Month: July 2026

Whether in an Oval Office proclamation signing about commercial fishing or during a Fox News interview while discussing Iran, President Donald Trump finds opportunities to share his views on transgender people.

During a June 2026 signing event, Trump claimed, in response to a question about proposed legislation regarding election procedures, called the SAVE America Act: “We are talking about saving America, right? No men in women’s sports.” He continued, “And we have no mutilization of your children for transgender purposes … where your child leaves your house, and they take your child from you. … In six states, they take the child and do what they want to do. What they do is, is I don’t even want to talk about it. No transgender mutilization of your children.”

Highlighting Trump’s ongoing use of the made-up word “mutilization,” criticism quickly followed his false claims about states forcibly transitioning children. Misrepresentations like these help fuel the transgender moral panic that Trump has provoked since he started instituting restrictions on trans people in his first term.

As a rhetoric scholar for nearly two decades, I have studied how emotions propel rhetoric that goes viral on public platforms like social media and how politicians use emotions for varying purposes, including to bolster anti-trans legislation.

Throughout the Trump administration’s second term, I’ve followed how its officials have invented threats and used provocative language and repulsive imagery to stimulate anti-trans disgust and paranoia in audiences, contributing to public misconceptions and declining support for trans rights and people.

Changing views of trans people and issues

The Trump administration’s anti-trans agenda has flourished since his first term.

Following Republicans’ US$21 million anti-trans and anti-LGBTQ advertising campaign that helped pave Trump’s way to victory in 2024, the administration and its allies have been busy. The White House has denied the existence of trans identity, and states have introduced a deluge of legislation that restricts trans people’s rights and protections, from access to healthcare to passports.

Presidential rhetoric can have a significant impact on public opinion. Since reaching a peak in the early 2020s, overall support for LGBTQ+ issues has since declined in the U.S. Likewise, surveys have shown a decline in support for trans healthcare for minors, a preference for using birth sex on IDs, and increasing support for restrictions in sports for trans people.

Meanwhile, public approval of Trump’s approach to trans issues is relatively high, as compared with his approval ratings on other issues.

A 2024 report by the Human Rights Campaign decried an “epidemic of violence” against trans and gender-expansive people. A 2025 Pew report found that 70% of trans adults have feared for their personal safety, and only 13% of LGBTQ respondents reported social acceptance of trans people.

Though the causes for changing trans views are complex, research suggests Trump’s rhetoric and policies have powerful influence, the ramifications of which are clear. Anti-LGBTQ+ laws and debates negatively affect young queer people, according to the Trevor Project’s 2025 U.S. National Survey on the Mental Health of LGBTQ+ Young People, and are associated with increased stress, discrimination and suicide attempts.

Moral panic as political strategy

From the Salem witch trials in the 17th century to the war on drugs in the 20th century, moral panics have emerged across history to stoke fear against a perceived threat to a society’s values or well-being.

Moral panics, coined by sociologist Stanley Cohen in 1972, follow a similar pattern: a threat is defined, media exaggerates the threat, public concern increases, authorities respond with laws and policies, and society is transformed.

Research on anti-trans moral panics illustrates their success in propelling anti-trans lawmaking in the U.S. and suggests they are often initiated by people with power, who use their platforms to shape public discourse.

Moral panics elicit a range of negative emotions, but disgust and paranoia are especially potent. Originally a response meant to protect us from disease and spoiled food, disgust has evolved to also express social inappropriateness. Disgust asserts that its object is inherently bad. Since disgust is culturally dependent, it can also be used to marginalize groups of people.

Meanwhile, paranoia focuses on visualizing and preparing for future threats. When experienced as an emotion – outside of psychiatric disorders – paranoia has a righteous undertone, as it seeks to uncover perceived enemies.

Disgust and paranoia are a powerful combination for sustaining moral panics. While disgust produces an intense, immediate physical feeling, paranoia is long-lasting, stewing and existential.

Stimulating disgust and paranoia

Trump’s offhand remarks often invoke disgust and paranoia against perceived enemies – for example, toward immigrants, whom he has repeatedly described as dangerous criminals. These same patterns emerge in the Trump administration’s formal communication regarding trans issues.

The March 31, 2026, White House press release “President Trump Ended Democrats’ ‘Transgender for Everybody’ Insanity,” which touts the administration’s reversal of protections for trans people, offers several examples.

The release asserts that former President Joe Biden’s 2024 Proclamation of Transgender Day of Visibility “desecrated Easter Sunday with a ‘transgender’ message that elevated radical leftist ideology over faith, family, and biological truth.” Rousing paranoia, “radical leftist ideology” (and later in the release, “gender ideology”) is portrayed as an existential threat that puts Americans and their beliefs in danger.

The release also claimed that “the Trump Administration is celebrating a decisive victory: the swift and unrelenting dismantling of subversive, woke policies that endangered children, eroded women’s rights, assaulted common sense, and dragged America toward moral and cultural decline.”

As a rhetoric scholar, I read these allusions to religion and war – using words like “desecrate” and “victory,” respectively – as implications that the U.S. is in a battle between good and evil. Schools, hospitals, bathrooms, locker rooms, sports facilities and military bases are spaces declared under attack.

The release also condemns “the chemical and surgical mutilation of minors” and “child mutilation programs” – revolting imagery that misleadingly depicts gender-affirming care and incites shock, concern and disgust.

Similarly, invoking images of nonconsenting, victimized children and women, the release denounces “the un-American indoctrination of schoolchildren” and “the unfair, demeaning practice of forcing women to compete against biological men in sports.” Stimulating anger and moral panic, these descriptions encourage anti-trans views and discrimination.

Recognizing these rhetorical patterns is key to understanding how politicians use inflammatory language to denigrate trans people and other marginalized groups, including women, Black people and immigrants.

Julie D. Nelson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation

In recent years, a growing number of elected officials have questioned or outright denied the results of elections, sought to undermine freedom of speech, and attempted to bend electoral rules to benefit themselves.

Only a sliver of Americans say they support these kinds of antidemocratic actions. For example, just 8% of Americans support making it harder for their political opponents to vote.

So how do politicians who espouse antidemocratic views continue to win elections if these policies are so unpopular?

As scholars affiliated with the Rooney Democracy Institute at the University of Notre Dame, we analyzed surveys of over 48,000 Americans conducted by YouGov, NORC at the University of Chicago and Bovitz between September 2022 and July 2025 to try to get an answer.

A key finding emerged: A significant swath of Americans were actually indifferent toward antidemocratic practices.

This is an important distinction. Prior research tended to assume that if a person doesn’t support antidemocratic practices, then they must oppose antidemocratic practices. In other words, if only 8% of the public supports making it harder for political opponents to vote, then roughly 92% of Americans must oppose making it harder for opponents to vote.

However, our research shows that there is actually a big chunk of Americans – at times a proportion as large as 52% of voters – who neither support nor oppose antidemocratic practices. While only a small number of Americans outright support violating core democratic norms, many Americans express no opinion about politicians who undermine democracy.

We call this attitude toward antidemocratic practices “democratic neutrality,” and we believe it’s an overlooked and understudied threat to democracy.

Ambivalence is not the same as opposition

We see democratic neutrality as key to explaining the success of antidemocratic politicians in America.

To illustrate: Only about 1 in 10 Americans agree that politicians should be loyal to their political party over the Constitution. But politicians who flout constitutional norms have won races at all levels of the government.

Dozens of Republicans won 2026 primary elections despite continuing to reject the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. The group includes Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, who asked the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate the certified election results in four states won by Joe Biden. In May 2026, Paxton defeated incumbent GOP Senator John Cornyn to become the party’s nominee.

We show that this apparent contradiction has a straightforward explanation.

Around 25% of the public expresses neutrality when asked whether politicians should be more loyal to their party or the Constitution. When those who prioritize their party over the Constitution and those who are neutral toward the idea are considered together, more than one-third of Americans are open to voting for a politician who prioritizes partisan, rather than constitutional, loyalty.

One-third of the population is more than enough to win a partisan primary. And given the deeply polarized political climate and declining electoral competition in the U.S. – including increases in gerrymandered legislative districts – winning a partisan primary is often tantamount to electoral victory.

The prevalence of democratic neutrality is troubling because in survey experiments with hypothetical candidates, most Americans who express neutrality toward antidemocratic policies vote the same way as the small number of Americans who outright support antidemocratic policies.

We were also able to show that when candidates for elected office take antidemocratic stances, only Americans who explicitly oppose antidemocratic practices punish those candidates at the ballot box. Americans who are neutral toward or supportive of antidemocratic practices do not.

When we accounted for neutrality across multiple antidemocratic practices, from political violence to voter suppression, the picture became even more dire. Nearly two-thirds of Americans express neutrality or support for some form of antidemocratic practice.

In other words, a clear majority of the public is willing to tolerate a politician who undermines core aspects of American democracy.

Neutrality is not a passive stance

Using what’s called regression analysis, we were able to dig deeper into the behaviors and attitudes associated with democratic neutrality. We found that democratic neutrality appears to be tied to a variety of factors.

Some Americans appear willing to tolerate politicians undermining democracy if it means those politicians enact policies they support. Others seem ambivalent about democracy, indifferent to the issue or unsure what qualifies as an antidemocratic policy. And consistent with prior research, some people may actually support antidemocratic policies but express neutrality because of social pressure.

Regardless of why Americans express neutrality, those who do so are just as likely to vote for authoritarian politicians as the relatively small number of Americans who explicitly support undemocratic practices in some form.

Our research indicates that fringe extremists and the few politicians who actively promote authoritarian ideas are not solely to blame for America’s democratic troubles.

The millions of Americans who simply remain neutral when democracy is threatened are a greater threat to the country’s system of government. These democratically neutral voters are, in our view, complicit in the continued erosion of democratic norms in the U.S, even if they do not openly express support for antidemocratic policies.

Indeed, our research indicates that neutrality is not a passive stance. Preventing further democratic erosion requires voters to reject candidates who undermine basic democratic principles, even – and especially – if they are candidates from one’s own party. As former President Theodore Roosevelt warned, “… to be neutral between right and wrong is to serve wrong.”

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

​Politics + Society – The Conversation