formed expectations of efficient and competent election administration. Older voters remember close national elections – in 1960, 1976 and 2004 – when results were known the next day.

In any event, convenience from mail voting does not always translate into more voters.

In California’s all-mail ballot election in 2024, voter turnout was 62.1%; in Florida, which limits mail voting to absentee ballots that voters must request, prohibits vote harvesting and requires absentee ballots to arrive by Election Day – all of which makes it harder to vote by mail – voter turnout was 66.7%.

Colorado and Hawaii – both all-mail ballot states – were toward the top and the bottom of turnout rates in 2024: Colorado had 73.1% turnout and Hawaii 50.3%.

The next election

In my analysis, whatever the temptations of partisan tribalism, neither narrative around mail ballots can be taken at face value. One automatically ascribes fraud to results that are often predictable, even routine; the other dismisses legitimate concerns as conspiracy theories.

Mirages will continue to occur, especially in states that use all-mail ballot elections, states that allow no-excuse absentee voting and states where votes can arrive after Election Day. A better-informed public would be better prepared to understand mirages when they occur – and better able to focus on more meaningful conversations about both the pros and cons of mail ballot elections.

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Andrew E. Busch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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