Author: alaskaadmin

In 2018, high-speed passenger trains branded as Brightline started running along the formerly freight-only Florida East Coast Railway. Initial service from Miami to West Palm Beach was extended to Orlando in 2023. Unfortunately, the southern end of the line is in the spotlight because of collisions with pedestrians and motor vehicles.

The safety concerns have received extensive coverage in the Miami Herald, Orlando Sentinel, The Atlantic and on local television and radio stations.

To South Floridians, the furor may be novel. But nationally the debate over how to prevent these incidents has been going on for decades.

Most of the risks of railroading fall on pedestrians and motorists. Over the past decade, an average of 900 pedestrians lost their lives each year in the U.S., and another 150 motor vehicle occupants died in collisions at highway-rail grade crossings.

I’m an economist who has studied transportation safety for 40 years. My research has analyzed why motor vehicle risks have fallen substantially, while there has been hardly any progress for pedestrians.

Reducing motor vehicle crashes

In 1966, 1,700 motor vehicle occupants died at railroad crossings. Nowadays, that number is typically less than 150. Over the same period, the number of vehicles on the road has tripled. By these measures, the risk has fallen by an amazing 97%.

What happened?

In part, the risk fell due to better vehicle technology and reduced drunken driving, which have improved overall highway safety.

The rest was due to actions taken starting in the early 1970s in reaction to the high number of deaths. Notably, the responsibility for deciding on safety features at crossings was taken away from the railroads and given to state and local highway authorities.

A design standards handbook and risk analysis tools were developed by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The analysis tools produce a priority listing of the riskiest crossings. The handbook describes the options that engineers can use to reduce risks, such as installing flashing warning lights and barriers across the road. It also suggests when to consider closing or consolidating dangerous crossings. Federal money supplemented spending by railroads and state and local governments to pay for these improvements.

A public information campaign educating drivers about the risks at crossings was established in Idaho in 1972 under the name Operation Lifesaver. By 1986, the program had spread to every state.

Railways closed many unprofitable lines after they were allowed to do so by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. The reduced number of railroad miles and crossings also dropped the associated risk.

Stagnant risks to pedestrians

A similar analysis of pedestrian deaths is complicated. Pedestrian deaths occur all along the railroad and not just at crossings. Sadly, some deaths are intentional. Federal railroad officials had stopped requiring that suicides be reported in the mid-1950s and resumed doing so only in 2011.

In 1966, there were 730 nonintentional pedestrian deaths. Today, that number is roughly the same. It’s worth noting, however, that the U.S. population is 70% higher than it was in the 1960s, so the risk per person is lower.

Federal data from the past decade shows that about a quarter of the 900 annual pedestrian deaths were ruled by a coroner or medical examiner to be intentional. Coroners often lack sufficient evidence to definitively rule a suicide, so the actual proportion of pedestrians with suicidal intent is likely much higher. My own research in the Chicago area found that about half were confirmed or likely suicides.

Getting to the root cause

While the risk is down, the reduction is nowhere near as large as that of motor vehicles at crossings.

In the past decade the U.S. Department of Transportation has funded development of handbooks on the design of pedestrian crossings and interventions to mitigate risks at places away from crossings.

The latter handbook emphasizes that successful countermeasures need to be tailored to the reasons people are on the tracks in the first place. And, of course, there are many reasons.

Fencing may seem like an obvious countermeasure, but a fence does not prevent access at crossings and stations. Moreover, fences also tend to be destroyed where it is onerous to detour to a formal crossing rather than take a shortcut.

In fact, fencing can be counterproductive if it screens the railroad from public view and encourages nefarious activities, including theft, drug dealing and loitering.

Tackling intentional deaths has been challenging. Countermeasures have focused on signage providing information on mental health services and training rail workers to recognize people displaying symptoms of distress and then intervening or calling for help.

At times, tackling the root of the problem may involve land use and zoning at a local level. For example, a city might decide not to allow a convenience store to be located on the opposite side of the tracks from the population it serves. Or a city or school district might relocate transit or school bus stops to avoid the temptation to take a shortcut.

Florida railroads

South Florida faces several challenges. The primary challenge is its flat land. No hills means there is no natural grade separation between the railroad and intersecting roads and footpaths.

Elevating the railroad would be expensive and would cut communities in two. The effects of such severance should not be underestimated. In fact, the trend in recent times has been to rejoin urban neighborhoods that were bisected by interstate highway construction in the 1960s.

Another challenge comes, ironically, from the original vision behind rail travel in Florida. Standard Oil magnate Henry Flagler developed and built the Florida East Coast Railway in hopes of spurring coastal development. These days, dense communities surround the line, with housing, schools, stores and restaurants scattered on both sides of the tracks.

Development also made it less safe for motor vehicles. Main roads, such as U.S. Route 1 and Dixie Highway, were built parallel to the tracks. Over time, as these roads have become wider and busier, the cross streets have a smaller distance between the railroad and the main road. The space for vehicles waiting to turn onto the main road is limited, and the lights and gates at the railroad crossing must be coordinated with the traffic signals on the main road. This is a major challenge to the state, county and municipal traffic engineers who have inherited these complicated intersections.

It is tempting to suggest that many of these crossings should be consolidated into fewer, well-designed crossings. But this could result in unintended consequences for pedestrians. When too few crossings are available, pedestrians are more likely to take unauthorized shortcuts. Any consolidation of road crossings must be accompanied by alternative ways for pedestrians to cross the tracks safely.

It is important to keep looking for solutions to pedestrian and vehicle safety issues so that South Florida communities can be safer while enjoying the benefits that rail offers, such as reducing the number of trucks on the roads and offering an alternative to passengers who wish to avoid flying or driving on congested Interstate 95.

If you are experiencing suicidal thoughts, you can contact the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline (988) or Crisis Text Line (text “HELLO” to 741741) for immediate support.

I was a volunteer member of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine oversight committee as the 2022 “Strategies for Deterring Trespassing on Rail Transit and Commuter Rail Rights-of-Way” handbook was developed. As such we could comment on drafts but were not the authors of the report.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

Donald Trump has flagged Venezuelan drug trafficking as a key reason for the U.S. military operation on Jan. 3, 2026, that captured President Nicolás Maduro and whisked him to New York to face federal drug charges.

Trump has described Maduro as “the kingpin of a vast criminal network responsible for trafficking colossal amounts of deadly and illicit drugs into the United States.”

In 2025, the administration presented the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and repeated strikes on alleged drug trafficking vessels off Venezuela’s coast as necessary to counter the flow of cocaine into the United States.

But as an international relations scholar focused on Latin America, I know that when assessed against hard data on cocaine production and transit, the U.S. pretense for military action against Venezuela falters.

Venezuela has never been a major cocaine producer. That distinction belongs overwhelmingly to Colombia, which accounts for the vast majority of coca cultivation and cocaine processing in the Western Hemisphere.

That means the arrest of Maduro and subsequent U.S. attempts to control Venezuela’s government are unlikely to stem the influx of cocaine into the U.S.

Justifying intervention

While Venezuela’s geography and governance gaps make it a transit country for Colombian products, most U.S. cocaine originates and flows through corridors north and west of Venezuela. This contradicts the claim that Caracas was the central hub of cocaine trafficking into the United States.

Moreover, the opioid overdose crisis in the U.S. today is overwhelmingly driven by synthetic drugs such as fentanyl, which have supply chains rooted in Mexico and Asia, not Venezuela.

So why did Washington elevate Venezuela’s role in narcotics?

The answer, I believe, lies less in illicit markets than in power. By conflating criminal networks with government authority, an act amplified through legal designations and indictments, the Trump administration could justify military intervention without explicit congressional authorization.

Once Maduro was removed, the substance beneath the rhetoric became clearer. The U.S. has not turned power over to an opposition democratic coalition. Instead, it facilitated the swearing-in of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president, a figure deeply tied to the existing regime and whose network includes people long accused by U.S. authorities of illegal activities.

The release of political prisoners by the interim government and U.S. moves to reopen Venezuela’s oil sector to American interests underscore that what unfolded was not purely a counternarcotics mission but a reconfiguration of governance in Caracas.

Pretext for military action

The role of the Cartel de los Soles – or Cartel of the Suns – in this narrative deserves particular scrutiny. Originally a label for alleged trafficking networks within Venezuela’s security forces, U.S. legal indictments and terrorist designations expanded that concept. That amplified the narrative that Maduro was at the head of a transnational criminal enterprise.

In fact, the Cartel de los Soles is not a structured cartel at all. Yet the narrative of Maduro as head of a narco-terrorist empire was politically and legally potent. It provided a pretext for military action, creating a justification that could be sold domestically and internationally as an effort to defend U.S. citizens from an external criminal threat.

But the U.S. attack in Venezuela was not, in substance, a counternarcotics mission. It was a strategic economic and geopolitical operation framed in the language of law enforcement.

Two days after the Venezuela attack, the Justice Department retreated from its November 2025 claim that Maduro was the head of Cartel de los Soles, underscoring that the link between drug enforcement and regime removal was more instrumental than evidentiary.

Rodríguez said just days after the U.S. attack, “Drug trafficking and human rights were the excuse; the real motive was oil.”

No meaningful reduction

While the U.S. operation in Venezuela undoubtedly disrupted the trafficking networks that operated under Maduro’s umbrella, at least temporarily, the action cannot be convincingly framed as a drug supply intervention.

The reality of drug trafficking itself underscores this point.

Cocaine production and distribution networks are dynamic. When one route is disrupted, traffickers invariably find alternative pathways.

Routes that once used Venezuelan territory have likely rerouted rather than collapsed. This has historically characterized drug flow in Latin America in response to pressure from law enforcement.

Even if Venezuelan transit networks are briefly destabilized, there is no evidence that U.S. intervention will lead to a meaningful reduction in the volume of illegal drugs flowing into the United States. The most significant drivers of U.S. drug problems, including Mexico-based distribution systems and the surge of synthetic opioids, operate largely outside Venezuela.

The U.S. operation may benefit Venezuela politically by toppling a long-standing authoritarian figure. That opens the possibility of political change.

But if the lens through which policymakers view these events is drug policy, they are misreading both the evidence and the incentives. The action was centered on energy and strategic realignment, with counternarcotics rhetoric serving as a justification rather than a driver of the U.S. attack.

And while trafficking networks adapt and survive, these shifts will not reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, which has long been shaped by factors far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

Eduardo Gamarra does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation