Despite public support in the U.S. for deposing Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, President Donald Trump is unlikely to find that level of support for fighting an actual war in that country.
Even as Trump tries to work through Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and now the acting leader of the country, to manage Venezuela, there are echoes of President George W. Bush in Iraq with Trump saying that the United States will “run” Venezuela and “nurse it back to health” with Venezuelan oil wealth. None of that – which requires a lot of control by Washington and a major presence on the ground – can or will happen without a significant commitment of U.S. military forces, however, which Trump hasn’t ruled out.
“We’re not afraid of boots on the ground,” Trump said.
Yet U.S. citizens have been and remain deeply skeptical of military action in Venezuela. From Lyndon Johnson to George W. Bush, history shows that leaders often pay a high political price – and costs to their legacy, too – when wars they start or expand become unpopular.
As an expert on U.S. foreign policy and regime change wars, my research shows that every major U.S. war since 1900 – especially those that involved regime change – was buoyed at its outset by a big story with a grand purpose or objective. This helped galvanize national support to bear the costs of these wars.
During the Cold War, a story about the dangers of Soviet power to American democracy and the need to combat the spread of communism brought strong public support, at least initially, for wars in Korea and Vietnam, along with smaller operations in the Caribbean and Latin America.
In the 2000s and 2010s, the dominant narrative about preventing another Sept. 11 and quelling global terrorism generated strong initial public support for wars in Iraq – 70% in 2003 – and Afghanistan, 88% in 2001.
A big problem Trump now faces is that no similar story exists for Venezuela.
What national interest?
The administration’s justifications for war cover a hodgepodge of reasons, such as stopping drugs that flow almost exclusively to Europe, not the U.S.; seizing oil fields that benefit U.S. corporations but not the wider public; and somehow curtailing China’s efforts to build roads and bridges in Latin America.
All these are unrelated to any story-driven sense of collective mission or purpose. Unlike Korea or Afghanistan at the start, Americans don’t know what war in Venezuela will bring them and whether it is worth the costs.
This lack of a holistic story or broad rationale shows up in the polls. In November, only 15% of Americans saw Venezuela as a national emergency. A plurality, 45%, opposed an overthrow of Maduro. After Maduro was removed in early January 2026, Americans’ opposition to force in Venezuela grew to 52%. No rally around the flag here.
Americans also worry about where things are heading in Venezuela, with 72% saying Trump has not clearly explained plans going forward. Few want the mantle of regime change, either. Nine in 10 say Venezuelans, not the United States, should choose their next government. And more than 60% oppose additional force against Venezuela or other Latin American countries.
Only 43% of Republicans want the United States to dominate the Western Hemisphere, indicating Trump’s foreign policy vision isn’t even popular in his own party.
Overall, these numbers stand in sharp contrast to past U.S. wars bolstered by big stories, where there was generally a deep, bipartisan consensus behind using force.
For the moment, 89% of Republicans support removing Maduro. But 87% of Democrats and 58% of independents are opposed.
Reflecting the national skepticism – and in a rebuke of Trump – the U.S. Senate advanced a measure to final vote requiring Trump to get congressional approval before taking further military action in Venezuela. Five Senate Republicans joined all Democratic senators in voting for the measure.
All told, the U.S. political system is flashing red when it comes to war in Venezuela.
Hubris can turn deadly
Research shows that U.S. regime change wars almost never go as planned. Yet, the hubris of U.S. leaders sometimes causes them to ignore this fact, which can result in deadly trouble. In Iraq, influential Vice President Dick Cheney told one interviewer, “We’ll be greeted as liberators.” We weren’t, and U.S. forces got bogged down in a bloody insurgency war.
Experts say the same trouble could come in Venezuela.
David Furst/AFP via Getty Images
What might stop the United States from rolling into a deeper war that’s not in line with how the public views U.S. interests? My research shows that the answer lies with U.S. leaders taking steps to back away from owning what comes next in Venezuela.
This turns a lot on presidential rhetoric. When leaders make robust commitments to action, it often boxes them in politically later on to follow through, even if they don’t want to do so. Their words create what political scientists call “audience costs,” which are domestic political setbacks, or punishment, that leaders will face if they fail to follow through on what they promised to do.
Audience costs can even form in a case like Venezuela, because despite limited public support for force, the media along with proponents of war inside and outside government often pick up on a president’s words and produce a churning conversation. That conversation is visible now in the news cycle, with leading Republicans and other prominent voices calling for more robust action. It’s the “you broke it, you fix it” discussion.
This churn raises questions about the president’s credibility that sometimes makes leaders feel boxed in to act, even when public support is questionable.
As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama promised to devote greater attention and resources to the war in Afghanistan. When he got in office, Obama’s words came back to bite him. Political pressure generated by his campaign pledge made it almost impossible for Obama to avoid surging troops into Afghanistan at a much higher level than what he intended.
While presidents should always strive to keep the public informed of the direction policy is headed, research shows that leaders can avoid the trap of audience costs by remaining relatively vague and noncommittal, which the public now prefers, about future military actions.
On Venezuela, Trump has done some of this vague language work already by sidestepping specifics about when and if force will be used again, and by also downplaying talk of U.S.-led democracy promotion. If he stops talking about “running” Venezuela and adopts the more measured language used by advisers such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who says the goal is to “move (Venezuela) in a certain direction” but not run the country, Trump could take another step away from being boxed in to do more militarily.
Events on the ground in Venezuela might also factor into future U.S. policy. Obama would not have faced the political pressure for the surge that he did when coming to office if the Afghan war had been going in a more positive direction.
Venezuela is close to economic collapse, according to some experts, due to Caracas’ inability to reap the profits of selling oil abroad. If that happens, political chaos could follow and leave Trump, like Obama in Afghanistan, feeling lots of pressure to act militarily, especially if Trump is still saying he “runs” Venezuela.
Again, Americans don’t want that, which means taking steps, such as loosening the current oil embargo, to alleviate economic pain in Venezuela might make sense for Trump. Otherwise, if American troops are sent in by Trump and deaths mount, even a president deemed virtually untouchable by scandal and failure could find himself finally paying a political price for his decisions.
Charles Walldorf is affiliated with Defense Priorities.
Politics + Society – The Conversation
