Category: Uncategorized

President Donald Trump announced on May 1, 2026, that the United States will withdraw 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany – personnel who had been deployed there as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Germany-U.S. tensions started after the U.S. invasion of Iran. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz refused to support Trump’s war and stated that Iran had humiliated Washington’s leadership by closing the Strait of Hormuz. Trump followed the initial U.S. troop withdrawal announcement with threats to pull more armed forces.

U.S. troops will depart Germany over the next six to 12 months, leaving about 31,000 troops in the country.

The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw personnel comes after weeks of mounting tensions between the U.S. and NATO members. The United Kingdom and Portugal have restricted Washington’s ability to use its bases in those countries for certain activities related to the Iran war.

Trump also threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Spain and Italy over their opposition to the war and refusal to help the U.S.

“Why shouldn’t I?” Trump said on April 30, 2026, referring to possible U.S. troop withdrawal from the two European countries. “Italy has not been of any help. Spain has been horrible. Absolutely.”

These remarks suggest the Trump administration views U.S. troop withdrawal as punishment for noncompliant European allies. But the reality is more complicated. Although this proposed 5,000-troop reduction is less than 15% of current U.S. forces in Germany, its logic and consequences speak to broader issues of power projection.

As experts in international relations, foreign policy and security cooperation, we have studied the relationship between U.S. military deployments and their host countries for years. While U.S. deployments contribute to the security of the host state, having troops based in Europe and other countries provides the U.S. with significant flexibility for pursuing its own foreign policy goals.

US deployment levels

Europe has historically been one of the regions with the highest concentrations of U.S. military personnel deployed overseas.

Since the end of the Cold War, for example, Italy has hosted between 20,000 and 40,000 personnel, and Spain between 2,000 and 7,000 personnel. Germany has regularly hosted the largest deployments. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. maintained approximately 227,000 military personnel in Germany. Though Europe remains a significant location for basing U.S. troops, this number fell dramatically in the 1990s, hovering between 50,000 and 75,000 for most years since then.

US power projection

Historians and policymakers often explained U.S. deployments to Europe as a means of deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling described the logic in 1966: Even a small deployment in West Berlin served as a trip wire, ensuring that Soviet incursions would trigger a much larger military response from the U.S. and its European allies.

But a closer look at U.S. foreign policy challenges this view. While U.S. troops stationed in Europe were meant to defend Europe, their utility has extended far beyond that.

U.S. military bases and deployments provide the U.S. with greater flexibility and opportunities to pursue its foreign policy goals. By forward positioning military personnel and assets, the U.S. can reduce response times during crises, as well as the costs of moving its military resources into strategic positions.

Foreign deployments can convince countries not to attack countries that host them. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. deployed nuclear weapons to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, a NATO ally. Turkey’s close proximity to the Soviet Union increased the U.S.’s ability to challenge its superpower rival with these weapons.

These missiles were famously later withdrawn during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, giving the U.S. something to bargain with in persuading the Soviets to remove their missiles from Cuba.

Larger military engagements, such as the Vietnam War or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have typically relied on U.S. military facilities in allied states that are closer to the conflict. During the Vietnam War, U.S. bases in Germany, Japan and the Philippines were used as staging areas through which U.S. personnel and equipment moved on their way in or out of Southeast Asia.

U.S. facilities in Germany, such as Ramstein Air Base and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, have been integral to combat operations, satellite control of drones and treating U.S. personnel wounded in combat. Landstuhl has admitted over 97,000 wounded soldiers since its founding in 1953 and has already treated service members injured during the ongoing Iran war.

Further, military equipment such as radar and interceptor missiles often have limited ranges. Deploying this equipment closer to rival countries can increase the chance of successfully intercepting and destroying incoming missiles.

Humanitarian benefits

Beyond warfare, U.S. humanitarian relief and disaster response operations often benefit from U.S. bases.

For instance, after a large earthquake struck Japan in 2011, U.S. personnel and facilities located in and around Japan enabled the rapid mobilization of relief operations.

In 2004, a powerful earthquake in the Indian Ocean triggered large tsunamis, affecting millions of people in nearby countries. U.S. personnel stationed at Yokota Air Base near Tokyo provided relief and supplies to people throughout Southeast Asia and as far as eastern Africa.

Similarly, after an earthquake in Turkey in 2023, U.S. medical personnel relocated from Germany to Incirlik Air Base to help provide relief.

Beyond their humanitarian benefits, these missions can increase favorable views of the U.S. More positive public views of America may also make foreign governments more likely to support U.S. foreign policy goals.

Lower costs for the US

Host states often make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of hosting and sustaining U.S. personnel. These can range from direct financial transfers to construction, tax reductions and subsidies. Japan and South Korea increased the amount they pay to host U.S. troops after Trump demanded they do so in 2019.

U.S. equipment – from tanks and trucks to planes and ships – also often relies on a host country’s infrastructure to operate and move within the host country. Germany, for example, paid over US$1 billion for construction costs and the stationing of U.S. troops in Germany during the 2010s.

Not all countries that host U.S. troops invest as much in their infrastructure as Germany does, and having those troops elsewhere could prove far more costly than having them in Germany.

Michael A. Allen received grant research funding from the Department of Defense’s Minerva Initiative, the US Army Research Laboratory, and the US Army Research Office from 2017 to 2021.

Carla Martinez Machain has received funding from the Department of Defense’s Minerva Initiative, the US Army Research Laboratory, and the US Army Research Office.

Michael E. Flynn has received funding from the Department of Defense’s Minerva Initiative, the US Army Research Laboratory, and the US Army Research Office.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Meetings between Chinese and American leaders are not exactly routine, but few are historically groundbreaking.

The exceptions include the very first visit by a sitting U.S. president to China, when Richard Nixon met with Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in February 1972 – at a time when America did not even formally recognize the People’s Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the U.S. in 1979 generated a similarly iconic moment when the reformist Chinese leader donned a Stetson at a Texas rodeo, a sign that he would be willing to engage with America in a way that Mao contemplated only near the end of his life.

Donald Trump may harbor hopes that his upcoming visit, slated for May 14-15, 2026, could have similar historical significance to those moments half a century ago. It will, after all, be the first face-to-face meeting of U.S. and Chinese leaders in Beijing since Trump’s own visit nearly a decade ago in 2017.

Yet the outcomes of this Trump summit with Xi Jinping are likely to be vague because the goals for both leaders are also only partially evident. The visit is being driven by trade imperatives, but there are other issues that threaten U.S.-China relations in the longer term.

It will be extremely hard for the two sides to address these more deep-rooted divides. Indeed, as an analyst of U.S.-China relations, I believe the world’s two largest economies will have an essentially competitive relationship for years to come, and areas of plausible cooperation – whether on climate change or AI regulation – are increasingly hard to find.

Taiwan: A change in US position?

One area that has been a source of contention for quite some time is Taiwan. Xi has made it clear that the unification of the island with the mainland cannot be left to “another generation” but has left it vague – up to now – as to how that goal will be achieved.

The summit has been preceded by lots of chatter about U.S. preparedness to honor its somewhat ambiguous promise to defend Taiwan in the event of an invasion – with Chinese analysts concluding that the war in Iran has severely weakened Washington’s capabilities on this front.

However, there are plenty of signs that Xi would rather find peaceful means to unite with Taiwan that avoid all-out war, particularly as the examples of Russia in Ukraine and the U.S. in Iran show that the outcomes of wars are not predictable.

Instead, China has seemingly concentrated its efforts on influencing the upcoming January 2028 Taiwan presidential election. The leader of the island’s major opposition Kuomintang party, Cheng Li-wun, recently visited the mainland and had a photo op with Xi – a sign that she thinks dealmaking with China might just be acceptable to the Taiwan electorate despite its deep distrust of Beijing.

To further fuel the narrative of a seemingly inevitable path toward unification, it would be helpful for Xi to have signals that the U.S. is no longer committed to defending Taiwan.

China will push for a change from the official position that the U.S. “does not support Taiwan independence” to “the U.S. opposes Taiwan independence.” The latter change sounds minor but would have great significance, as it would essentially be an acknowledgment that the U.S. recognizes unification, by some means, as a legitimate goal in its own right.

Trump has kept his own position ambiguous: He has noted more than once that Taiwan is very close to China and very far from the U.S., but he has also authorized major arms sales to the island that have infuriated Beijing.

Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party does not specifically endorse independence, as it knows that’s a red line for Beijing, but it would regard this change in American language as a serious blow to its position. It’s unlikely that the U.S. would make such a major concession during Trump’s visit – but that won’t stop Beijing from asking for it.

AI: The battle for global leadership

A more tentative but increasingly important area for discussion during the Xi-Trump summit is technology in general and AI in particular.

Just three years ago, the attitude of the U.S. government was summed up in the phrase of then national security adviser Jake Sullivan: “small yard, high fence.”

In other words, there would be only a few restricted areas of technology, but they would be fiercely guarded.

In 2026, things have changed. In some areas, tech restrictions have just become looser; the U.S. government now permits the sale to China of some high-specification, American-manufactured chips that were previously restricted. That policy was probably driven by the sense that China was developing its own domestic alternatives anyway and that the U.S. was losing market share.

Yet there is growing concern both in the U.S. and China that AI developments are moving too fast for governments – or companies – to know fully what the technology is capable of doing, let alone being able to regulate it.

China and the U.S. both desire to dominate AI and set the global norms and standards surrounding it. But they are also aware that AI has the potential to cause immense damage.

There has been loose discussion of whether any joint form of supervision or regulation of AI between the U.S. and China might be possible. And that could well form part of the discussions during the leaders’ summit.

But realistically, both sides see themselves in fierce competition, and the likelihood that either American or Chinese companies would restrain themselves may be fanciful.

The trade elephant in the room

The most substantial achievements of the summit, however, are likely to be in the least glamorous area: remedying the trade deficit.

Trump’s tariffs aim to make the United States’ global trade partners pay a higher price for entry to the American market, and China’s persistent and massive trade surplus has been a prime target for the U.S. president.

While there are many American products that China would like to buy, most of them are not products that the U.S. government is willing to let them have, including high-tech equipment that could be used for military purposes.

Instead, the key products are likely to be agricultural, including U.S. soybeans and beef. Look out for concessions from China that would benefit farmers in key Republican states, such as Iowa.

The current tariff dispute between the U.S. and China has frozen into a standoff: The U.S. has agreed to allow China’s goods into its immense market at manageable tariff rates, and China has – mostly – agreed to allow critical minerals and rare earths to flow to U.S. manufacturers.

That truce lasts until October, but the summit may see it extended.

Neither side is keen to restart the trade war that marked the summer of 2025, when Trump announced tariffs of over 100% on China and the U.S. was in danger of having key mineral supplies cut off as a result.

Summit to talk about? Perhaps not

So how consequential will the Trump-Xi summit be? Well, don’t expect another “Nixon meets Mao” moment.

The circumstances more than a half-century on are also remarkably different. Today’s China, unlike in 1972, has an economy and military second only to the U.S. and a central position in global organizations, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, particularly as the U.S. retreats from such institutions.

Both the U.S. and Chinese sides know that they can expect limited cooperation at best from their opponent.

But after a period, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, when communication between the countries atrophied, it’s still important that they are talking at all.

Rana Mitter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The outrage was swift and severe when the U.S. Supreme Court, by an ideologically divided 6-3 vote, recently struck down Louisiana’s majority Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Critics lambasted the court for gutting the Voting Rights Act, the federal law that had until recently garnered strong bipartisan support and had ensured Black political representation in the South for more than half a century.

Many analysts see Jim Crow-era disenfranchisement of Black voters on the horizon.

Whether Louisiana v. Callais will wreak this kind of havoc remains to be seen, although some Southern states have already begun to redraw their legislative districts, aiming to ensure Republican control. Several Black legislators – all Democrats – are expected to lose their seats in the upcoming midterm elections. Democrats are threatening to retaliate with their own redistricting plans.

Because of a 2019 decision by the court, such political gerrymanders, where a legislative district is crafted to ensure partisan control, cannot be challenged under federal law. Both parties had taken full advantage of that ruling.

Prior to the Callais ruling, however, legislators had to be sure that when they sought partisan control of a district, they did not excessively dilute the voting power of minority residents. Multiple lawsuits had challenged political gerrymanders on exactly these grounds.

After Callais, that guardrail is gone. Indeed, lest they provoke the same type of litigation faced by Louisiana, state legislators must now ignore the race of voters altogether. From here on out, gerrymandering is fine, but only if it’s race-neutral.

This does not mean, however, that the race-blind mapmaking process envisioned by the Supreme Court majority will manifest. Based on our recently published research, it may, in fact, be just the opposite.

Race, we found, is – at least in the South – a more reliable predictor of how someone will vote than their party identification. And that makes race, we believe, a potentially irresistible lure for those designing congressional districts.

Race a more reliable predictor

We are both political scientists – one of us an expert on Congress and national elections and the other a constitutional law and Supreme Court scholar. In Southern states, race and political party overlap significantly, with the vast majority of Black voters favoring Democrats and most white voters favoring Republicans. And in our study, we document that in this region, mapmakers actually have an incentive to take race into account when conducting a political gerrymander.

Political gerrymandering is the process of drawing electoral districts to favor one party over another. In most states, the responsibility for drawing districts rests with the state legislature. Thus, the party that controls state legislatures very often controls elections – at both the state and congressional level.

The goal of partisan redistricting is to maximize the chance that candidates from that political party will win elections. Our study shows that using both the race and party of voters to redraw districts, rather than just party alone, better ensures partisan advantage.

The research we conducted was motivated by a claim made by Justice Samuel Alito in another recent racial gerrymandering case decided by the Supreme Court, Alexander vs. South Carolina NAACP. He argued in the court’s majority opinion that when drawing districts to favor one party, mapmakers would need to look only at voters’ party affiliation – their race would be irrelevant to ensuring partisan control.

It is a straightforward, seemingly sensible claim. It is also wrong.

Our study uses an original dataset of precinct-level election results in South Carolina from 2010 to 2020 to explore how well a precinct’s racial and partisan composition before redistricting predicts how it votes over the following decade.

What we found reveals a more complicated picture than Alito – and the subsequent Callais decision – presumes.

A precinct’s Democratic and Republican vote share prior to redistricting was the strongest predictor of future election results. But there are two problems with relying on only such partisan data when gerrymandering a district.

First, our analysis showed that roughly a quarter of a precinct’s voters in the next election did not follow what the partisan data predicted – a sizable amount, given the supposed ease of gerrymandering by party.

Second, precinct election results are surprisingly volatile. Our analysis shows that the effect of preredistricting partisanship varies with election cycles, national conditions, gradual changes in party coalitions and other factors. A precinct that leaned Republican in the election before redistricting may vote very differently in a midterm wave year when the president is unpopular, precisely the type of election coming in November.

By comparison, the analysis shows that voters’ race is a more reliable predictor than their party of how they will vote in the next election. Consequently, it seems that, at least in Southern states, legislators have a genuine, data-driven incentive to use racial data when drawing partisan districts.

Will race still affect political gerrymanders?

Consider this redistricting scenario: South Carolina’s Republican-led legislature wants to flip the state’s lone Democratic congressional seat – long held by prominent African American U.S. Rep. Jim Clyburn – for the 2026 midterms. A simple approach is to identify those who voted for Donald Trump in 2024 and then just redraw the district to add enough of those voters to ensure Republican control.

The plan backfires, however. Not only does Clyburn hold his seat, but a neighboring district also elects a Democrat. What went wrong?

Simply put, the legislature failed to realize that past partisan returns are an imperfect predictor of future voting behavior.

A heavily Democratic area that is predominantly Black will vote Democratic far more consistently than a heavily Democratic area that is predominantly white. Two precincts that look identical on a partisan map can behave very differently at the ballot box. And a legislature that fails to take this into account has taken an unreliable route to partisan advantage.

If Republican legislators want to oust Democratic officials, the most reliable route is to oust from a district the minority Democratic voters who would have elected them.

This is not to suggest that legislators should use race in this way. It certainly smacks of racism and echoes the type of electoral machinations used during Jim Crow. But that analogy is not exactly on point. The approach we identified targets the power of Black voters not because they are Black, but because they are such reliable Democrats.

To many, that may be a difference that makes no difference. More litigation over gerrymanders is inevitable. If litigants can demonstrate that race was a “predominant” factor that “drove” redistricting, or that mapmakers purposefully attempted to diminish the power of Black voters because of their race, legal liability can still follow.

Voting rights advocates should be aware of the temptation legislators may have to let race affect their political gerrymanders.

Perhaps minority voters are as free from invidious discrimination as Alito’s majority opinion in the Callais case suggests. This does not mean, however, that those charged with ensuring all voters are fairly represented in American democracy will be colorblind. Our findings show that race could easily remain embedded in the political gerrymandering landscape, despite vehement claims to the contrary.

Jordan Ragusa has served as an expert witness in racial gerrymandering litigation, most notably in Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP. He also serves on the advisory board of Charleston Civil Rights and Civics (C3), an educational non-profit that fosters civic engagement and civil rights awareness among high school students

Claire B. Wofford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The United States is spending billions of dollars to secure access to critical minerals – minerals and metals that are essential to modern technology, from electric vehicles to smartphones and military systems.

But amid the push to dig more, one question gets far too little attention: Who will actually process what comes out of the ground?

Between mining and the finished product lies a complex chain of separation, refining and advanced manufacturing. Since the 1990s, however, the United States has lost much of its critical mineral processing capacity.

Rebuilding domestic mineral supply chains will depend not only on resource availability and funding, but also on whether the U.S. can rebuild the technical expertise and industrial systems required to process those materials on a large scale.

How America lost its lead

The United States was a global leader in rare earth minerals from 1965 through the mid-1980s. It produced about 15,000 metric tons a year, about three times the amount produced by the rest of the world.

The Mountain Pass mine in California supplied the majority of the world’s rare earth elements used in electronics and the defense industry. American metallurgists, chemical engineers and processing facilities had significant expertise in its production and processing.

However, environmental damage, including wastewater pipeline leaks that released radioactive wastewater into the Mojave Desert during the 1980s and 1990s, and tightening regulations increased operating costs in the United States. During that period, much of the world’s manufacturing base for rare earth elements shifted to China, where labor costs were lower and environmental regulations were less stringent.

As production grew abroad, U.S. production of rare earth elements fell sharply – to near zero by the early 2000s, according to the U.S. Geological Survey.

In recent years, as much as 90% of the rare earth minerals extracted in the United States and allied countries have been shipped to China for processing. In 2024, the U.S. relied on imports for about 80% of its rare earth compounds and metals.

Why bringing processing back is not simple

The U.S. government is now pushing to increase domestic critical minerals production, citing national security. But building a processing facility is not like opening a warehouse.

These facilities require years of permitting, highly specialized equipment and a workforce trained in metallurgy, chemical engineering and industrial systems operation. The time from investment decision to production can stretch across a decade.

The U.S. currently has two domestic rare earth mining locations. One is in southeast Georgia, which extracts rare earth elements as a byproduct of heavy mineral sand mining. The other is Mountain Pass, which produces bastnaesite, a rare earth carbonate mineral. The mines produced about 51,000 metric tons of rare earth mineral concentrates in 2025, while the U.S. imported about 21,000 metric tons of rare earth compounds, most of them from China, according to 2025 U.S. Geological Survey data.

The U.S. has also lost expertise. Mining and mineral engineering education programs now produce only a few hundred graduates per year, well below the levels of past decades. The number of accredited programs has declined since the 1980s. Many faculty members are nearing retirement.

Industry projections estimate that the mining workforce will need to grow significantly in the coming years to meet rising demand. Specialized skills in areas such as rare earth separation, metallurgical testing and environmental systems design require years of training and practical experience. And while mining can produce high-paying jobs, the industry also has a reputation for environmental damage and hazardous conditions.

Environmental compliance is part of the skill set

Processing critical minerals is a dirty industry. That fact has made it more difficult for processing and refining companies to operate in the U.S.

For example, separating rare earth elements typically involves chemical processing with acids and solvents. When waste streams are poorly managed, these processes can produce toxic wastewater and air pollution and contribute to soil erosion. In parts of China where rare earth production expanded rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s, contamination from mining and processing has polluted rivers and damaged nearby farmland, and the wastewater can seep into soil and groundwater.

In the U.S., modern facilities must meet strict federal and state standards for air quality, water discharge and waste management that raise the cost of processing. These regulations were developed in response to environmental disasters, like the Cuyahoga River fire of 1969, when industrial oil and waste on the river burned, and hazardous waste crises like the Love Canal disaster that led to landmark environmental laws.

Operating a refinery or separation facility in compliance with regulatory standards today requires expertise in pollution control, waste treatment and sustainable process design. That requires a workforce skilled in materials science and engineering and with knowledge of environmental systems. Without environmental expertise, operational risks, regulatory challenges and project delays can increase, affecting long-term viability.

How to build a US supply chain

Rebuilding U.S. supply chains will require more than expanding extraction.

Canada’s critical minerals strategy offers an example. It connects mining projects to battery and electric vehicle manufacturing by funding processing facilities, developing regional supply chain hubs and investing in workforce training programs tied to those industries.

Australia has combined critical minerals policies with incentives and public financing to encourage domestic mineral processing, while also expanding university and vocational training in mining, metallurgy and mineral processing.

The United States has many of the key ingredients needed to rebuild its processing capacity, including research universities and workers with transferable industrial skills. Land-grant and technical universities could expand programs that integrate mining, materials science, environmental restoration and recycling. In regions such as Appalachia, where coal’s decline has left workers with skills but few job opportunities, retraining programs for new mineral recovery jobs could help people transition to a new industry.

A few federal programs support parts of this transition, including research hubs that develop new extraction and processing technologies, apprenticeship initiatives and university-industry partnerships. However, these efforts are spread across multiple agencies, with limited coordination to align priorities and investment.

The real bottleneck

America’s critical minerals strategy is often discussed in terms of geology and geopolitics – where resources are located and who has access to them.

But supply chains depend on people and systems. That’s America’s real bottleneck in creating a domestic supply chain.

A successful domestic supply chain will require workers who know how to separate neodymium from praseodymium, operate solvent extraction circuits and maintain hydrometallurgical plants within regulatory standards. These are highly specialized skills that take years to develop.

The United States has significant mineral resources and growing policy support. Now, it needs to pay attention to the workforce and industrial capacity needed to transform those resources into usable materials.

This gap developed over decades. Addressing it will likely require sustained investment alongside broader mineral policy changes such as permitting reforms and investment in domestic processing facilities.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

As the Trump administration moves to weaken America’s air pollution rules, it is deploying new legal interpretations that are intended to tie the hands of future administrations for years to come.

In practice, the changes limit the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority under the Clean Air Act. The result allows EPA officials to ignore science, data and the adverse effects their decisions will have on public health and the environment.

But the new interpretations are also designed to apply not just to the rule in which they are first set forth but into the future.

If affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in inevitable legal challenges, these interpretations could make it harder for future administrations to restore the public health protections that the Trump administration eliminates. They could also make it difficult to update rules to respond to new information about health risks.

Typically, moves to weaken pollution regulations through novel legal interpretations would have a good chance of being overturned in court. But the EPA’s new interpretations are strategically designed to appeal to the current U.S. Supreme Court’s view of federal agencies’ authority, especially in light of the court’s 2024 ruling in Loper Bright v. Raimondo. In that case, the court overturned what’s known as the Chevron doctrine. A 1984 Supreme Court ruling had established that courts should defer to executive agencies’ legal interpretations of their governing statutes when the text of the law was ambiguous or left gaps. That deference no longer applies.

As a former EPA appointee who helped write and review dozens of regulations under the Clean Air Act during the Obama and Biden administrations, I find these efforts to prevent the EPA from doing its job of protecting public health and the environment to be alarming. Here are two examples of how the new interpretations are playing out.

Blocking future climate regulations

In February 2026, the EPA rescinded its 2009 endangerment finding, a determination under the Clean Air Act that carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” because they contribute to climate change.

The endangerment finding was the scientific and legal basis for EPA rules requiring automakers, power plants and oil and gas operations to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. Erasing it would make it easier for the Trump administration to eliminate greenhouse gas regulations.

Rather than try to challenge the science of climate change, which would be difficult given the growing mountain of evidence, the Trump EPA relied on legal arguments that were intended to dispense forever with the EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gas pollutants under the Clean Air Act.

Among the administration’s numerous arguments, two stand out:

First, the Trump EPA says the Clean Air Act should be read to limit the EPA’s authority to regulate air pollution only if its harm to the public is “through local or regional exposure.”

That would mean contributions from U.S. sources to global air pollution, no matter how demonstrable or how much they endanger Americans, are not covered by the Clean Air Act.

Second, the Trump EPA says that reducing greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and engines would be “futile.” It points to global climate modeling that suggest these reductions would not meaningfully reduce the harm to public health and welfare.

What that argument fails to mention is that actions by people around the world to reduce emissions across different sectors add up. Motor vehicle emissions are the No. 1 contributor of U.S. emissions. If this sector is too small to regulate, then nothing is big enough.

Each of these interpretations is contrary to positions that the EPA took in the original endangerment finding, which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld in 2012.

Allowing more toxic air pollutants

A second example involves the EPA’s proposal on March 17, 2026, to weaken pollution restrictions on businesses that sterilize medical equipment using ethylene oxide, a known carcinogen.

In that proposal, the EPA is also changing a legal interpretation in a way that would constrain the agency’s ability to protect human health into the future, this time from emissions of toxic air pollutants.

The Clean Air Act, under Section 112, establishes a methodical program for the EPA to regulate industries that emit significant quantities of air pollutants that can cause cancer, birth defects, genetic mutations or neurological harm, or harm reproductive health.

The EPA reviews how facilities control their emissions and sets standards that require all facilities to meet what the best-controlled sources are doing. But Section 112 has an important provision called “residual risk” review: Eight years after the EPA sets the first technology-based standards, it must determine whether the public health risk posed by emissions from the facilities after controls are added is acceptable.

In 2024, the EPA updated its hazardous air pollution rule for facilities that use ethylene oxide to sterilize medical equipment sensitive to steam heat, such as devices containing plastic, rubber or electronic components. Because recent research showed that ethylene oxide posed a much higher risk of cancer than previously thought, the EPA also updated its 2006 residual risk finding and required additional safeguards.

The Trump EPA is now arguing that the agency can assess residual risk only once, even if more recent information shows that the health risk is unacceptably high.

By constraining its own authority, the EPA is withholding standards that would protect thousands of people from a higher risk of cancer. It is also creating a legal precedent that will justify weakening other standards. Those include standards for chemical manufacturing facilities that the Biden EPA updated in 2024 through residual risk review.

That precedent would also prohibit the EPA in the future from taking into account new information about the health effects of any regulated hazardous air pollutant from any type of industry the EPA regulates under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, including petroleum refineries, chemical manufacturing and paper mills.

Arguing the law

These rules are just two examples of the administration’s “if you don’t have the facts, argue the law” approach.

If the administration’s strategy works, the American public may be living, and dying, with the consequences of these industry-friendly regulations for years to come.

Janet McCabe is a volunteer with the Environmental Protection Network and has held several appointed positions at the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Consistent with the Indiana University Statement of Policy on Institutional Neutrality, the comments contained in this communication are solely my views and are not intended to be construed, and shall not be construed, as the views of Indiana University or comments made on behalf of or by Indiana University.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

If someone you know is detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, it can be incredibly challenging to find and communicate with them.

For example, it can take several days just to confirm where they are. Even after locating a loved one, it is possible to lose track of them again, as ICE regularly moves people between facilities without notice.

I’m a law professor at Temple University in Philadelphia, where I work with immigrant rights organizations on issues of ICE arrest and detention.

Here’s what we know about how and where ICE is holding people as of May 2026.

A confusing web of detention facilities

When a person is arrested by ICE, the lack of a centralized immigration detention system makes it hard to figure out where they are.

For ICE detention, the federal government can contract with counties for county jail space or to execute service agreements with private prison companies. ICE also contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons to hold immigrants in their facilities.

Pennsylvania is no exception to this patchwork system. Four county jails – in Pike, Clinton, Cambria and Franklin counties – have contracts with the federal government to detain immigrants for ICE. Pike County, for example, received US$16 million from ICE in 2024 and 2025 for use of its jail.

Further, ICE contracts with Centre County so the county can serve as a pass-through for payment to the private prison company, the Geo Group, which runs the Moshannon Valley Processing Center. Moshannon is the largest detention center in the Northeast with 1,876 beds. This pass-through system allows the federal government to avoid the burdensome Federal Acquisition System for contractors. That purchasing system is governed by uniform policies that apply to all federal agencies that enter into contracts for services to ensure that business is conducted with integrity, fairness and transparency.

ICE pays millions of dollars each month to operate the Moshannon Valley facility.

Most recently, ICE set up contracts with two Bureau of Prison facilities in Pennsylvania to hold immigrants: the federal detention center in Philadelphia and the federal prison FCI Lewisburg.

Over 2,000 immigrants in detention in PA

After a person has been arrested by ICE, major federal policy changes that are intended to keep people locked up or have them deported make it difficult to get that person released.

For example, ICE has issued new guidance that expands who is subject to mandatory detention without access to a bond hearing to include anyone who entered the U.S. without a visa. This policy is currently being legally challenged by the ACLU along with other groups.

Additionally, ICE releases many fewer people. Under federal law, ICE has the discretion to release most people, unless they fall into a specialized category of “criminal aliens.” Previously, people were released on parole or on their own recognizance, sometimes with an order of supervision or bond.

As a result, immigration detention has reached unprecedented levels.
Over 70,000 people were held in immigration detention in January 2026. As of April 2, 2026, over 2,000 people were held in immigration detention in Pennsylvania.

Isolated from family and legal advice

Once arrested, ICE detainees have a hard time contacting the outside world.

Upon arrival at a facility, they are stripped of their belongings, including their cellphone. They must pay for telephone calls to their family or get others to pay by putting money in their commissary account.

Further, ICE detention facilities are often outside of major urban areas and far from legal services and community support. Moshannon, for example, is over 100 miles from any nonprofit immigration attorneys who provide representation to people in immigration removal proceedings.

Previously, the federal government funded a Legal Orientation Program where nongovernmental legal services offered information, referrals and representation to those in detention. In 2025, the Department of Justice ended the program, justifying its termination based on the executive order entitled “Protecting the American People Against Invasion.” Section 19 of that executive order relates to reviewing, pausing or terminating contracts, grants or other agreements with nongovernmental organizations that support or provide services “to removable or illegal aliens.”

Out-of-state transfers are common

ICE’s movement of people without notice across different facilities is a long-standing practice. However, a recent UCLA study found that out-of-state transfers of noncriminal Latino detainees jumped from 18% to 55% after President Donald Trump’s reelection in 2024.

Transfers are mostly about ICE’s own efficiency in maximizing the filling of bed space. Some advocacy organizations have alleged that transfers are conducted for retaliatory reasons against people who make requests or complain. Transfers are not only disorienting for the person involved but also impede communication with family and access to counsel.

How to find someone in ICE detention

Several online guides provide information about how to locate someone after an ICE arrest and how to prepare one’s family in case of future arrest.

Here are some key tips.

1. Use the ICE online detainee locator.

The locator requires either a person’s country of birth and alien registration number – called an “A number” – or their full name and date of birth. A person might have an A number if they have a past or present case with the government, including having applied for a green card or asylum. It can take 48 hours for ICE to enter information about the person into its database so it can be picked up by the online locator. The name must be an exact match with what was entered into the system.

2. Contact the ICE field office.

The Philadelphia field office covers Delaware, Pennsylvania and West Virginia. If you are a noncitizen, you might want a U.S. citizen to do this for you out of an abundance of caution, because ICE records information about the person calling. Call 215-656-7164 or email Philadelphia.Outreach@ice.dhs.gov.

3. Contact the consulate.

In many instances, ICE is supposed to notify the consulate of the arrested person’s home country within 72 hours.

4. Reach out to community groups, attorneys and elected officials.

In Philadelphia, community groups such as Asian Americans United, Juntos and New Sanctuary Movement, or the statewide Pennsylvania Immigration Coalition, might be able to help you. An attorney might also be able to help you. Here is a list of nonprofit legal service providers in Pennsylvania.

Further, you can ask for help from your federal elected officials, such as your congressional representative or Sens. John Fetterman or Dave McCormick. If you have a more direct relationship with a local elected official, such as your city council member, it cannot hurt to see whether they can also help you.

How to prepare in advance

If you know someone who is at risk of arrest by ICE, you can help them prepare in advance. Tell them to:

1. Keep copies of their documents in a secure space.

This includes their A number as well as immigration documents, passport, birth certificate, marriage certificate, tax returns and any employment and medical records. If they have children, make sure to include their passports, birth certificates and medical records.

2. Memorize important phone numbers.

They should know the numbers of family members and their attorney in case their cellphone is taken from them.

3. Have an emergency plan.

A family preparedness plan includes designating a caregiver for children in case a parent or guardian is arrested. They should also consider filling out documents that may help a family member or friend to care for their children if they are unavailable because of detention or deportation. These include forms that provide temporary guardianship or custody of minor children, consent for medical care of minor children and information for the Philadelphia School District.

Philadelphia Legal Assistance provides free downloadable packets in English and in Spanish to build a family preparedness plan.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

Jennifer J. Lee does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

On April 30, 2026, Texas executed James Broadnax, a Black man who was sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of two men in 2008.

Before the jury was seated, the prosecutor moved to dismiss each of the seven Black people from the jury pool. Citing court documents, CNN noted that he “(utilized) a spreadsheet during jury selection that bolded only the names of every Black juror” and none of the white or Latino people. After defense objections, the judge reseated one Black juror, citing the otherwise all-white jury.

The trial proceeded with 11 white jurors and one Black juror.

A jury with that racial composition is likely to deliberate in a different way than one that is more racially diverse. According to Duke University law professor James Coleman, “Juries with two or more members of color deliberate longer, discuss a wider range of evidence, and collectively are more accurate in their statements about cases, regardless of the race of the defendant.”

A 2012 Duke University study of two Florida counties found that juries “formed from all-white jury pools convicted Black defendants 16% more often than white defendants, a gap that was nearly eliminated when at least one member of the jury pool was Black.”

Broadnax was executed on the 40th anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors cannot exclude jurors solely on account of their race.

But Broadnax’s case is not an outlier. Similar efforts to “whiten” juries in capital cases regularly occur in states that authorize the death penalty. A 2025 analysis of Alabama’s death row by the Equal Justice Initiative found that across 122 capital cases – involving Black and white defendants in roughly equal numbers – more than one-third were decided by juries with no Black jurors or, like Broadnax’s case, only one.

As a death penalty scholar who has tracked the role of race in the death penalty system, I believed Batson was a step forward in the effort to address a long history of excluding Black people from jury service. But 40 years have shown that Batson merely scratched the surface of the problem.

A long history

The exclusion of Black people from jury service is as old as the republic itself.

Before the Civil War, one way this was done was by limiting eligibility for such service to those who could vote. Some states went further, saying only whites could serve on juries. A Tennessee law dating from 1858 is a good example: “Every white male citizen who is a freeholder, or householder, and twenty-one years of age, is legally qualified to act as a grand or petit juror.”

It was only after the Civil War and the passage of the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution that Black people were entitled to serve on juries nationwide – at least in theory.

Some states resisted. For example, West Virginia law specified that “all white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors.”

In 1880, 12 years after the ratification of the 14th Amendment – which guarantees equal protection of the law – the Supreme Court struck down that West Virginia law. It did so in the case of a former slave who was convicted in a capital case by an all-white jury and given a death sentence – a preview, I believe, of the kind of thing that happened to Broadnax.

The court held that the West Virginia law that “denies to colored citizens the right and privilege of participating in the administration of the law as jurors because of their color … is, practically, a brand upon them, and a discrimination against them which is forbidden by the [14th] amendment.”

Despite the court’s unequivocal ruling, the door to jury service remained closed to Black people. As legal scholar Sarah Claxton argued in 2022, “States across the country enacted vague and subjective standards for juror eligibility – requiring good moral character, honest and intelligent men, persons having educational qualifications – whose discriminatory application excluded Black citizens from juries.”

The modern story

The story of racial discrimination in jury selection is not simply a story of a now discredited past.

In 1965, the Supreme Court refused to remedy the exclusion of Black people from juries that its 1880 decision was supposed to have ended. It held, in Swain v. Alabama, that “a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to a proportionate number of his race on the trial jury or the jury panel.”

Two decades passed before the court again took up the glaring problem of racial discrimination by prosecutors seeking to keep Black people off juries.

In Batson v. Kentucky, the court considered a case in which the prosecuting attorney “used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons” in the jury pool and managed to seat an all-white jury. And on April 30, 1986, it reaffirmed that “a State denies a Black defendant equal protection when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.”

The court then created a process for challenging jury selection. First, the defendant must point to evidence – based on how the prosecutor used their strikes – that suggests racial discrimination. If they can, the prosecutor must then come forward with “a neutral explanation for challenging Black jurors.” Finally, the trial judge weighs all the evidence to decide whether the prosecutor’s stated reason is genuine or a cover for bias. In practice, this means a Batson challenge will fail as long as the prosecutor can offer any nonracial reason for excluding Black jurors, however thin.

When Batson v. Kentucky was decided, Justice Thurgood Marshall, drawing on his years of experience as an NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyer, warned that the decision would not end racial discrimination in jury selection. “Merely allowing defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge,” he explained.

He predicted that “any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons.”

40 years of Batson

History has proved Marshall right.

In the Broadnax case, prosecutors claimed that their efforts to remove Black jurors had nothing to do with their race. They suggested that they were dismissed because they could not be impartial or they had reservations about the death penalty, disqualifying them from service on a jury in a capital murder trial.

The Batson test has not been much of an obstacle for prosecutors in other capital cases either. In fact, in 2025 the Death Penalty Information Center reported that in the years after Batson, “prosecutors soon learned how to successfully defend race-based challenges, and courts generally accepted even the flimsiest excuses.” That’s why defendants rarely win Batson challenges “despite powerful evidence of racial bias.”

In the 40 years since Batson was decided, the Death Penalty Information Center has identified only 68 cases across 16 states in which a capital defendant succeeded in getting a conviction or death sentence reversed because of racial discrimination in jury selection.

The picture is similar in California, where more comprehensive data exists. According to a 2020 Berkeley Law report, the California Supreme Court reviewed 142 cases involving Batson claims over 30 years and found a violation in only three. At the time the report was published, it had been more than three decades since that court found a Batson violation involving the strike of a Black prospective juror.

Looking at what has happened since Batson v. Kentucky, Elisabeth Semel, a UC Berkeley law professor and co-director of the school’s Death Penalty Clinic, said in an interview with the Death Penalty Information Center that she would give Batson a grade of “F.” As she explained, “It certainly has failed to achieve its promise.”

Austin Sarat does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

The number of family caregivers has grown from 53 million Americans in 2020 to 63 million as of 2025. This number is expected to increase as the baby boomer generation ages and faces the limitations of our current health and social services systems.

A family caregiver is an unpaid individual who provides assistance to a family member who needs support due to illness, disability or aging.

The population of metro Pittsburgh is one of the oldest in the country, according to U.S. Census Bureau data. This means an increasing proportion of the local population will require care from family caregivers as they age. In Allegheny County, the number of residents age 65 and older is projected to grow by 50,000 by 2050.

Despite their critical role in supporting the aging population, however, family caregivers are not often provided with medical training or help with navigating the health and social services systems. This puts them at significant risk of experiencing physical and mental strain that can lead to burnout and leaving the workforce before retirement age. Caregivers and those they support can also develop health complications based on these factors.

This is particularly true for women, who provide a disproportionate amount of care in the U.S.

I study ways to improve the quality of life for aging adults and their care partners. My work centers on how family caregiving can improve mental health for families. I also examine the toll that caregiving takes on families navigating serious illness and decline.

Sandwich generation caregivers

The “sandwich generation” refers to adults – typically in their 40s and 50s – who are simultaneously caring for their aging parents while raising their own children. They are “sandwiched” between two generations of dependents and often face significant financial and emotional pressures as a result.

These caregivers often find themselves caught between work and unpredictable caregiving demands. Without formal protections like paid leave, they may feel forced to reduce hours, turn down promotions or leave the workforce altogether. These decisions can add to the financial strain they’re already under.

Where the law falls short

Several national and state programs exist to support older adults.

The federal Older Americans Act funds services like meal delivery, transportation and caregiver support, and Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services helps older adults receive care at home rather than in a facility. But systemic barriers – from eligibility gaps to access issues – limit their reach.

Federal initiatives like the RAISE Family Caregivers Act offer some hope for family caregivers. It outlines specific actions the government can take to help caregivers, including making it easier for them to balance caregiving with their jobs.

In addition, several states have implemented paid family leave policies. California, for example, offers up to eight weeks of paid family caregiving leave – replacing up to 90% of wages for lower earners. Washington and Massachusetts both provide up to 12 weeks, with wage replacement rates of 90% and 80%, respectively, and include job protection so caregivers don’t have to choose between their loved one and their livelihood.

Pennsylvania may be next. Legislators are currently debating the Family Care Act, paid leave legislation proposed by state Rep. Jennifer O’Mara. The bill, approved by the Pennsylvania House in March 2026, would allow employees to take up to 12 paid weeks off after the birth of a child or to care for a family member during a serious illness. Spotlight PA reports that the House-approved bill proposes employers cover the cost, with grants available for small businesses.

The state Senate’s version of the Family Care Act, pending in the Labor & Industry Committee as of May 2026, would fund benefits through employee payroll deductions of up to 1% of their income. This addresses a critical gap in existing federal law, which guarantees only unpaid leave.

Even if passed and signed into law, the proposal may fall short for sandwich generation caregivers, who face simultaneous, overlapping demands on both ends of the age spectrum. Many of these caregivers have already reduced hours or left the workforce entirely. A benefit tied to employment may never reach the people who need it most.

Pittsburgh’s generational tug-of-war

Pittsburgh-based sandwich generation caregivers face competing demands: securing reliable, affordable childcare – a growing problem in Allegheny County driven by staffing shortages and limited spots – while simultaneously managing eldercare responsibilities. Without a state or federal paid leave mandate, many Pittsburgh workers, like those in lower-wage or part-time roles, have no guaranteed access to the time off they might need to meet either obligation.

Paid leave policies vary by employer, and without a universal federal mandate, coverage is uneven – often weakest for lower-wage workers, part-time employees and people at small businesses.

Research has shown that sandwich generation caregivers already use most of their paid time off for caregiving tasks. This means they have limited time to take care of their own health. The proposed Family Care Act caps paid leave at 12 weeks per year. While this is an improvement from having no mandatory paid leave, it’s designed to supplement – not replace – standard sick days. The Family Care Act would cover intermittent leave for singular events, like childbirth or surgery. But sandwich generation caregiving is chronic, overlapping and resource-intensive in ways the bill isn’t designed to address.

In addition, the act proposes a partial wage replacement – 90% of wages for a weekly benefit cap ranging from $573 to $995 per week, depending on the individual’s earnings.

Caregivers who step back from work to care for a child or an aging parent are disproportionately lower- and middle-income workers. A 90% wage replacement rate at a lower-wage tier means those workers don’t have to choose between a paycheck and showing up for their family.

Yet this coverage is still likely insufficient for caregivers who often face significant financial strain related to caregiving, such as out-of-pocket expenses for care.

While the Family Care Act – whether it is funded through employee and employer payroll contributions – is a step forward, it still falls short for sandwich generation caregivers. What this population needs is the ability to take flexible time off as needs arise, not just in one block. However, intermittent leave presents administrative challenges for employers, like scheduling disruptions and paperwork burdens that could make it harder to put into practice.

Kate Perepezko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Ted Turner, who died on April 6, 2026, was bright, shrewd and, most of all, lucky. The cable TV visionary proved to be in the right place, at the right time, to change television and video news forever.

Most of his big gambles, on things such as the MGM studio and library, which led to the creation of the Turner Classic Movies channel, paid off handsomely.

But Turner will be remembered mostly for the creation and development of the Cable News Network – CNN – which launched in 1980 and made our knowledge of distant events instantaneous and our world more comprehensible. In this sense, Turner’s legacy extends beyond television. He changed our conception not only of journalism but also of our world.

Turner’s obituaries note his record-setting philanthropy, his impressive conservation efforts and his campaign to make the world safer by securing post-Soviet Union era nuclear weaponry. Over the course of his 87 years, Turner proved an outstanding yachtsman, an active and involved sports team owner and a quotable maverick in the business world.

Yet as a scholar of broadcast history – and a former CNN employee – I think Turner’s ultimate legacy is a bit more atmospheric than measurable.

He changed the media ecology in profound and lasting ways. CNN’s arrival disrupted an established media environment, in which broadcast journalism routines and audience viewing habits had become standardized by the ABC, CBS and NBC TV networks.

The ramshackle early CNN, with its farcical “world headquarters” housed in a former Atlanta-area country club, was derided as the “Chicken Noodle Network” by veteran network journalists. But by the mid-1980s it had established profitability, and by 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, it assumed a singular position in America’s – and the world’s – information environment.

CNN had matured to respectability, and Turner was recognized as a visionary by Time magazine, which named him 1991’s Man of the Year. His idea had blossomed into a new arena for global information sharing, and his cable network fully competed with the established broadcast channels on big stories throughout the 1990s.

Right place, right time, right team

Turner’s cable TV news revolution required significant collaboration. The fulfillment of his vision needed luck, inherited money, innovative new technologies, supportive partners and even federal regulatory intervention.

For example, had Newton Minow’s Federal Communications Commission not pushed Congress to pass the All-Channel Receiver Act of 1962, American TV manufacturers would likely never have placed the UHF dial on their sets. That UHF dial made additional local TV competition possible by allowing more stations to broadcast.

In 1970, Turner purchased UHF Channel 17 in Atlanta, which he named WTGC for “Turner Communications Group,” and UHF Channel 36 in Charlotte, North Carolina, which he named WRET for “Robert Edward Turner,” and began building his broadcasting empire.

By the mid-1970s, the cost of satellite distribution to cable system operators had decreased to such an extent that Turner realized – and seized – an opportunity to nationally distribute his local station. He worked with satellite and cable system operators, building early relationships that would prove beneficial to everyone in the cable industry as it developed over the 1980s and ’90s.

In 1979 and 1980, he used these relationships to build the first 24-hour TV network, but it was his internal hires that made the original channel function. To launch CNN, Turner hired veterans of the TV news business, including Robert Wussler, who had previously been president of CBS Sports and the CBS Television Network. And he hired Reese Schonfeld, who had previously founded the Independent Television News Association, a national syndicator of pooled local TV programming.

It was Turner’s vision, investments and established partnerships that made CNN possible. But the creation of the network proved a team effort requiring managerial competence and veteran television production experience.

CNN’s success was never assured. The channel continually lost money in its initial years. But the idea of 24-hour TV news being delivered to paying subscribers, through their cable system operators, proved so valuable that as early as 1981, two CBS executives secretly jetted to Atlanta to meet with Turner and Wussler about purchasing the network.

“I’ll sell you CNN,” he told them. But the deal floundered when the CBS executives would not accept anything less than 51% ownership – and control – of the channel. “You want control? You don’t buy control of Ted Turner’s companies,” he explained. “Forty-nine percent or less.”

Only four years later, Turner would turn the tables and attempt to take over CBS.

Turner came very close to living long enough to see CBS and CNN under a single ownership. CBS’ parent company, Paramount Skydance, is closing in on the purchase of Warner Bros. Discovery, the corporation that owns CNN.

Yet today, these two once hugely profitable news operations have been subsumed within massive multinational corporations, with their legacy brand equity providing as much value to their ownership as their journalism. Turner had long bemoaned the managerial fate of his cable news channel, which he sold to Warner Bros. in 1996.

Success invites criticism, establishes a legacy

Turner is one of the few figures in American media history who left a clearly identifiable legacy. There was a media world that existed before CNN and the one that came after. CNN’s success gave rise to competitors such as MSNBC, Fox News and others.

These channels simultaneously differentiated themselves from CNN while constantly measuring themselves against their older rival. But Turner’s original vision was distinct from the panel programs and punditry that’s now replaced original reporting from around the world.

Turner wanted to own and operate a global news organization where the news would always be the star, and where, like the classic wire services, professional reporting would be instant and accurate. And he wanted to make a fortune while doing it.

When he finally succeeded, critics began to complain about what journalist and academic Tom Rosenstiel called “The Myth of CNN” in a cover story in The New Republic in 1994. Scholars bemoaned CNN for its privileging good visuals over context and depth. They argued that its foreign coverage failed to maintain sufficient independence from the U.S. government.

Dictators and terrorists around the world learned to exploit CNN to get their messages across to the American public. In this sense, CNN’s neutrality, once a source of respect and credibility, could also undermine it by making the channel easily exploitable.

Billions of people around the world now take for granted the profusion of news access to anywhere on earth, at any time of day or night. That world was unimaginable before Turner’s work to make CNN conceivable and then real.

His legacy is not simply a series of cable channels but an entirely new way of thinking about information retrieval and access. Think about that the next time you scroll past video clips from London, Tokyo, Beirut or Mexico City, or check out breaking news videos from Ukraine or Tehran. And thank Ted for making such a world possible.

Michael J. Socolow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Hate communities often flourish online for years, raising the question of how they persist. My research team has found that powerful stories keep members of a hate group galvanized, either by repeating the story over and over or by constantly adding fresh accusations and interpretations to it.

I’m a computational social scientist who studies social and political networks. My colleagues and I uncovered these trends by examining 10 years of posts, reactions and participation patterns in Facebook groups that shared antisemitic and Islamophobic content. Our findings have been accepted at the 2026 International Conference on Web and Social Media.

First, we measured who was posting and how that related to engagement on a site. Groups in which a small number of people produced most of the content tended to attract more reactions and responses. Then we looked at subjects the group members discussed – religion, immigration, geopolitics – and the kinds of stories members told about those topics, such as describing an entire group of people as criminals or warning that certain types of people are secretly taking over a country’s way of life.

When we put these pieces together, we discovered some clear patterns. Messages posted by a few very active people were strongly associated with higher site engagement in the form of likes and shares in the near term. And repetition – espousing the same ideas again and again – was an effective tactic. We also found that when many users kept adding fresh accusations, conspiracy theories and explanations, a group tended to persist. Very uniform content that used the same framing led to less engagement over time.

Different communities seemed to be drawn to different messaging patterns. In Islamophobic groups, the most prolific posters tended to repeat a narrow, consistent set of messages. Often these were religiously framed posts that portrayed Muslims as morally condemned. In antisemitic groups, the most engaged members were more likely to impart a mix of narratives, from tales of victimization to conspiracy theories about public figures.

Why it matters

Our findings suggest that hate communities can sustain themselves in various ways, so efforts to moderate them should consider these variations. If a few voices drive the conversation, removing them could quiet the noise. If new stories constantly appear from many contributors, harmful ideas may survive even if a few key online accounts are taken down. Hate networks can persist even after social media platforms ban specific groups or accounts.

It is also important to understand how stories can make prejudice feel justified and emotionally compelling. Extremist stories may claim that a group is under attack, that outsiders are dangerous or subhuman, or that violence is the only way to stay safe. Groups seen as outsiders – such as immigrants – are common targets, and they may be described as an “invasion” that threatens the nation.

What other research is being done

Researchers are finding that extremist ideas are now spreading through looser networks where many voices contribute and messaging can vary widely. That could affect whether engagement in the future still depends on consistent repetition or novelty. Some investigators are also scrutinizing how harmful language, conspiracy theories and propaganda evolve over time.

What’s next

Another important direction is tracking how hate narratives are spread by public figures and influencers, how the narratives move between online platforms, and how they surface in offline groups and efforts to organize supporters, all of which can normalize harmful ideas. My group is starting to study how this amplification works: who shares which narratives and why, which kinds of people become bridges across different online platforms, and how those roles shape which messages spread.

The Research Brief is a short take on interesting academic work.

Yu-Ru Lin’s research has received federal funding, including National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense (DARPA, AFOSR, Minerva, and ONR). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding sources.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation