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Perhaps no one outside of Venezuela or Cuba should care more about the U.S. capture of nominal President Nicolás Maduro than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Khamenei and his regime are in trouble, and it’s not clear how they would survive should the Trump administration decide to support the millions who want a new government system without Khamenei and his ilk.

Iran has no state allies that would be willing to intervene militarily on its behalf. Further, its once-powerful network of partner and proxy militias – Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other members of the Axis of Resistance – has been rendered incapable or reluctant to get involved. And Iran’s economy is in shambles in the midst of an ongoing water crisis with no relief in sight.

Further, the Iranian people have again taken to the streets to air their grievances against harsh economic conditions as well as government corruption, mismanagement and hypocrisy, echoing similar conditions to Venezuela in recent years.

Lastly, President Donald Trump has returned his attention to Iran. On Jan. 2, Trump warned Khamenei that if his forces violently suppress protesters, Iran would be “hit very hard” by the U.S.

Trump’s warning and show of solidarity will likely embolden protesters, which will almost certainly cause Iran’s internal security to crack down harder, as has happened in the past. Such U.S. intervention could lead to the overthrowing of the ayatollah, intended or not. Furthermore, Maduro’s fate demonstrates that the Trump administration is willing to use military force for that purpose if deemed necessary.

As an analyst of Middle East affairs focusing on Iran, I believe that these conditions place Khamenei’s regime under greater threat today than perhaps any other time in its 46-year history.

Growing threats, internal and external

If Khamenei hopes to survive politically or mortally, I believe he has three options.

First, he could capitulate to U.S. demands to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, Iran could sprint toward a nuclear bomb. Lastly, he could flee.

In hopes of restoring deterrence, Khamenei could also continue rebuilding his country’s military capabilities, which were significantly degraded during the June 2025 12-day war in which Israel and the U.S. aimed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability.

Israel is eager to stifle Iran’s reconstitution plans, protests are spreading and growing more intense, and Trump – through hostile rhetoric and offensive military action – has put Khamenei on notice.

Khameini’s problems aren’t his alone. The revolutionary theocratic system of government that he leads is in danger of falling. And his military and internal security apparatus may not have the time or ability to address its growing and interrelated internal and external threats simultaneously.

There are two fundamental factors analysts like me consider when assessing enemy threats: offensive capability to inflict damage and hostile intentions to use these capabilities to harm enemies.

Determining offensive capability involves evaluating the quality of a country or organization’s complete arsenal – air, ground, maritime, cyber and space capabilities – and how trained, disciplined, integrated and lethal their forces might be. Determining intentions involves evaluating if, when and under what conditions offensive capabilities will be used to achieve their goals.

If states hope to survive when they come under such pressure, their defense strategy should account for differences between their own military capability and the enemy’s, especially if enemies intend to attack. Or states need to convince enemies to be less hostile, if possible.

Maduro’s mistake was his inability to defend against a far superior U.S. military capability while believing that U.S. leaders would not remove him from office. Maduro gambled and lost.

Bad choices

Iran’s supreme leader faces a similar conundrum: First, there is no foreseeable path that allows Tehran to produce or acquire the military capabilities necessary to deter Israel or defeat the United States, unless Iran develops a nuclear weapon.

And decades of mutual hostility, the memory of Iran’s once-clandestine nuclear weaponization program and recent Iranian lawmaker calls to develop nuclear bombs minimizes the prospect that U.S. leaders view Khamenei’s intentions as anything but hostile.

But as the clear weaker party, it is in Tehran’s interest to change Trump’s mind about Tehran’s hostile intent. The way to do that would be by abandoning nuclear enrichment.

In terms of threat analysis, the regime’s oft-repeated chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” perhaps have sent an easily misinterpreted message: that Iran’s hostile leaders intend to destroy the U.S. and Israel. But they simply lack the capability, for now.

President Theodore Roosevelt famously said “speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” Today, he might say that Khamenei is unwise for speaking with such vitriol considering the size of Iran’s stick. The United States and Israel possess military capabilities far superior to Iran’s – as demonstrated by the 12-day war – but they did not then share the same intent. Though both Israel and the U.S. operations shared the objective of neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability, Israel’s objectives were more broad and included targeting senior Iranian leaders and destabilizing the regime.

To Khamenei’s momentary personal and institutional fortune, Trump immediately called for a ceasefire following U.S. B-2 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, delineating the United States’ narrower objectives that at the time did not include regime change in Iran.

But that was before U.S. forces removed Maduro from Caracas and before the outbreak of protests in Iran, both of which coincide with Israel’s signaling preparations for Round 2 against Iran.

Iran without Khamenei?

During Trump’s Dec. 29 press conference at Mar-a-Lago with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he warned that the U.S. could “knock the hell” out of Iran if the country reconstitutes its nuclear facilities.

This is separate from the ominuous warning that the U.S. could intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters; it would almost certainly differ in scale.

Nevertheless, a potential U.S. intervention could embolden protesters and further undermine and destabilize the Islamic Republic regime. Khamenei has predictably scoffed at and dismissed Trump’s warning.

I believe this is a serious mistake.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on Jan. 3, 2025, that Khameini should not “play games” as Maduro did. Khamenei, Rubio said, should take Trump’s warnings seriously. I agree.

If Iran refrains from violent crackdowns on protesters, there is a chance that anti-government protestors overthrow the government. But the supreme leader’s chances of surviving a popular uprising are probably greater than surviving an unbridled U.S. or Israeli military intent on ushering in a new – post-Islamic Republic – Iran.

Otherwise, Khamenei has to address superior U.S. and Israeli military capability, quickly. But Iran is broke, and even if sanctions were not continuously strangling Iran economically, the country could probably never purchase its way to military parity with the U.S. or Israel.

Alternatively, Iran could determine that it must move quickly to develop a nuclear weapon to mitigate U.S. and Israeli military capabilities and deter future aggression. However, it is extremely unlikely Iran could do this without U.S. and Israeli intelligence discovering the project, which would immediately trigger an overwhelming military campaign that would likely expedite regime change in Iran.

And like Maduro, the supreme leader is utterly alone. None of Maduro’s closest partners – China, Russia, Cuba and even Iran – were willing to fight in his defense, despite weeks of forewarning and U.S. military buildup near Venezuela.

Under these circumstances, it may be impossible for Khamenei to address overwhelming U.S. and Israeli military capabilities. He could, however, reduce the threat by doing what is necessary to ensure the United States’ objectives for Iran remain narrow and focused on the nuclear program, which may also keep Israel at bay.

However, Khamenei would have to demonstrate unprecedented restraint from cracking down violently on protesters and a willingness to give up nuclear enrichment. Due to historical animosity and distrust toward the U.S., both are unlikely, increasing, I believe, the probability of a forthcoming Iran without Khamenei.

Dr. Aaron Pilkington is a U.S. Air Force Senior Analyst of Middle East affairs and a Fellow at the University of Denver’s Center for Middle East Studies. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, the Department of the Air Force, or any other organizational affiliation.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The U.S. military operation in Venezuela and capture of President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, topped off months of military buildup and targeted strikes in the Caribbean Sea. It fulfills President Donald Trump’s claim to assert authoritative control over the Western Hemisphere, articulated in his administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

Some national security experts say U.S. military action in Venezuela – taken without U.S. congressional approval or U.N. Security Council authorization – is unlawful. It may violate domestic and international law.

The Venezuela attack represents the clearest example during Trump’s second presidency of the shift from traditional American values of democratic freedom and the rules-based international order to an America exerting unilateral power based purely on perceived economic interests and military might. Autocratic leaders are unconstrained by law and balance of power, using force to impose their will on others.

So, what does this transition from a liberal America in the world to an autocratic U.S. look like? After decades of working internationally on democracy and peace-building, I see three interrelated areas of long-standing U.S. foreign policy engagement being unraveled.

1. Peace and conflict prevention

The Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela reflect its “peace through strength” approach to international relations, which emphasizes military power. The actions also follow the emphasis the administration places on economic pressure and wins as a deterrent to war and a cudgel for peace.

This approach contrasts with decades of diplomatic efforts to build peace processes that last.

Foreign policy experts point out that the Trump administration’s emphasis on business deal-making in its conduct of foreign relations, focused on bargaining between positions, misses the point of peacemaking, which is to address underlying interests shared by parties and build the trust required to tackle the drivers of conflict.

Trump’s focus on deal-making also counters the world’s traditional reliance on the U.S. as an honest broker and a reliable economic partner that supports free trade. Trump made it clear that U.S. interest in oil is a key rationale for the Venezuela attack.

Before Venezuela, the limits of the Trump administration’s approach were already showing in the global conflicts Trump claims to have halted. That’s evident in ongoing violence between Thailand and Cambodia and in ceasefire violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Moreover, U.S. expertise and resources for sustainable peacemaking and preventing conflict are gone.

The entire Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations in the U.S. Department of State was dismantled in May 2025, while funding for conflict prevention and key peace programs like Women, Peace and Security was cut.

Trump’s unilateral military action against Venezuela belie an authentic commitment to sustainable peace.

While it’s too soon to predict Venezuela’s future under U.S. control, the Trump administration’s approach is likely to drive more global conflict and violence in 2026, as major powers begin to understand the different rules and learn to play the new game.

2. Democracy and human rights

Since the 1980s, U.S. national security strategies have incorporated aspects of democracy promotion and human rights as U.S. values.

Trump has not highlighted human rights and democracy as rationales for capturing Maduro. And, so far, the administration has rejected claims to the Venezuelan leadership by opposition leader María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, widely considered the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election.

Much of the U.S. foreign policy to build democracy globally and promote human rights was delivered through foreign assistance, worth over US$3 billion in 2024. The Trump administration cut that by nearly 75% in 2025.

These funds sought to promote fair elections, supporting civil societies and free media globally. They were also meant to help enable independent and corruption-free judiciaries in many countries, including Venezuela.

Since 1998, for example, the U.S. has funded 85% of the annual $10 million budget of the U.N Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. The fund, now imperiled, helps survivors recover from torture in the U.S. and around the world.

The congressionally mandated annual Human Rights Report issued by the State Department in August signaled the Trump administration’s intent to undermine key human rights obligations of foreign governments.

However, the White House has used tariffs, sanctions and military strikes to punish countries on purported human rights-related grounds, such as in Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa. Equally concerning to democracy defenders is its rhetoric chastising European democracies and apparent willingness to elevate political parties in Europe that reject human rights.

3. International cooperation

A major aim of U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been to counter threats to America’s security that require cooperation with other governments.

But the Trump administration is ignoring or denying many transnational threats. They include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, new technologies and climate change.

Moreover, the tools that America helped build to tackle shared global threats, like international law and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, have been disparaged and undermined.

Even before the U.S. attack on Venezuela, scholars were warning of the collapse of the international norm, embedded in the U.N. Charter, that prohibits the use of force by one sovereign country against another, except in specific cases of self-defense.

Early in 2025, Trump signaled an end to much of U.S. multilateral engagement, pulling the country out of many international bodies, agendas and treaties.

The administration proposed eliminating its contributions to U.N. agencies like the fund for children. It is also allocating only $300 million this year to the U.N., which is about one-fifth of the membership dues it owes the organization by law. A looming budgetary crisis has now consumed this sole worldwide deliberation body.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration says migration and drug trafficking, including from Venezuela, pose the greatest security threats. Its solutions – continuing U.S. economic and military might in the Americas – ignore shared challenges like corruption and human trafficking that drive these threats and also undermine U.S. economic security.

There is also evidence that the Trump administration is not only disregarding international law and retreating from America’s long-standing respect for international cooperation, but it’s also seeking to reshape policy in its own image and punish those it disagrees with.

For example, its call to reframe global refugee protections – to undermine the principle that prohibits a return of people to a country where they could be persecuted – would alter decades-old international and U.S. domestic law. The Trump administration has already dismantled much of the U.S. refugee program, lowering the cap for 2025 to historic levels.

Even for those who work in international institutions, there could also be a price to pay for an illiberal America. For instance, the Trump administration has economically sanctioned many judges and prosecutors of the International Criminal Court for their work.

And the administration has threatened more sanctions unless the court promises not to prosecute Trump – a more salient challenge now with the apparent U.S. aggression against Venezuela, which is a party to the International Criminal Court.

Some democracy experts worry that the U.S. military action in Venezuela not only undermines international law, but it may also serve to reinforce Trump’s project to undo the rule of law and democracy at home.

Until July 1, 2025, Shelley Inglis served in the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance at the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D).

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Colorado is the sixth-least affordable state for child care in the nation. Costs for center-based care average 14% of a two-parent household’s median income and 45% of a single parent’s median income. The federal affordability benchmark is just 7%.

Colorado also faces significant shortages in access to slots in licensed child care programs. In 2023, more than 40,000 Colorado parents reported quitting a job, turning down a job or significantly changing a job because of problems with child care.

Recently, several Colorado counties passed measures to subsidize child care through local taxes. Despite these advancements, Colorado’s child care system is facing a fiscal crisis that is likely to affect families and children for years to come.

Child care disruptions for families with infants and toddlers are estimated to cost the state more than US$2.7 billion in lost economic productivity and revenue. Ensuring access to affordable child care supports workforce participation and enhances the well-being of children and families.

I study early care and education policies and programs that promote children’s cognitive, behavioral and social-emotional learning. My research lab at Colorado State University has been investigating the consequences of a lack of access to high-quality, affordable child care on child and family outcomes.

Colorado’s Child Care Assistance Program

Since the late 1990s, the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program has subsidized the cost of child care for parents and caregivers with lower incomes who are working, searching for work or pursuing education. My research shows these subsidies are a critical lifeline that help lower-income families access child care.

Subsidies allow families to prioritize factors other than cost, such as location, in their search for child care. From 2023 to 2024, the Colorado subsidy program served more than 30,000 children in the state. That’s about 10% of those who qualified, which is typical for most states.

A federal March 2024 rule from the Administration for Children and Families caps family co-payments at no more than 7% of household income. It also requires reimbursement rates to reflect the full cost of care, whereas previously subsidy payments were based on what families could afford to pay.

Although intended to improve affordability for families and adequately compensate child care programs, the rule included no additional federal funding. In Colorado, meeting these new requirements is projected to cost the subsidy system approximately $43 million more per year.

These changes, combined with the expiration of COVID-19 relief funding that provided Colorado an additional $465 million to stabilize and expand child care assistance, has created growing financial instability for the subsidy system.

Approximately one-third of Colorado counties are experiencing an enrollment freeze for their child care subsidies. This means new applicants cannot access subsidized care until the freeze is lifted. There is no set timeline for when that will occur.

Without additional funding that would allow the freeze to be lifted, enrollment in Colorado’s Child Care Assistance Program is estimated to decline by 64%, falling from about 30,000 to just 10,000 enrollees. As children age out or families no longer qualify, spots that would normally open up for new enrollees will remain unfilled during the freeze.

Zooming in on Larimer County

I have been studying the impacts of the enrollment freeze in my hometown of Larimer County, Colorado. It’s a geographically diverse region that includes urban centers such as Fort Collins and Loveland, mountain destinations such as Estes Park, and rural agricultural communities. Like elsewhere in the state, child care costs pose a significant financial strain on local families.

A household in Larimer County with a median income of $64,919 and two children under the age of 5 spends approximately 37% of its income on child care. Due to budget constraints, Larimer County has had an enrollment freeze in the Colorado Child Care Assistance Program since February of 2024. The county has effectively paused the intake of new applicants for subsidies.

Recently, we administered surveys to 88 families in Larimer County. Approximately half of those surveyed were currently receiving a subsidy and half had applied but were unable to access it because of the freeze. We compared families using advanced statistical modeling that controlled for any differences between groups, allowing us to isolate the effects of the subsidy freeze on family outcomes.

In unpublished research that is being prepared for peer review, we found families affected by the freeze used fewer paid child care hours, faced higher costs, expressed greater concerns about costs, and reported more difficulty paying for care. They also had less reliable and stable arrangements, were less satisfied with their care, experienced higher child care-related stress and displayed greater risk of depression.

But that’s not all. Families without a subsidy reported missing twice as many workdays. When extrapolated across the 425 families in Larimer County affected by the freeze, this translated to over $2.2 million in lost annual earnings.

Local initiatives driving solutions

Recognizing the gaps in affordable child care, counties across Colorado introduced ballot measures to fund local solutions through tax revenue.

These measures come after the state established a universal preschool program in 2022. The following year, the program provided up to 15 hours per week of tuition-free, high-quality preschool for more than 85,000 children.

Measures in Larimer, San Miguel, Garfield, Pitkin and southwest Eagle counties will directly fund child care through sales or property taxes. Measures in Gilpin, Hinsdale, Ouray and Eagle counties will generate funds through lodging taxes.

In Larimer, voters passed a measure that established an additional countywide sales tax of 0.25%, or 25 cents per 100 dollars. The measure is expected to generate $28 million annually for child care assistance and workforce compensation.

In San Miguel, voters passed an existing property tax of 75 cents for every 1,000 dollars of assessed property value, allowing the county to collect and use all the revenue it generates instead of being limited by a new state cap. This will allow the county to retain nearly $1 million annually to support local child care affordability.

In Eagle County, voters passed a measure approving a lodging tax increase from 2% to 4% on hotel stays and short-term rentals that will raise approximately $4.5 million annually to lower child care costs.

Revenue from these initiatives will provide child care tuition to families, expand child care slots, support quality improvement and raise wages for child care workers.

These local investments cannot by themselves resolve Colorado’s statewide child care funding deficit, but they have the potential to transform access and quality within communities where they are implemented.

Colorado is not alone in these issues. Many other states are facing subsidy enrollment freezes and are exploring regional solutions to stabilize funding.

For example, ballot measures in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Seattle, Washington, also recently passed, providing reliable funding for child care assistance, preschool quality and workforce compensation.

With the uncertainty of the state and federal funding landscape, municipalities across the country may look to Colorado as a model for locally driven strategies that address community needs.

Read more of our stories about Colorado.

Jenn Finders has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, and North Central Regional Center for Rural Development.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation